Women and Justice: Keywords

The defendant, a boy under the age of 18 (juvenile: 16-18 years), committed lewd acts against a girl under the age of 14 (minor). The first-instance court imposed a punishment of five years imprisonment (Part 2 of Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - Criminal Code). However, the court of first instance released the defendant from serving a sentence and instead imposed a probationary period of two years (Articles 75, 104 of the Criminal Code). The Court of Appeal left the decision unchanged. The victim's representative demanded a review of the case due to the mildness of the punishment, failure to take into account the gravity of the crime, and aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (Articles 50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The sentence must be based on the principles of proportionality and individualization, the type and size of the punishment should correspond to the nature of the crime, its dangerousness, and the identity of the perpetrator. When choosing a coercive measure (enforcement), the mitigating circumstances (sincere remorse and the commission of the crime by a minor) and aggravating circumstances (not established during the trial) are essential considerations. An individual analysis of the situation showed a low risk of committing a repeated criminal offense. The Supreme Court found that the defendant presented a low risk for re-offending because the defendant was a child under 18 who, according to psychological analysis, was capable of re-education, moreover it was the first offense he committed, and he sincerely repented. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the victim’s petition to increase the sentence. This case is important because it shows the principle of proportionality and efficiency of punishment, and emphasizes the importance of preventing unreasonably heavier punishment.

Особа, що не досягла 18 років, (неповнолітня: 16-18 років) вчинила розпусні дії щодо особи, яка не досягла 14 років (малолітньої особи). Суд першої інстанції призначив покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 5 років (ч.2 ст. 156 КК), але засудженого було звільнено від відбування покарання з випробуванням з іспитовим строком тривалістю 2 роки (ст. 75, 104 КК). Апеляційний суд залишив рішення без змін. Представник постраждалої особи вимагав перегляду справи через м’якість покарання, неврахування тяжкості злочину та обтяжуючих обставин. Верховний суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, повинно бути призначено покарання, необхідне й достатнє для її виправлення та попередження вчинення нових злочинів (ст. 50, 65 КК ); виходячи із принципів співмірності й індивідуалізації покарання за своїм видом та розміром має бути адекватним (відповідним) характеру вчинених дій, їх небезпечності та даним про особу винного. При виборі заходу примусу мають значення й повинні братися до уваги обставини, які його пом'якшують (щире каяття та вчинення злочину неповнолітнім) та обтяжують (в ході судового розгляду не встановлено). Індивідуальний аналіз ситуації показав, що ризик вчинення повторного кримінального правопорушення низький, а тому перевиховання засудженого без ізоляції від суспільства цілком можливе, тому вимоги представника постраждалої особи не були задоволені. Ця справа є важливою, бо показує дію принципу пропорційності покарання злочину і недопущення необґрунтовано більш тяжкого покарання.

The complainant visited the gynecologist for an abortion. In the process, the doctor damaged the complainant’s uterus, bladder, and intestines. The complainant needed surgery to repair the damage and lost the ability to bear children. During the court hearing, the State’s forensic medical examiner found that the doctor did not violate medical protocols. The examiner also found that the doctor's actions did not cause the complainant’s organ damage, and that the accident occurred due to the peculiarities of the complainant’s body. The court of first instance found the doctor not guilty, taking into account the doctor's impressive professional qualifications. The prosecutor filed an appeal, but later refused to continue because of insufficient evidence of the doctor’s guilt. This case is important because it shows the difficulty in gathering evidence in criminal cases related to abortion and the protection of women's reproductive rights. One of the reasons for this is the lack of an independent forensic medical examination in Ukraine, as well as falsification of medical documentation.

Скаржниця звернулася до гінеколога для проведення аборту. При цьому лікар пошкодила скаржниці матку, сечовий міхур і кишечник. Скаржниця потребувала операції, щоб усунути пошкодження, і вона втратила здатність народжувати дітей. Під час судового засідання державна судово-медична експертиза встановила, що лікар не порушував медичних протоколів. Експерт також встановив, що дії лікаря не спричинили ушкодження органів скаржника, а нещасний випадок стався через особливості організму скаржника. Суд першої інстанції визнав лікаря невинним, враховуючи високу професійну кваліфікацію лікаря. Прокурор подав апеляцію, але пізніше відмовилася підтримувати обвинувачення через брак доказів провини лікаря. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки показує складність збору доказів у кримінальних справах щодо абортів та захисту репродуктивних прав жінок. Однією з причин цього є відсутність в Україні незалежної судово-медичної експертизи, а також фальсифікація медичної документації.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.

Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої ​​частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.

The two defendants were charged with raping the complainant. The court of first instance sentenced the first defendant to four years of imprisonment, but discharged him from punishment on probation. The court acquitted the second defendant due to lack of evidence. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the prosecution had sufficiently proven the guilt of the acquitted defendant. The prosecutor argued that discharging the first man from punishment on probation did not correspond to the gravity of the crime. Thus, the prosecutor asked the Court of Appeal to re-evaluate the matter and sentence both men to imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. However, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions and assigned new proceeding, due to the need to impose a more severe punishment in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal did not properly examine and evaluate the prosecutor’s arguments and evidence.

Двох підсудних було обвинувачено у зґвалтуванні скаржниці. Суд першої інстанції засудив першого обвинуваченого до чотирьох років позбавлення волі, але звільнив його від покарання з випробуванням. Другого обвинуваченого суд виправдав за браком доказів. Прокурор подав апеляційну скаргу, стверджуючи, що стороною обвинувачення надано достатньо доказів для доведення вини виправданого обвинуваченого. Прокурор стверджував, що звільнення першого обвинуваченого від покарання з випробуванням не відповідає тяжкості злочину. Таким чином, прокурор просив апеляційний суд переглянути справу та призначити обом чоловікам покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк 10 років. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок суду першої інстанції без змін. Однак, Верховний Суд скасував рішення судів попередніх інстанцій і відправив справу на новий розгляд в суд апеляційної інстанції у зв’язку з необхідністю призначити більш суворе покарання відповідно до закону. На думку Верховного Суду, суд апеляційної інстанції належним чином не перевірив і не оцінив доводи прокурора та докази.

The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that a third party staged the crime scene and placed his property there; sexual intercourse with the first woman was consensual; and the forensic medical examination confirmed that the appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized that the conclusions of the lower courts regarding the appellant’s guilt were based on their careful examination of the evidence (e.g., the appellant’s property near the corpses indicated that he was at the place of the crimes; forensic medical examinations found traces of a man's DNA on the bodies). Accordingly, the Supreme Court left the sentence of life imprisonment unchanged. This decision is important because it demonstrates that serving a prison sentence may not deter persons who commit sex crimes from re-offending after their release from custody.

Cкаржник був засуджений судом першої інстанції за вбивство та зґвалтування однієї жінки, а також вбивство та замах на зґвалтування іншої жінки. Враховуючи те, що чоловік раніше був судимий за аналогічні злочини, суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді довічного позбавлення волі. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін. Адвокат скаржника подав до Верховного Суду касаційну скаргу, в якій просив суд скасувати вирок та закрити кримінальне провадження через недостатність доказів. Зокрема, скаржник стверджував, що третя сторона влаштувала інсценування злочину та розмістила там його майно; статевий акт з першою жінкою був за її згодою; і судово-медична експертиза підтвердила, що скаржник не вступав у статеві зносини з іншою жінкою. Верховний Суд підкреслив, що висновки судів попередніх інстанцій щодо винуватості скаржника ґрунтувалися на ретельному дослідженні доказів (наприклад, майно скаржника поблизу трупів вказувало на те, що він був на місці злочинів; судово-медичні експертизи виявили сліди ДНК чоловіка на тілах). Відповідно, Верховний Суд залишив без змін покарання у вигляді довічного ув'язнення. Це рішення є важливим, оскільки воно демонструє, що відбування покарання не може стримувати осіб, які вчинили сексуальні злочини, від повторного вчинення злочину після звільнення з-під варти.

The case concerned domestic violence and resulted in a one-year prison sentence pursuant to article 229 of the Criminal Code. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the police, alleging that three days earlier, at approximately 6:00 A.M., her husband punched her and threated to kill her during an argument. The evidence showed that this violence was not an isolated incident, but part of continuous behavior of the defendant. The Court held that the physical and psychological violence suffered by the victim in the household shall include any conduct that by action or omission is intended to cause harm or pain. Witness testimony proved that the defendant deliberately used threats and intimidation to control and manipulate his wife. Therefore, the defendant was convicted for domestic violence.

El caso se basó en violencia doméstica y resultó en una pena de prisión de un año de conformidad con el artículo 229 del Código Penal. La demandante presentó una denuncia ante la policía, alegando que tres días antes, aproximadamente a las 6:00 a. m., su esposo la golpeó y la amenazó de muerte durante una discusión. La evidencia mostró que esta violencia no fue un incidente aislado, sino parte de un comportamiento continuo del acusado. La Corte sostuvo que la violencia física y psíquica que sufre la víctima en el ámbito doméstico comprende toda conducta que por acción u omisión tenga por objeto causar daño o dolor. El testimonio de los testigos demostró que el acusado usó deliberadamente amenazas e intimidación para controlar y manipular a su esposa. Por lo tanto, el acusado fue condenado por violencia doméstica.

The appellant challenged his concurrent sentences for six violations of the Trafficking in Persons Act as manifestly excessive. The sentences ranged from 10-14 years of imprisonment including hard labor. The maximum penalty for a standard count of trafficking under article 14 of the Act is 14 years, the maximum penalty for trafficking children under 18 years is 21 years (article 15), and article 16 lists aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty for human trafficking to life imprisonment. The appellate court found that the lower court had inaccurately noted which charges corresponded with each victim, which resulted in confusing and improper sentencing decisions. First, the trial court erroneously sentenced the appellant for article 14 trafficking for Counts 1, 2, 5, and 6, but the victims were children and thus these charges should have been sentenced with reference to article 15’s 21 year maximum. In another error regarding Counts 3 and 4, the trial court found the appellant guilty of trafficking an adult of unsound mind in violation of article 16(1)(c), but the conviction should have been for article 14 trafficking of an adult because the adult victim was of sound mind. Ultimately the appellate court affirmed four of the six sentences related to trafficking children because the aggravating factors meant that those maximum penalties for were substantially longer than 14 years, rendering these sentences judicious. For the erroneous article 16 convictions, the appellate court substituted two article 14 convictions and imposed a substitute sentence of 10 years for each count to run concurrently. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the sentences were manifestly excessive because they were well below the maximum available sentences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to raping and impregnating a 12-year-old girl for which he was originally sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labor. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentence was excessive in light of mitigating factors. While recognizing the victim’s age and pregnancy as aggravating factors, the appeals court reduced his sentence to nine years imprisonment. The court articulated several rules regarding mitigation in favor of this outcome based on the citation of cases from the appellant. First, the court stated that guilty pleas should reduce a sentence by one-third, even in the case of serious crimes. Second, citing in Rep v. Bamusi Mkwapatira, the court stated that all first-time offenders, regardless of the severity of the offense, should benefit from mitigation. Finally, the court identified the appellant, who was 33 years old at the time of the offense, as “youthful,” asserting that “men especially grow slowly mentally and at 35 they are at their prime experimenting with life.” Cautioning against mitigating too significantly, however, the court explicitly recognized the victim’s pregnancy, which “disturbed [her] life […] physically and psychologically,” and her very young age as aggravating factors. Thus, the court reduced the sentence by one-quarter, resulting in a nine-year sentence, rather than one-third or more.

The defendant was accused of murdering his wife and sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment, in addition to paying of kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 million kwanzas, i.e. approximately US$ 2,300) to the victim’s family, plus court expenses. The prosecution (Ministério Público) then appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that, in accordance with the court’s own jurisprudence, the compensation amount should be risen to kz. 2.000.00,00, i.e. the equivalent of US$ 3,100. It argued that, as shown by the evidence, the accused had tried to have sexual relations with his wife and, when she declined, beat her in front of their two underage children. When she tried to escape, the defendant stabbed her in the back with a “homemade knife” multiple times, which killed her. The accused fled to the woods, while their nine-year-old daughter went to get help. The Supreme Court reasoned that, although the object used to stab the victim had not been examined, there was no doubt as to the fact that it was used to injure the victim and caused her death. Furthermore, in agreement with the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had undoubtedly committed the crime of which he was accused, noting that he confessed to it during police interrogations. The defendant’s motive was also considered as particularly vile (i.e., as his attempt of sexual intercourse was simply frustrated) and his intent was proven by the predictability of death as a direct consequence of his actions. The appeal was, therefore, granted by the Supreme Court, increasing the compensation amount to the family’s victim to the requested amount.

O réu foi acusado de matar sua esposa e sentenciado a 18 anos de prisão, em adição ao pagamento de kz. 1.500.000,00 (1.5 milhões de kwanzas, i.e. aproximadamente US$2,300) para a família da vítima, além dos gastos com o tribunal. A acusação (Ministério Público) então apelou para o Tribunal Supremo alegando que, de acordo com a jurisprudência da própria corte, o valor da compensação deve aumentar para kz. 2.000.000,000, i.e. o equivalente a US$3,100. Ele afirmou que, como mostrado pela evidência, o acusado tentou ter relações sexuais com a sua esposa e, quando ela negou, ele bateu nela na frente das suas duas crianças menores de idade. Quando ela tentou escapar, o réu esfaqueou ela nas costas com uma “faca caseira” por múltiplas vezes, o que a matou. O acusado fugiu para a floresta, enquanto a sua filha de nove anos de idade foi buscar ajuda. O Tribunal Supremo raciocinou que, ainda que o objeto usado para esfaquear a vítima não tenha sido examinado, não restou dúvida sobre o fato dele ter sido usado para machucar a vítima e causar a sua morte. Além disso, de acordo com a decisão da corte inferior, o Tribunal Supremo sustentou que o réu sem dúvidas cometeu o crime pelo qual ele foi acusado, já que ele confessou o crime durante interrogações policiais. O motivo do réu também foi considerado particularmente vil (i.e. já que a sua tentativa de relação sexual simplesmente foi frustrada) e a sua intenção foi provada pela previsibilidade da morte como consequência direta das suas ações. A apelação foi, assim, acolhida pelo Tribunal Supremo, aumentando a indenização para a família da vítima para o valor requerido.

The defendant appealed from a lower court decision convicting him to 12 years of imprisonment for committing the crimes of domestic violence, child mistreatment and sexual abuse, and aggravated coercion. The defendant sought to reduce his sentence, arguing that the lower court erred in applying the law to the facts, since there was no evidence that his actions could be characterized as domestic violence. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra denied the appeal, concluding that the record demonstrated that defendant had treated his spouse inhumanely over the years, through repeated physical, psychological, and moral humiliations and aggressions. The Court of Appeals did not find the 12-year imprisonment sentencing excessive, noting that the defendant’s overall conduct was particularly egregious and manifestly inconsistent with the social values that criminal law seeks to protect (sexual self-determination and human dignity).

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instância, o qual o condenou a 12 anos de prisão pelos crimes de violência doméstica, maus-tratos e sexual abuso contra seus filhos e coerção agravada. O Defendente buscou no recurso a redução da sua pena, sob a justificativa de que a decisão em 1ª instância errou ao aplicar a lei aos fatos, em razão da inexistência de provas que caracterizariam o crime de violência doméstica. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra negou provimento ao recurso, concluindo que as provas nos autos demonstravam que o Defendente tratava sua esposa de forma desumana ao longo dos anos, a partir de repetidas humilhações e agressões verbais, físicas, psicológicas e morais. Além disso, o Tribunal entendeu correta a aplicação de pena de 12 anos de prisão, ressaltando que a conduta do Defendente foi particularmente grave e manifestamente inconsistente com os valores sociais que o direito penal procura proteger (autonomia sexual e dignidade humana).

The respondent was convicted of two charges of defilement of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment even though the maximum punishment for each charge was life imprisonment. The Attorney General of Kiribati appealed this sentence as “manifestly inadequate.” The Court of Appeal of Kiribati allowed the appeal and delineated the proper framework for sentencing in the context of this offense. First, the court noted that the minimum sentence for defilement should be five years and that any aggravating or mitigating factors must be accounted for in the final sentencing decision. Second, a court must make an upward adjustment for any aggravating factors external to the criminal act such as a person’s relevant criminal record. Third, a court should allow a reduction of the sentence where there are mitigating factors, such as guilty pleas, expressions of genuine remorse, prior good character, cooperation with police, or the youth of the offender. Fourth, a court should reduce the sentence based on the amount of time the offender spent in custody prior to sentencing. Finally, where a sentence would be less than two years, the court should consider a suspended sentence. Considering the aggravating factor of the multiple instances of sexual abuse against the victim and the mitigating factor of the respondent’s record of past good character, the court found the initial sentence manifestly inadequate and adjusted it to six years and six months imprisonment.

The Criminal Trial Court issued a condemnatory sentence against the defendants for the repeated rape of their daughter and for other sexual crimes, including sexual abuse of a minor of less than 14 years of age and production of child pornography. The defendants sought to reverse the judgment, alleging that the Trial Court failed to consider the mental disabilities of one of the perpetrators and erred by failing to consider a lesser sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the failure of the Trial Court to consider the mental disability of the defendant was an error and should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the mother should have been charged solely as an accomplice because she had also actively participated in photographing the sexual abuse of the victim. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely in respect to the sentencing calculation, as the crimes were of the same nature and, therefore, the Trial Court should have granted a lesser sentence. (External Link leads to the website of the Chilean Judicial System. This case is available by searching by the case number.)

El Tribunal Penal de Primera Instancia dictó sentencia condenatoria contra los imputados por la violación reiterada de su hija y por otros delitos sexuales, incluido el abuso sexual de un menor de 14 años y la producción de pornografía infantil. Los acusados ​​buscaron revocar la sentencia, alegando que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no consideró la discapacidad mental de uno de los imputados y cometió un error al no considerar una sentencia menor. El Tribunal de Apelaciones sostuvo que el hecho de que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia no tuviera en cuenta la discapacidad mental del acusado fue un error y debería haber sido considerado como una circunstancia atenuante en la sentencia. La Corte de Apelaciones rechazó el argumento de que la madre debería haber sido acusada únicamente como cómplice porque también había participado activamente en la fotografía del abuso sexual de la víctima. La Corte de Apelaciones revocó la sentencia únicamente en lo que respecta al cálculo de la sentencia, ya que los delitos eran de la misma naturaleza y, por lo tanto, la Corte de Primera Instancia debería haber dictado una sentencia menor. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial de Chile. Este caso está disponible buscando por el número de caso).

The accused was charged with conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in violation of section 260.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. She pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, facing charges that she had recruited four women from Malaysia to work at a brothel. The victims entered Australia on student visas, were forced to repay AUD 5,000 each, and were not permitted to leave the brothel until they repaid that amount. The accused also threatened the women with physical violence and deportation. The Court found the work that the women were forced to perform, including being paraded in front of potential customers wearing numbers for identification, was demeaning and dehumanizing. The Court found the accused guilty on all seven counts and sentenced her to six years’ imprisonment.

This was an appeal from convictions for violations of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995, which generally prohibits forced labor. The two appellants, a married couple, ran various brothels in Sydney where five Thai women were sex workers. Four of the Thai women, while still in Thailand, signed contracts agreeing to provide sexual services in Australia. The contracts obligated each of them to repay approximately AUD 45,000 before they could keep any of their earnings. Four of the five women paid the AUD 45,000, and then continued working at the brothels. There was no dispute that the women worked in the brothels; the dispute was whether they had been subjected to sexual servitude. Following a trial, the defendants were convicted of conducting a business involving sexual servitude and sentenced to five years’ and four years’ imprisonment, respectively. Both appealed their convictions on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury on the fault element of the offense, and that their sentences were excessive. The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the convictions.

After pleading guilty to defensive homicide and being sentenced, the applicant appealed her sentence. The applicant’s violent and abusive partner, Mr. Mifsud, had compelled the applicant to kill the victim, Mr. Nankervis, by threatening to kill her family unless she killed Mr. Nankervis. The sentencing judge described the applicant’s offense as a “very grave example” of defensive homicide on the basis that Mr. Nankervis was innocent, Mr. Mifsud was absent at the time of the killing so the applicant could have gone to the police, and because the attack on Mr. Nankervis was extremely violent and disturbing. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentence (10 years imprisonment) imposed by the judge was manifestly excessive. The Court of Appeal had regard to the litany of cruel, humiliating, and violent acts that Mr. Mifsud had subjected the applicant to throughout their 12-month relationship, and Mr. Mifsud’s substantial criminal history. The Court of Appeal also considered the applicant’s youth (she was 19 at the time of the offense), her contrition in pleading guilty, and the effect of the violence on her state of mind, which made it “exceptionally difficult” for her to resist the requests of those in positions of influence. The Court of Appeal found that there was no basis for drawing an adverse inference from the disproportionate violence used to kill Mr. Nankervis. Instead, against the background of family violence, the violence was indicative of the applicant’s fear that Mr. Mifsud would kill her family.

The defendant had been found guilty of murdering his estranged wife in her home. This decision concerned his sentence. The court noted that “family violence” or “gender-based violence” are not separate crimes, but instead categorical descriptions of the relevant crime (here, murder), and that standard sentencing principles apply. The court condemned “family violence in the strongest possible terms” and stressed that general deterrence, denunciation, and just punishment were strong sentencing considerations. In accordance with the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the court considered factors such as the gravity of the offense of murder, the premeditated nature of the offense, as well as the trauma that the victim’s death had imposed upon her family members and friends. The court also gave weight to the fact that a family-violence intervention order had been in place for the victim’s safety, and that the defendant showed no remorse and maintained his innocence. The court discussed the approach adopted by the police and the courts in relation to family violence, and noted that the evolution of society’s values in relation to the treatment of women must be taken into account in sentencing. The court sentenced the defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment (without parole-eligibility for 25 years).

The defendant was charged with murder by stabbing the deceased woman. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused had stalked the deceased for days, at school and at home, and he had threatened to kill the deceased. Four days before the murder, the deceased, her father, and her brother visited the home of the defendant and his brother, with whom the defendant lived, about the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. Witnesses testified that the defendant became angry at the accusations and falsely accused the deceased of following him. After, the defendant’s brother agreed, as the defendant’s guardian, to stop the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. At the murder scene, a road near the entrance to the deceased’s school, the police recovered the murder weapon, a bloody knife. After the murder, the defendant attempted suicide and was taken to a hospital where doctors found photographs of the deceased and a note indicating that the accused had pledged himself to commit suicide and to cause the death of the deceased at the same time. Based on the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.

A man was sentenced to nine years in prison in the Skane and Blekinge Court of Appeal for approximately 100 cases of rape and other sexual offenses against a child over the course of five years. The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that when assessing the penalty value for repeated serious sexual offenses against the same plaintiff, the court must weigh the connection between the crimes and their characteristics. When the perpetrator has committed crimes for a long time against the same person, the victim is often vulnerable and in a constrained situation. There is therefore particular reason to consider the effects of the crime on the victim. Considering these factors, the Supreme Court increased the sentence to 12 years' imprisonment.

Four defendants were charged with War Crimes against the Civilian Population in violation of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo and the Geneva Conventions, for variously beating “A” and “B,” both Kosovar Albanian female civilians, raping A, and subjecting them to a mock execution. All the defendants were acquitted by the Basic Court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Basic Court’s acquittal of two of the defendants as the victims could not positively testify about their participation, and no other evidence conclusively linked them to the crimes. However, the panel held that the lower court failed to fully adjudicate the mock execution charge. It also dismissed as “incomprehensible” the first instance court’s ruling that there was no credible evidence that the victims had direct contact with S.S. (one of the remaining defendants who allegedly beat them), noting the victims’ testimony indicated they were certain of the identity of the defendant. The tribunal held that the lower court’s refusal to allow an in-court identification of S.S. was a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code. While the appellate court agreed that witness identification should be approached with great caution, here the victims had the opportunity to see the defendant clearly for an extended time. The panel disagreed that witness testimonies are by default unreliable, explaining that they are entitled to the same evidentiary value and analysis as any other evidence and in certain cases the victim’s testimony is the only available evidence. The appellate court then pointed out the lower court’s contradiction with regard to the rape charge: it accepted that A was kidnapped, and also that there were intercourses while she was in captivity, yet then assumed that the intercourses may have occurred with consent, only because A and H.2. (the defendant accused of raping her), had an earlier intimate relationship. The tribunal held that it was absurd to assume that someone in captivity would be able to validly express consent, and even if A did consent due to the Stockholm Syndrome, a traumatic bonding of that kind would be a psychological condition and “any consent expressed by a victim in such circumstances would hardly be considered legally valid.” The appellate court further ruled that the events took place during a war, and consent in such a coercive environment would be “void by default,” citing the definition of rape in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. On the question of whether H.2.’s actions constituted a war crime, the panel held that it was irrelevant whether he had any association with the military. The relevant factors were instead whether there was an ongoing armed conflict, whether it was governed by international or domestic conflict norms, whether the victims were protected persons under international law, and whether there was a causal link between the armed conflict and the offense. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Basic Court to clarify facts on the mock execution and the involvement of H.2. in the alleged rape, and to conduct an in-court identification of S.S. (Also available in English.)

The defendant husband held enduring suspicions that the late victim, his wife, was involved in an extramarital affair, and required her to seek permission to leave their home without his or their children’s accompaniment. The victim one day attempted to leave the house without the defendant’s permission, resulting in an argument in which he shot and killed her. The defendant was charged with Aggravated Murder under Article 147 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, found guilty, and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the offense is Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress (Art. 148) rather than Aggravated Murder, because he at the time of the shooting had reacted to the victim’s insult and did not act out of jealousy. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and ruled that the court of first instance correctly qualified the crime as Aggravated Murder rather than Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress. The court reasoned that the offense of Murder Committed in a State of Mental Distress did not apply because Article 148 requires that the mental distress happen through no fault of the accused, whereas in this case the victim’s insult was a reaction to the defendant’s previous false accusations, personal offenses, and even physical mistreatment. The tribunal further held that the court of first instance correctly found that the defendant had killed his wife for base motives as required for Aggravated Murder under Article 147, explaining that the defendant did not only kill his wife out of jealousy, but also because she had “dared” to attempt to leave the house without his permission. This reaction demonstrates the defendant’s belief that he was entitled to decide his wife’s right to exist, a “ruthlessly selfish concept” that showed “utmost disrespect for the natural right of another human being to live and is as such a base motive.” Accordingly, the sentence was appropriate. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was arrested for being suspected of touching a female police officer’s shoulder and trying to kiss her, and charged with Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession pursuant to Article 200 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and attempt to commit such an offense, among other crimes. The municipal court found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years and four months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for three years. The district court rejected the charge of Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession, and reduced the sentence to 12 months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for two years. Thereafter, the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality against the lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the lower courts unlawfully convicted him of attempted Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession. The defendant argued that an attempt requires the offender to intentionally take immediate action toward the commission of the offense. Here, the commencing of the criminal offense was not proven because there was no action manifesting a sexual purpose behind his touching. The Supreme Court held the defendant’s claim was unfounded, pointing out that Article 200’s text states only “[w]hoever touches another person for a sexual purpose.” Here, the defendant not only touched the victim but also tried to kiss her, and was prevented from kissing her mouth only by the victim’s resistance. Hence, the defendant did not commit an attempt, but in fact completed the offense. The court, however, determined that the principle of reformatio in peius (prohibiting placing the appellant in a worse position after appeal) barred it from changing the lower courts’ qualification of the criminal offense. The court additionally rejected the defendant’s argument that the attempt in this case was not punishable, determining that an attempt to commit Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession was punishable under the Criminal Code. (Also available in English.)

The defendant pleaded guilty to having sexual intercourse with his daughter, a minor. The daughter became pregnant as a result and the child was adopted.. The judge commended the daughter for reporting the offense, despite the defendant’s attempt to persuade her not to. The defendant was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison.

The Trial Court of Tacuarembó sentenced AA to 12 months in prison for domestic violence, deemed as aggravated because the victim was a woman. AA and the victim had been living together in a common law marriage since 2000. In 2002 the victim reported on several occasions multiple instances of physical abuse and of psychological violence. In September 2003, the victim filed a complaint against AA for injuries inflicted to her neck and arm, which were verified by a public health doctor. The couple reconciled, but thereafter got separated again. On January 1, 2004 the victim was on her way to visit a friend when AA intercepted her on the street and forcibly grabbed her left arm while pressing a ring against her mouth until he broke her front tooth. Between December 2003 and January 2004 the victim had also reported several threats and aggressions from AA. AA appealed to the Appeals Court. The Court dismissed the appeal affirming the decision of the Trial Court and ruling that the 12-month sentence was appropriate considering the evidence presented and AA’s dangerous personality.

El tribunal de primera instancia de Tacuarembó condenó a AA a 12 meses de prisión por violencia doméstica, lo que se consideró agravado porque la víctima era una mujer. AA y la víctima habían estado viviendo juntas en un matrimonio de hecho desde 2000. En 2002, la víctima denunció en varias ocasiones múltiples casos de abuso físico y violencia psicológica. En septiembre de 2003, la víctima presentó una denuncia contra AA por las lesiones infligidas en su cuello y brazo, que fueron verificadas por un médico de salud pública. La pareja se reconcilió, pero luego se separaron nuevamente. El 1 de enero de 2004, la víctima se dirigía a visitar a una amiga cuando AA la interceptó en la calle y la agarró por la fuerza del brazo izquierdo mientras presionaba un anillo contra su boca hasta que le rompió el diente frontal. Entre diciembre de 2003 y enero de 2004, la víctima también había denunciado varias amenazas y agresiones de AA. AA apeló ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones. El Tribunal desestimó la apelación afirmando la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia y resolvió que la sentencia de 12 meses era apropiada considerando las pruebas presentadas y la personalidad peligrosa de AA.

The Trial Court sentenced the 28-year-old accused (AA) to seven years and six months in prison for the crimes of rape, kidnapping and robbery. On March 27, 2011, AA approached the 18-year-old victim (BB) at a bus station and threatened her with a knife. BB offered him money, but AA put a knife to her throat and took her to a nearby field where he sexually assaulted her several times during the night, hit her repeatedly, and videotaped the sexual assault with his cellphone. AA then tied up BB and, before leaving her in the field, used BB’s cellphone to text her mother the location where BB could be found. He stole the cellphone and sold it at a fair. On July 22, 2011, AA was arrested. The police found in his possession a memory card with pornography and the video of BB’s rape. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court amended the qualification of the crimes to aggravated and rendered opinion that the sentence imposed by the Trial Court should have been more severe due to the proven dangerous nature of AA.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) de 28 años a siete años y seis meses de prisión por los delitos de violación, secuestro y robo. El 27 de marzo de 2011, AA se acercó a la víctima que tenía 18 años (BB) en una estación de autobuses y la amenazó con un cuchillo. BB le ofreció dinero, pero AA le puso un cuchillo en la garganta y la llevó a un campo cercano donde la agredió sexualmente varias veces durante la noche, la golpeó repetidamente y grabó en video la agresión sexual con su teléfono celular. AA luego ató a BB y, antes de dejarla en el campo, usó el teléfono celular de BB para enviarle un mensaje de texto a su madre sobre el lugar donde se podía encontrar a BB. Robó el teléfono celular y lo vendió en una feria. El 22 de julio de 2011, AA fue arrestado. La policía encontró en su poder una tarjeta de memoria con pornografía y el video de la violación de BB. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones modificó la calificación de los delitos a agravada y emitió una opinión de que la sentencia impuesta por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia debería haber sido más severa debido a la naturaleza peligrosa comprobada de AA.

The appellant advertised in Korea for families to come to Australia to attend a missionary school. The appellant was responsible for settling those families’ affairs, and they were dependent on him to organize the necessary extensions of visas. Most of the time, the parents spoke no English and their children spoke little English. The appellant organized accommodation for the parents of the complainant among other families, and at the same time he arranged for separate accommodation for their daughter with children of other families. The accommodation for the daughter was close to the appellant’s house, but an hour’s drive from her parents’ house. The appellant was the only individual who had the keys to the children’s rooms. The appellant advised the father of the complainant to return to Korea to seek more families, and he did. One night, the appellant returned around 1:00 AM to the children’s accommodation and entered the complainant’s room where another girl was with her. That girl left after certain remarks by the appellant. The appellant took the complaint in his van to a remote place where he proceeded to touch her, took off her pyjamas, and then had sexual intercourse with her, despite her resistance. During this resistance, they both fell to the floor of the van and the appellant injured his arm. The appellant threatened the complainant not to inform anyone about this incident, reminding her that her family needed him to renew their visas. The complainant immediately told her friends at the accommodation of the sexual assault. In the morning, the complainant walked to a public telephone where she called her father in Korea and told him about the incident, and then called her mother to inform her of the same. In fear with respect to their visas, the family went with the appellant to Brisbane where they had their visas renewed, acting as if nothing happened. Later, the father flew back to Australia and immediately lodged a complaint with the police. Through investigation, the police found physical evidence of rape, including injuries to her genitals consistent with rape, the appellant’s DNA, and wounds consistent with complainant’s statement of the rape. Based on the evidence, the District Court sentenced the appellant to eight years for two counts of rape and one count of indecent dealing with a circumstance of aggravation. Relying on older cases, the appellant filed this appeal to lower his sentence, claiming it was too high for someone his age, considering he had no previous convictions and that there were no violence or weapon used. The Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, stating that the older cases referenced by the appellant were dated before the implementation of new rules that increased the sentences for rape. In addition, even though no violence was used against the complainant, the court found that the appellant took advantage of her because of her visa situation, and this was an aggravating factor. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The two accused were prosecuted for invading the home of the two victims and assaulting them, which temporarily prevented the victims from being able to work. The first accused organized the crime because she could neither accept the breakup with one of the victims nor the fact that the victim was in a relationship with a man. Additionally, the first accused created a false Facebook profile to make fun of one victim’s sexual orientation and to convince one victim to break up with the other. The Court found that the motive of the crime was, among others, the sexual orientation of the victims, which is an aggravating circumstance of the assault. The Court found that the facts regarding the first accused had been clearly established. However, the interrogation and the investigation did not provide the court with enough evidence to hold the second accused criminally liable. The Court convicted the first accused and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50, i.e., in total EUR 5000), but suspended for five years if the accused complied with the terms of probation.

This domestic violence case involved an appeal against a sentencing decision. The defendant set fire to the victim when she was 12 weeks pregnant and caused serious injury. After the attack, she terminated her pregnancy due to the permanent nature of her injuries. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. On appeal by the defendant, the Court of Appeal decided that this was “manifestly excessive” compared to other cases of serious injury by fire and resentenced the defendant to 10 years and six months imprisonment. On appeal by the prosecution, the High Court of Australia held that the Court of Appeal had erred in decreasing the sentence and pointed out that there were not enough comparable cases of intentionally causing serious injury by fire and the few cases mentioned could not establish a sentencing pattern.

In 2015, the appellant was charged and convicted for committing five sexual offenses against his sister. The had purportedly occurred over years,. Most of the charged offenses, sexual exploitation of a child and two rapes, occurred when the appellant was an adult, but prosecutors also charged him with an indecent assault committed when he was 11 or 12 years old and thus presumed to be incapable of the offense. To rebut this presumption, the prosecution offered evidence of the appellant’s earlier, uncharged acts of sexual violence against his sister beginning when he was five or six years old. In the first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was insufficient to overcome the doli incapax presumption for the indecent assault charge and the evidence was “too sparse” to sustain a conviction for the third count in the indictment. The court upheld the other three convictions. In this appeal, the High Court examined whether it was permissible for the prosecution to use evidence of the dismissed charges for “contextual” purposes related to the remaining three charges, each of which the appellant was convicted. In dismissing this appeal, the High Court found unanimously that the evidence was relevant because it illustrated the family background in which the appellant and his sister were raised and that it was admissible “relationship evidence.” The court found that without such contextual evidence, the sexual abuse claims could easily have been seen as implausible.

The lower court convicted the appellant of intentional assault and sentenced her to life imprisonment and deprivation of political rights for life for stabbing her cohabiting boyfriend to death. The lower court held that the defendant’s motive, frivolous arguments, constituted a crime of intentional assault. The lower court found that the consequence of the crime was serious and that the defendant should receive a severe punishment. On appeal, the Higher People’s Court of Sichuan Province reversed the lower court’s holding, finding that (1) the appellant turned herself in and obtained forgiveness from relatives of the deceased; (2) on the day of incident, the victim had attacked the appellant first, and should bear certain responsibility. Thus, the High People’s Court reversed the lower court’s ruling and reduced the sentence to 15 years in prison and deprivation of political rights for three years. Available here.

家庭暴力

四川省达州市中级人民法院原判认定被告人唐芳因持水果刀朝同居男友胸部捅刺数刀，致其死亡，犯故意伤害罪，判处无期徒刑，剥夺政治权利终身。原判认为，本案系婚恋纠纷引发，被告人唐芳有自首情节，并取得被害人亲属谅解，可依法从轻处罚。四川省高级人民法院认为，上诉人（原审被告人）唐芳因生活琐事纠纷，持刀致同居男 友卢某甲死亡，其行为已构成故意伤害罪，后果严重，应予严惩。鉴于本案系婚恋家庭矛盾纠纷引发，案发后唐芳有自首情节，并取得死者亲属的谅解，被害人卢某甲平时对唐芳实施家庭暴力，案发当天先殴打唐，有过错，可依法对被告人从轻处罚。法院撤销四川省达州市中级人民法院判决，即被告人唐芳犯故意伤害罪，判处无期徒刑，剥夺政治权利终身； 并判决上诉人唐芳犯故意伤害罪，判处有期徒刑十五年， 剥夺政治权利三年。

The accused murdered her newborn child and pleaded guilty to the crime. In determining her prison sentence, the judge took into account mitigating circumstances such as her young age (21 years old), the fact that the child’s father denied responsibility for the child, and the fact that her family nearly kicked her out of their home when she had her previous child. The judge also acknowledged that she was a first-time offender and showed remorse for the crime. However, he reiterated the seriousness of the crime and stated that he did not want his leniency in this case to serve as a message to other young women that infanticide was acceptable. He further stated that newborn infants have just as much a right to life as anyone else. For the murder, he sentenced the accused to three years imprisonment with 30 months suspended for five years on the condition that the accused not be convicted of murder during the suspension. For the concealment of the birth of her newborn child, the judge sentenced the accused to six months imprisonment to run concurrently with the murder sentence.

The accused was convicted of pre-meditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment after stabbing his girlfriend (“the victim”) 27 times and locking her in a room until she bled to death. Prior to murdering the victim, the accused sent her a text message describing how he would kill her. At trial, the court determined the crime was aggravated by the fact that the accused had a direct intention of murdering his girlfriend and did so in a domestic setting. In imposing a sentence, the court took into account retribution, prevention of crime, deterrence and reformation. The court further found that the accused did not care about the victim’s right to life, but rather his own wellbeing, that he “played victim,” and that he showed no remorse. The judge stated that it “is high time that men in relationships with women should understand that once a woman tells them that they are no longer interested in continuing with the relationship, she means just that and her views and feelings should be understood and respected.”

The Defendant forced his wife (the victim) to sleep in the cold outside of the bedroom and when the victim tried to enter the bedroom and sleep on the bed, the Defendant proceeded to push her to the floor and beat her, causing bruises and injuries to the victim. The court found the Defendant guilty of an act of domestic violence under Article 44(1) of Law No.23 2004 on Elimination of Domestic Violence. The court sentenced the Defendant to three months imprisonment.

The appellant threw an accelerant on her husband, followed by a lit candle. She then immediately attempted to douse the flames in water. Her husband died and she was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant attempted to introduce new evidence that she had suffered from Battered Women Syndrome (“BWS”). This evidence was not available during the appellant’s trial because there were no qualified forensic psychiatrists available in Belize. The Court of Appeal granted the appeal on the ground that (1) it was capable of belief; (2) it was relevant to the issues before the jury; (3) it would have been admissible at trial; (4) the trial attorney had been asked why no medical evidence was presented at trial; (5) the new evidence may have caused the jury to decide differently; (6) the evidence supported a defense of diminished responsibility and (7) it cast doubt as to the reasonableness of the verdict and admission of the evidence was in the interest of justice. The court considered the findings of an experienced and distinguished professional in the field of forensic psychiatry who examined the appellant, interviewed witnesses, reviewed trial documents, and found that the appellant’s history and behavior was consistent with BWS. The forensic psychiatrist concluded that the appellant had been physically, sexually, financially, and psychologically abused by her partner for nine years. This abuse, together with the appellant’s response to the abuse, was found to be consistent with BWS. The Court reduced the appellant’s sentence to eight years. This case was the first time that a court in Belize admitted new evidence in relation to BWS and PTSD in connection with a defense of diminished responsibility.

The appellant Barry Carne was formerly in a relationship with L.S., the victim and the mother of his four children. One day Carne entered L.S.’s home without consent, destroyed property, and confronted L.S.. During the altercation he grabbed and twisted L.S.’s right hand and fingers, causing her to fall in pain. As a result he was charged with aggravated assault, and a domestic violence order was issued against him. The domestic violence order restrained him from contacting, approaching, intimidating or harassing the victim and from exposing their children to domestic violence. While the domestic violence order was in force, Carne again went to L.S.’s house. After L.S. did not answer, he attempted to hang himself outside the home, only to be saved by his son, who was 14 at the time. Carne was charged with breaching the domestic violence order, and pleaded guilty. The sentencing magistrate sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment for the breach and two months for the aggravated assault, to be served concurrently. Carne appealed the sentence, claiming that it was manifestly excessive, and argued that the magistrate took into account irrelevant matters, in particular his suicide attempt. The court of appeal considered the definition of “domestic violence” and whether Carne’s attempted suicide in front of the children was an attempt to cause mental harm to L.S. and/or her children. The court held that the sentencing magistrate had not received sufficient evidence from the prosecution demonstrating that Carne had attempted the suicide in order to cause mental harm to L.S. and/or her children and, accordingly, it was not open to the magistrate to make such a finding. The magistrate was required to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis, permitted by the facts, regarding the attempted suicide before concluding that the intent was to cause mental harm. As such, the sentence was reduced to one month’s imprisonment.

In the predawn hours of a Sunday morning, police officers came upon a cab parked in a secluded location. A woman (apparently an adolescent) emerged from the car naked and told the officers she was being raped by the driver, who was found with his pants down. Prosecutors charged the driver with attempted sexual violence. After the driver pled guilty and was sentenced to 50 months of imprisonment, the victim appealed the classification of the offense and prosecutors opposed the appeal. Based on evidence in the record, the court of appeals modified the conviction to sexual violence, doubling the time of the prison sentence. On the driver’s cassation appeal, the Supreme Court held that, by upgrading the conviction beyond the driver’s plea, the modification denied the driver the opportunity to present a defense and thus violated his right to due process. The Supreme Court accordingly vacated the modification and remanded the case for rehearing of the victim’s appeal.

The applicant pleaded guilty before the Circuit Court of Westmoreland for the offence of having sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16, in violation of section 10(1) of the Sexual Offences Act. He was in a serious relationship with the underage girl, but the matter was brought to the attention of the police when the complainant discovered she was pregnant and there was a dispute regarding the defendant’s paternity (tests showed he indeed was the father). He then argued that he was lured and tempted by the complainant, who would attend to his shop in revealing clothes and make sexual advances to him. The grounds for the defendant’s application was that the four-year sentence was manifestly excessive and that the judge was obliged to indicate, as a matter of law, the sentence that would have been imposed if the applicant had been convicted at trial and use that as a starting point for taking into account the fact that the applicant had plead guilty. In addition, his counsel highlighted as mitigating factors: the girl was just six months away from the age of consent and the sexual intercourse was consensual. His counsel also argued that the judge did not take into consideration the character and antecedents of the applicant, as well as the classic sentencing principles of retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. However, the Court decided that, although the indication of a starting point for sentencing would have been desirable, they do not see the omission as being fatal to the reasoning underlying the sentencing. They also highlighted that it’s clear that Parliament has recognized this offence as a serious one, and their commitment against it. This case is particularly important because the Court stated that Jamaica has particular difficulties in dealing with offences involving young girls constantly being abused and exploited by older men, and that they have to get the message out that the children must be allowed to transition into adulthood without any molestation. Furthermore, the court stated that the pregnancy of the girl must not be taken as a mitigating factor, because that would send the message that a man who gets the girl pregnant is likely to be treated more favorably by the Court. Finally, the Court insisted that these pronouncements, in the context of the alarming local circumstances, should be guiding principles in sentencing these matters and cases.

This case is an appeal from a judgment by a lower court. Judge Delmy Elizabeth Mejia Salazar found Alvin, a 27-year-old farmer originating from Concepcion de Ataco, guilty of attempted rape of a minor (11 years old) in violation of articles 159 and 172 of the El Salvadoran criminal code, and sentenced Alvin to seven years imprisonment. In the underlying case, the victim testified that Alvin forced her into a crawling position, raped, and sodomized her. On appeal, Alvin argued that the sentencing judge did not properly apply article 179 of the criminal code of procedure as the evidence presented by the forensic expert did not show any injuries in support of a finding of rape and/or sodomization. On appeal, the court emphasized that the medical examination was conducted a month and a half after the attempted rape and sodomization, which provided sufficient time for any injuries to heal. The court further stated that article 159 of the penal code does not require the use of violence and indicated that not every attempted violation will leave physical evidence (e.g., if the victim has a passive reaction to the aggression which does not result in the use of force). Additionally, Alvin did not deny attempting to sexually assault the victim by putting her in a crawling position. Thus, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling and sentence, which was shorter than the eight years imprisonment recommended by the relevant statute.

Este caso es una apelación de una decisión de un tribunal inferior. La jueza Delmy Elizabeth Mejía Salazar encontró culpable a Alvin, un campesino de Concepción de Ataco de 27 años, por intento de violación de una menor (11 años) en violación de los Artículos 159 y 172 del Código Penal salvadoreño, y sentenció a Alvin. a siete años de prisión. En el caso visto en el tribunal inferior, la víctima testificó que Alvin la obligó a gatear, la violó y la sodomizó. En la apelación, Alvin argumentó que el juez de sentencia no había aplicado correctamente el Artículo 179 del Código de Procedimiento Penal, ya que las pruebas presentadas por el perito forense no mostraban lesiones que respaldaran la determinación de violación y / o sodomización. En la apelación, el tribunal enfatizó que el examen médico se realizó un mes y medio después de la violación y sodomización, lo que proporcionó tiempo suficiente para que cicatrizaran las heridas. El tribunal declaró además que el Artículo 159 del Código Penal no requiere el uso de la violencia e indicó que no todo intento de violación dejará evidencia física (por ejemplo, si la víctima tiene una reacción pasiva a la agresión que no da lugar al uso de fuerza). Además, Alvin no negó haber intentado agredir sexualmente a la víctima poniéndola en una posición de gateo. Por lo tanto, el tribunal de apelación confirmó las conclusiones y la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia, la cual era más breve que los ocho años de prisión recomendados por la ley pertinente.

In 2002, Nermin Ćupina (“Ćupina”) recruited two underage girls and one woman and forced them, through threats of violence to them and their family members, to provide sexual services for money. Each day, the victims were forced to earn KM 400 through prostitution, all of which Ćupina kept. The Court of BiH sentenced Ćupina to 12 years’ imprisonment, which it added to Ćupina’s four-year prison sentence from the Cantonal Court in Mostar, resulting in a single sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment after credit for time served. In addition, in accordance with Article 110 of the Criminal Code of BiH, the Court of BiH confiscated the material gain Ćupina acquired through his criminal enterprise. The court, relying on the findings of an expert, established that Ćupina made at least BAM 100,000 in 2002 by prostituting the victims. The court also concluded that because neither Ćupina nor his wife had regular income during 2002, the construction of an apartment valued at BAM 61,481.55 was financed entirely from Ćupina’s criminal enterprise. The Court of BiH confiscated the apartment and ordered Ćupina to pay the remainder of the estimated material gain, BAM 38,518.45.

Decision available in English here.

In September 1992, during the Bosnian War, the Army of BiH attacked Serb houses in the village of Džepi. During this assault, Ćerim Novalić and an unidentified soldier entered a home to see if the couple was hiding Serbs. While the unidentified soldiers interrogated the husband about his neighbors of Serb ethnicity, Novalić forced the wife into an upstairs room and raped her. In 2010, the Court of BiH found Novalić guilty of a War Crime against a Civilian under Article 173(1) of the CC BiH and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. The following year, a panel of the Appellate Division of the Court of BiH revised Novalić’s conviction, finding him guilty under Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the law in effect at the time of Novalić’s crime. The Appellate Panel considered the “extremely humiliating manner” in which Novalić raped the victim – her underage children and mother-in-law were in an adjacent room and her husband was downstairs – and increased his sentence to eight years and six months imprisonment. This is the upper-end of the typical prison sentence mandated by the Court of BiH for one count of rape during the Bosnian War.

Second revised verdict available in English here.

In May 1993, during the Bosnian War, Velibor Bogdanović, a member of the Croatian Defence Council, and five unidentified soldiers ransacked the home of a couple in Mostar. The group stole jewelry from the home and took the husband to the local prison where he was unlawfully detained for 30 days. In addition, Bogdanović raped the wife. In 2011, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”) found Bogdanović guilty of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 173(1), as read together with Article 180(1) and Article 29, of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“CC BiH”). In July 2015, the Constitutional Court of BiH overturned Bogdanović’s conviction, finding that it had been based on an inapplicable law. And in September 2015, the Appellate Division of the Court of BiH revised Bogdanović’s sentence, finding him guilty of the criminal offense of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The Court imposed the minimum sentence on Bogdanović – five years imprisonment – reasoning that the accused was a married father, that he had been 22-years-old at the time that he committed the crime, that he had committed no criminal offense since the war, and that he had apologized to the victim after the war and offered her assistance.

Revised second instance verdict in English available here.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for injuring his wife, who he inherited according to customary practice after her husband died in 2002. On November 8, 2013, his wife attempted to pack clothes to visit her children in Nairobi. The appellant refused to let his wife travel and threatened to murder her. The appellant cut both of his wife’s arms using a panga (machete), but she managed to escape to her nephew’s home. The nephew saw the appellant armed with the panga and a knife before taking his aunt to the police station and later the hospital. The appellant was convicted of Grievous Harm Contrary to Section 234 of the Penal Code and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to consider that this was a mere domestic issue that could have been resolved by village elders. The appellant asked for a non-custodial sentence citing the fact he was an elderly man (78 years old). The High Court upheld the conviction and the sentence, noting, “The appellant’s actions amounted to violence against women. It is my view a gender-based violence which the court cannot condone or tolerate and let perpetrators of violence against women and girls go unpunished.” This case demonstrates the relationship between the criminal courts in Kenya and customary law.

The defendant was accused of the killing of her husband. She entered into a plea agreement to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter. The deceased returned home on May 7, 2016, intoxicated and accused the defendant of infidelity. A violent domestic fight ensued and the defendant used a kitchen knife to fatally stab the deceased. The defendant was also injured by the deceased during the altercation. The defendant asked the court for a non-custodial sentence based on a number of mitigating circumstances including the fact that the defendant is the primary caregiver of her three children with the deceased, aged five, three, and one. Relatives and friends of the deceased confirmed that he was verbally and physically abusive to the defendant and the killing occurred in “the heat of the moment.” Furthermore, the defendant had no prior record, demonstrated remorse, and the deceased’s family and the community had forgiven her and were willing to help her raise her children. The High Court agreed that these factors merited a non-custodial status, adding that the defendant is both the accused and the victim, and was acting in self-defense even though she used excessive force. The High Court handed down a three-year non-custodial sentence. This case marks an important example of Kenyan courts treating victims of domestic violence with leniency where excessive force is used while defending themselves from their abuser.

The appellant was charged with the offence of indecent assault on a female contrary to Section 137(1) of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The victim worked for the appellant as a maid when she was indecently assaulted. The appellant advanced four grounds of appeal: (i) the trial court erred when (i) it found the appellant had a case to answer at the close of the prosecution’s case; (ii) it convicted the appellant of the offence in the absence of corroborative evidence; (iii) the trial court erred when it convicted the appellant on the evidence of the victim who suffered from unsoundness of mind without satisfying itself that the victim understood the nature of an oath and was capable of giving rational testimony; and, (iv) it held that the findings in the medical report supported the prosecution’s evidence and when it held that the appellant had corroborated the evidence of the victim when he admitted touching the victim. The Court dismissed all grounds for appeal on the following bases: (i) the Court was satisfied that the victim’s testimony was presented in a very coherent manner and that the three ingredients of the offence had been established and that the victim’s testimony was not discredited at all; (ii) there was medical evidence which corroborated the crime as well as evidence that the victim did not consent to the indecent assault; (iii) the victim’s testimony was very consistent and was given with ‘lucid clarity’, therefore there was nothing in the victim’s testimony that could have compelled the trial court to conduct a voir dire; and, (iv) there was medical evidence which corroborated the victim’s testimony and there was no evidence of a romantic relationship between the parties which would indicate consent. Further, the Court held that, because of the ‘master and servant’ nature of the relationship, the minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment was inappropriate and should be set aside and replaced by a sentence of 20 years imprisonment with hard labor effective from the date of conviction.

The appellant was charged with incest contrary to Section 159(1) of the Penal Code but was convicted of the lesser charge of indecent assault contrary to Section 137(1) as amended by Act No. 15 of 2005, Cap 871, as the medical evidence ‘left a lot to be desired’ (as described by the Magistrate). However, when the matter was sent to the High Court for sentencing, the sentencing judge substituted the charge of indecent assault with incest and sentenced the appellant to 20 years imprisonment with hard labor. The appellant appealed this conviction and sentence on the basis that the Magistrate “erred in law and fact when he tried and convicted the appellant without the Director of Public Prosecutions’ consent.” In support of this argument, the appellant noted that the instructions of the Director of Public Prosecutions were to try the appellant for rape not incest. Therefore, in the absence of express consent by the Director of Public Prosecutions as required by Section 164 of the Penal Code, Cap 871, the trial court had jurisdiction neither to hear the matter nor to proceed to convict the appellant on indecent assault and sentence him to 20-year term for incest. The Supreme Court reviewed the letter from the Director of Public Prosecutions and noted that, while the first paragraph gave the impression that he had sanctioned the prosecution to go ahead with the charge of incest, the remainder of the letter made it clear that he had also sanctioned the appellant’s prosecution on a charge of either rape or defilement. The Supreme Court also noted that the latter could potentially enable a conviction of indecent assault under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code. Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Director of Public Prosecutions rightly guided the prosecution and the court below to invoke whichever of these provisions as necessary. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that the Magistrate rightly concluded that ‘the medical evidence left a lot to be desired.’ Ultimately, it concluded that the appellant was not guilty of the offence of rape, but that he was guilty of the offence of indecent assault contrary to Section 137 of the Penal Code and that the sentencing judge was mistaken to sentence the appellant for incest. The Supreme Court quashed the incest conviction, but still upheld the conviction for indecent assault and imposed a 20-year prison sentence.

A women inmate at Tafaigata Prison who was two months pregnant asked the defendant to abort the fetus using a duck speculum and uterine sound instrument while she was on weekend parole. Upon returning to the prison and complaining of severe pain, the woman was rushed to the hospital, where she delivered a live, premature female infant. The baby died of respiratory failure as a result of extreme prematurity and neonatal sepsis; the medical report stated that the instruments used by the defendant had infected the victim’s uterus and induced labor. In 2004, she had been sentenced to two and one-half years for the same offense. Although the charges were not prosecuted at the time, they were revisited in 2005 and a year was added to the defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge in the case considered the defendant’s record of recent convictions as aggravating factors. While the maximum sentence for this offence is seven years, the court considered that it warranted a starting point of six and a half years. The only mitigating factor in the defendant’s favor was her guilty plea, which avoided the necessity of a full trial, for which twelve months were deducted from her sentence. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Convention on the Rights of the Child and CEDAW ought to be considered in sentencing. In the course of answering such question in the negative, the judge was clear in relying solely upon national legislation: “This country through its elected representatives namely Parliament has chosen to take a pro-life stand and have legislated against abortion except when it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Parliament having enacted that law, the courts duty is beyond question, it is required to enforce the laws of the land. The rightness, wrongness or morality of such a law is debated in the building next door, not in this one.” The fact that Samoa continues to criminalize abortion after ratifying international conventions evinces clear legislative intent against domesticating CEDAW through specific legislation.

In 2008, Francisco Ramírez Irala was found guilty of domestic violence against his wife. The Justice of the Peace ordered the accused to refrain from living at their home or being within 300 meters of his house or any other place that represented a risk for the victim for a period of 60 days. The accused appealed, and the sentence was confirmed. Subsequently, the accused filed a request before the Supreme Court alleging that the sentence caused him great harm because he is a colonel in the military with an impeccable career and being evaluated for a promotion. The Supreme Court rejected his motion.

En 2008, Francisco Ramírez Irala fue declarado culpable de violencia doméstica contra su esposa. El Juez de la primera corte le ordenó al acusado abstenerse de vivir en su domicilio o estar a menos de 300 metros de su casa o de cualquier otro lugar que representara un riesgo para la víctima por un período de 60 días. El acusado apeló, pero se confirmó la sentencia. Posteriormente, el acusado presentó una solicitud ante la Corte Suprema alegando que la sentencia le causó un gran daño de reputación por tratarse de un coronel en el ejército con una trayectoria impecable y estar siendo evaluado para un ascenso. Aún así, la Corte Suprema rechazó su petición.

Two minor children, an eight-year-old boy and a twelve-year-old girl, were raped by their father, once and multiple times over several years, respectively. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years in prison, but the Criminal Appeals Court reduced the sentence to 19.6 years in prison on October 11, 2001, after finding that the 20-year sentence was impermissible under Paraguay’s sentencing guidelines.

Dos niños menores, un niño de ocho años y una niña de doce, fueron violados sexualmente por su padre, una y varias veces durante varios años, respectivamente. El acusado fue sentenciado a 20 años de prisión, pero la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal redujo la sentencia a 19,6 años de prisión el 11 de octubre de 2001, tras concluir que la sentencia de 20 años era inadmisible según las directrices de sentencia de Paraguay.

In 1994, a married woman was sexually abused and raped by Juan Aveiro Gómez in her home. Law 104 (dated December 17, 1990) modified Paraguay’s penal code to punish the rape of a married woman with prison. The Criminal Appeals Court sentenced the defendant to 12 years in prison. However, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to eight years in prison on February 20, 1997.

En 1994, una mujer casada fue abusada sexualmente y violada por Juan Aveiro Gómez en su casa. La Ley 104 (de 17 de diciembre de 1990) modificó el código penal de Paraguay para sancionar con tiempo en la prisión la violación de una mujer casada. El Tribunal de Apelaciones en lo Penal condenó al acusado a 12 años de prisión. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema redujo la pena a ocho años de prisión el 20 de febrero de 1997.

A nine-year-old girl was sexually abused by her father, Florencio Arias, on several occasions. The defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison, which was confirmed by the Criminal Appeals Court on April 25, 2003.

Una niña de nueve años fue abusada sexualmente por su padre, Florencio Arias, en varias ocasiones. El imputado fue condenado a 10 años de prisión, lo cual fue confirmado por la Corte de Apelaciones en lo Penal el 25 de abril de 2003.

In 2013, the appellant was found having sexual intercourse with the victim, who was 15 years old. The next day the victim told the court that she and the appellant had been in love since June 2011 and that they had a sexual relationship. She testified that they were married and she was his second wife, but Malawi required parental permission for children aged 15-17 to marry (as of 2015, section 14 of the Marriage, Divorce and Family Relations Act requires that parties be 18 years old to marry). Malawi charged the defendant with defilement contrary to Penal Code § 138(1) and indecent assault contrary to § 137(1). Section 138(1) provides, “Any person who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of sixteen years shall be guilty of a felony and shall be liable to imprisonment to life” (¶ 7.1). In the lower court, the appellant pleaded not guilty arguing that the victim consented to the sexual acts and that she showed him an identification card that she had doctored to state that she was 17 years old at the time. Acknowledging that the victim had changed her year of birth on her identification, the lower court found the appellant guilty on both counts. The appellant filed two grounds of appeal asking: (i) “whether the conviction of the appellant was proper with regard . . . to the circumstances of the case;” and; (ii) “whether the sentences were manifestly excessive considering the” fact the victim had mislead the appellant with respect to her age (¶ 3.1). The High Court upheld the conviction citing the strict liability nature of the crime. The Court noted that the victim was clearly underage at the time of the sexual intercourse and rejected the defendant’s consent defense noting that “girls under the age of . . . [16] are incapable of giving consent due to immaturity (¶ 7.4).” Notwithstanding, the Court reduced the appellant’s sentence to four years for defilement and one year for indecent assault to run concurrently, noting that the appellant did not know that the victim was under age.

The trial court sentenced the 25-year-old Appellant to 17 years in prison after finding him guilty of raping a 70-year-old widow from a neighboring village. The trial court rejected the defense that he was not in her village at the time of the rape. The trial court found that in November 1998 the Appellant broke into the home of the victim, who confronted him with a panga (machete). While raping her after disarming her, the victim called out and the Appellant, worried about being caught, fled with her panga. The police found the panga in his home the next day and he was arrested. The Appellant contested his sentence, arguing that it was manifestly harsh because he has a wife, two children, and two young brothers to care for. The State contended that the sentence was appropriate because of the victim’s age and family circumstances. The standard for appellate court interference is a sentence that is “manifestly excessive or low in view of the circumstances of the case.” The Court noted that the crime of rape, particularly the rape of “grandmothers,” is prevalent in the area and very serious. The Court held “[t]he appellant raped an old lady. That was bad. However, considering all the circumstances of the case, we think that a sentence of 17 years imprisonment was manifestly so excessive as to cause a miscarriage of justice” and reduced the sentence to seven years.

While considering the appeal of a rape conviction, the High Court condemned the trial court’s failure to punish the defendant in accordance with the severity of his crime. The Court found that where a trial court finds sufficient evidence of rape, the sentence should be more than a mere “slap on the wrist.” The court stated that “rape is always serious even without aggravating circumstances” because the victim’s “virginity has been assaulted and undoubtedly her dignity and reputation have been compromised blighting her prospects for marriage” (p. 1). The Court found that those factors should always be considered before a sentence is imposed. The Court affirmed the conviction and increased the defendant’s prison sentence from five to ten years.

Hodgins had repeated misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence when the state of Washington brought charges against him for violating an order of protection on seven different occasions. Hodgins pled guilty to two of the seven counts of domestic violence, but the court did not include his prior misdemeanor convictions in its calculation of his offender status for purposes of sentencing. The Court of Appeals found that, under the facts of the case and relevant Washington law, Hodgins should have received an extra point on his offender status for any prior repetitive domestic violence offenses. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to consider his convictions in determining his offender status at sentencing. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for sentencing with a higher offender status.

The Respondent in this case faced a prison term of two years and six months based on his convictions for 9 counts of serious domestic violence offenses. The Respondent was also ordered to refrain from any harassment or threatening conduct toward the victims (or those in domestic relationships with the victims) for ten years. In response to the sentencing of the Respondent, “the Crown submitted that the sentences imposed upon the Respondent were manifestly inadequate.” The Crown noted that “a number of individual sentences were themselves inadequate given the objective seriousness of the crimes involved.” The Court emphasized the importance of both specific and general deterrence for domestic violence offenses and noted “[r]ecognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important.” The Court ultimately held that “the sentences imposed upon the Respondent were manifestly inadequate” and resentenced the Respondent.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to two charges of rape of a 14 year old female and a 24 year old female, under section 376 of the Penal Code. Regarding the first charge, the court accepted the first complainant’s evidence. Corroboration that she did not consent included fresh abrasions found by a doctor on the defendant’s arms and chest, the crying and distress of said complainant as observed by several witnesses very soon after the incident and the promptness of the complaints made by her. The court held the defendant guilty of having sexual intercourse with said complainant against her will or without her consent, imposing a sentence of seven years imprisonment and six strokes. The court also accepted the second complainant’s evidence. Corroboration that she did not consent included her sad condition and her crying as observed by a witness immediately after the incident, and the complaints she made to said witness, her mother, brother and the police. The court found that the defendant said threatening words which had put her in fear of death or hurt. The court held the defendant guilty of aggravated rape of said complainant, imposing a sentence of nine years imprisonment and 14 strokes. The sentences as to each rape were to run consecutively.

The defendant was charged with two charges of rape of the complainant, a 14 year old female, punishable under section 376(1) of the Penal Code, and two charges of unlawful carnal knowledge with a girl under 16 years old, an offence under section 2 of the Unlawful Carnal Knowledge Act (Cap. 29). DNA and other forensic evidence indicated that the defendant was the biological father of the complainant’s child. While that evidence alone could not prove rape, the complainant’s evidence, consisting largely of her testimony, was found credible despite minor discrepancies in the testimony of her various witnesses. The court held that the prosecution had proved beyond the reasonable doubt the four charges against the defendant, and he was accordingly convicted. The court sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment on the first and second charge, and four years imprisonment on the third and fourth charge, to run concurrently. A total sentence of imprisonment was 10 years was imposed.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to raping a 16 year old female, punishable under section 376(1) of the Penal Code, and the alternative charge of attempted rape, punishable under section 376(2) of the Penal Code. The court was satisfied that the complainant’s complaint to her mother was made by her at the earliest possible moment, which was consistent with her complaint to the police and other evidence, therefore corroborating the complainant’s evidence. The court found the complainant credible, and accepted her evidence indicating that she did not consent. In addition, the complainant was examined by a doctor, who found numerous injuries and concluded in her report that there was some injury to the complainant’s vulva, which may be due to attempted sexual intercourse. The court found, however, that the doctor did not seem sure whether penetration occurred. Regarding whether there was penetration, the court found the complainant’s evidence unreliable, and therefore reasonable doubt. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and voluntarily causing hurt. The court imposed sentences of 10 years imprisonment and 12 strokes.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to one charge of attempted rape of an 11 years and 10 months old female, under section 376(1) of the Penal Code. The court found that the complainant gave different versions as to the events that occurred. It found the complainant’s evidence unreliable. The court concluded that the complainant was the initiator of the events that led to the attempted intercourse. The court found that there was an attempt at sexual intercourse. In view of medical evidence that revealed that the hymen was intact and that ejaculation may have occurred outside the complainant, the court found doubt as to whether penetration occurred. The court highlighted that consent was not a defense to rape as the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time at issue. Nonetheless, consent becomes relevant to punishment, as a minimum sentence is prescribed for rape which occurs “without the consent of the victim”. The court found that the complainant gave her consent to the defendant’s attempt to have sexual intercourse with her and that she gave a real consent, not vitiated by immaturity or by any of the other factors specified in section 90 P.C. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and imposed sentences of one year imprisonment and three strokes.

The defendant was charged with two charges of rape of his daughter, under section 375 of the Penal Code. According to the complainant, her father first raped her when she was 12 years old and he raped her about 9 to 12 times in a month. The court found that the evidence did not support the complainant’s allegation that she was raped by the defendant, and that her evidence was uncorroborated. The court further found that the complainant had not been telling the truth in several instances, which made her evidence questionable. The court highlighted that, although the complainant claimed she was raped about 500 times by her father since 1989, nobody ever saw the parties together in one of their rooms, nor the complainant in a distressed condition. The court found it dangerous to convict the defendant by relying solely on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant. The court acquitted the defendant of the two charges and discharged him.

After the Department of Homeland Security learned that Ernesto, Alberto and Israel Cortes Castro, were smuggling women from Mexico into the U.S. for forced prostitution, they were charged with conspiring to traffic women for prostitution by force or coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) and other substantive trafficking crimes. The Defendants plead guilty to the conspiring charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges. The factual proffer submitted with the plea agreements stated that the Defendants agreed to establish a sex-trafficking business in the U.S. in which women would be transported from Mexico and prostituted in exchange for money. It also detailed the methods employed by the Defendants to defraud, force and coerce women into prostitution. The district court accepted the plea agreements and sentenced the Defendants to 180 months of imprisonment, an upward variation from the 108-135 month range provided by the advisory guidelines. According to the district court, the upward variation was justified by the “unusually heinous, cruel, brutal and degrading” nature of their conduct. Additionally, the court ordered the Defendants to pay $1,239,200 in restitution losses to the victims. On appeal, the Defendants challenged the upward variation and the restitution award. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court had not abused its discretion by sentencing the Defendants to terms 45 months over the advisory guidelines range because they had “enslaved, demeaned and debased immigrant women” forcing them into prostitution for several years and subjecting them to mental, physical and emotional abuse. The Court further held that the district court reasonably determined that an upward variation was required to address the “abhorrent nature” of the crimes. Finally, the Court held that the district court did not err in granting the restitution award because the victims were statutorily entitled to compensation and such award was based on factual information in the factual proffer and the presentencing report.

The defendant paid his friend to bring the victim, a 14-year-old child, to defendant’s café under the pretext of attending a birthday party. After defendant’s friend abandoned the victim at the café, the defendant told the victim to work as a server but also forced her to have sex with the male clients and kept all payments received for the victim’s services. Because the defendant used fraud to bring the victim to the café and exploited the victim by forcing her to act as a sex worker for profit, the Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty of human trafficking under section 2(1) of Law No. 21 of 2007 and sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment with a fine of Rp. 120,000,000. The High Court upheld the lower court’s decision but amended the defendant’s sentence to seven years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the High Court’s sentence of seven years was an error since the court did not consider that the victim had stayed with the defendant’s friend before coming to the café and therefore the health and condition of the victim may have worsened before coming to the defendant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and did not rule on the sentencing since it was a “judex facti matter (question of fact of the case)”.

The Defendant, Mr. Nyambe, and the victim, Mrs. Nyambe, were married. Upon return from a fishing trip, Mr. Nyambe found Mrs. Nyambe in bed with another man and reacted by beating the other man. One month later, Mrs. Nyambe revealed that the reason she committed adultery was because Mr. Nyambe “was not a real man,” whereupon the two began to fight, and Mr. Nyambe struck Mrs. Nyambe with an axe and killed her. Despite the one month that had elapsed between the initial discovery of the adultery and the murder, the High Court found that the adultery still constituted provocation. However, under Zambian law, a murder defendant’s reaction must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation to invoke that affirmative defense to reduce the conviction to manslaughter. The High Court found that the Defendant’s retaliation of striking his wife with an axe was not proportional to the provocation and convicted him of murder.

A woman who had been a repeated victim of marital rape petitioned the Supreme Court of Nepal to make sentencing for marital rape on par with sentencing for other types of rape. The Court found that punishing marital rape differently from other forms of rape violated equal rights provisions in the Interim Constitution and international law, especially considering that prior sentencing guidelines of three to six months put the victim in danger of repeated violence and rape. Although the Court did not have the power to change sentencing terms on existing offences, it directed the legislative authorities to change sentencing terms for marital rape, showing recognition of the gravity of rape as a violation of rights and dignity while also exhibiting a proactive will to reform legal codes in the name of equality.

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a six-year-old girl and was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Appellant was a teacher at the victim’s school. The school held a special program for students during school holidays. During this program, appellant took the victim into his office at school and had sexual intercourse with her. Despite his warning not to tell anyone, the victim told her brother, who told her parents. A medical examiner confirmed that she had been defiled. On appeal, appellant argued that the sentence of 14 years was too harsh. In support, he argued that he was the sole breadwinner for 11 dependents, including two lame dependents and four orphans. Appellant also argued that since the victim was a very young child, she had already gotten over the trauma of the defilement. The court upheld the sentence and ruled against appellant. The court found that, as a teacher, he had a duty to protect the victim, but instead chose to ravish her, disgracing himself, his profession, and society.

This appeal was limited to sentencing only. Appellant was convicted of defilement of a baby girl and was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. Appellant was a relative of the child and was known as a teacher of Christianity. Appellant requested a more lenient sentence of 10 years. The Court of Appeals ruled against Appellant and increased his sentence to 25 years, citing the policy consideration that, despite the fact that defilement can be punishable by death, individuals still continue to defile babies. Thus, the court used this case as an opportunity to send a message to society that “violating the rights of child females must stop.”

In this case, a defendant who had been sentenced to twenty five years for kidnapping, among other crimes, appealed his conviction, contending that he had committed lesser kidnapping (plagio) instead of the more serious crime of premeditated kidnapping (rapto) of which he was convicted. The court decided to uphold his conviction, despite the fact that there was only coercion involved. The “lessening of sexual integrity” against the will of the victims made the defendant guilty of the greater crime of rapto under article 130 of the Argentinean Penal Code.

En este caso, un acusado que había sido condenado a veinticinco años por secuestro y otros delitos, apeló su condena, alegando que había cometido secuestro menor (plagio) en lugar del delito más grave de secuestro (rapto) premeditado del cual fue condenado. El tribunal decidió defender su condena, a pesar del hecho de que solo hubo coerción. La "disminución de la integridad sexual" contra la voluntad de las víctimas hizo que el acusado fuera culpable del mayor delito de rapto en virtud del artículo 130 del Código Penal argentino.

A husband killed his wife by stabbing her in the abdomen and was sentenced under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to life imprisonment. He appealed the sentence, claiming that the record clearly establishes that he only delivered a single blow to his wife in a sudden quarrel, and therefore conviction under Section 302 is not proper. The High Court dismissed the appeal but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the husband’s actions in a sudden fight did not warrant life imprisonment. His sentence should have been brought under the fourth exception of Section 300, accounting for the heat of passion in a sudden fight, and accordingly his sentence was reduced to ten years.

The Trial Court convicted a man of raping a ten-year-old girl and sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) of the Indian Penal Code. On appeal, the High Court reduced his sentence to seven years considering the convicted had already suffered a custodial sentence of six years, was young, and the only breadwinner in a family with two children. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the High Court’s reduction of the sentence because it fell below the statutory minimum. The Supreme Court held that the measure of punishment in a rape case cannot depend on the social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend on the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the victim, and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women are to be severely dealt with. The proviso to Section 376(2) specifies that the court may, for special and adequate reasons, impose a sentence of less than ten years. However, the Supreme Court in the present case, found there to be no justifiable extenuating or mitigating circumstances available that would justify imposing a less-than-minimum sentence.

The complainant was raped by the accused, a distant relative, while unconscious in her home. Prior to the incident, out of kindness, the complainant had taken the accused to her home and had offered to let him stay with her. Just before the assault, the two were sitting on a bed talking, drinking, and watching television. The complainant then passed out, and she awoke to find the accused having sexual intercourse with her. She pushed him off and brought suit against him for sexual assault. The trial judge found the accused guilty of sexual assault. Although there is a three-year minimum sentence for serious sexual assault, the judge took the recommendation of defense counsel and sentenced the accused to 90 days imprisonment, to be served intermittently, plus three years probation. The State appealed the sentence, arguing that it should have been in the three- to four-year range. In evaluating the appropriate application of the proportionality principle to sentences for sexual assault, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the Supreme Court had never endorsed the concept of a harmless rape or other major sexual assault. The court held that non-consensual sexual intercourse under any circumstances constituted a profound violation of a person’s dignity, equality, security of person and sexual autonomy, and that under the circumstances of the instant case, the offense should have been sentenced as a serious sexual assault. However, the court also ruled that, having regard to all relevant considerations, a downward departure from the three-year minimum sentence is justified. Finding that the original sentence was inadequate, the court granted the appeal and concluded that a fit and proper sentence would be two years imprisonment plus two years probation.

This is an appeal challenging a rape conviction and sentencing of 15 years imprisonment. Appellant, an army sergeant, went to a village and used a gun to murder his maternal uncle. On the same day, he led his victim, a widow of appellant’s late brother, to an abandoned house and raped her at gunpoint. Three days later, the victim reported the incident and was medically examined. Because she recently had a baby, the medical examiner was unable to find any physical damage to her body. Appellant appeals on two main grounds: (1) without medical proof of penetration, the victim’s accusation requires corroboration to stand; (2) the sentence of 15 years was excessive. On appeal, the court accepted the prosecution’s argument that, because the victim was a new mother and was being held at gunpoint, it was very unlikely that she would have been physically damaged from the penetration or struggle. The court also followed prior precedent that held that, in certain criminal cases, corroboration was not necessary for a conviction. Concerning sentencing, the court also agreed with the prosecution. The court found that appellant had been given a gun by the military to protect the people of Uganda, but instead appellant used that gun to terrorize and rape the victim. Because of those circumstances, the court refused to be lenient, but rather increased appellant’s sentence to 25 years.

The issue here was whether violation of official duty of a doctor was considered sexual abuse under the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"). A was the working doctor when B went for a breast ultrasonography. A had touched B's breast with bare hands and complemented her on her breasts. A had also massaged gel on the breasts with his hands and several times touched B's breasts. A had also, after getting permission from B, suckled the breasts in order to get excretion. The District Court and the Court of Appeal held that the procedure was not appropriate but did not amount to sexual abuse. The questionbefore the Supreme Court was whether the procedure had a sexual purpose. According to Chapter 20 Section 5(1) of the Criminal Code, a person who abuses his or her position and entices another into engaging in sexual intercourse or another sexual act or submitting to such an act should be sentenced for sexual abuse. The Court held that the procedures that A performed deviated from established and medically recommended practice. As a whole the procedure was done in a way that strongly indicated the purpose of sexual arousal or satisfaction. The fact that B had reacted only afterwards was not significant. The Court held that doctor and patient are not in an equal position and the fact that a patient agrees to a medical examination does not imply that the patient would give up her sexual self-determination. The Court saw that A had misused his position as a doctor and found A guilty of sexual abuse and violation of an official duty in accordance with Chapter 40 Section 9(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court found that this was only a single incident towards a consenting adult and sentenced A to pay 80 days-fine and damages to B of 1,200 Euros.

The issue here was whether a partner's experience of domestic violence during her former relationships could be seen as a mitigating circumstance in connection with the partner's manslaughter of her new partner. A (female) had killed B (male) by making a deadly strike with a kitchen knife. Before the strike A had flailed the knife in a way which caused several marks on B's body. A and B were arguing on the night of the stabbing. A claimed that B had never before been violent towards A, but in A's former relationships A had experienced domestic violence. The District Court found that the fact that there was a plastic bag behind the living room sofa containing knives collected from the house could suggest that there was a threat of violence. It found that there were some indications of justifiable defense and sentenced A to prison for 8 years 6 months for manslaughter. The Court of Appeal held that B had attacked A unlawfully, causing A the need for self-defense. However, it found that the use of a knife in the situation was not justifiable, as A did not receive any grave wounds except for bruises. The Court found that A was guilty of excessive self-defense. According to Chapter 20 Section 3 of the Finnish Criminal Code (39/1889, as amended) (the "Criminal Code"), if the manslaughter, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the offense, the motives of the offender or other related circumstances, when assessed as a whole, is to be deemed committed under mitigating circumstances, the offender shall be sentenced for killing to imprisonment for at least four and at most ten years. The Finnish government proposal (94/1993) for the Criminal Code states that these kind of exceptional circumstances can be present when a wife has been constantly terrorized with violence by her husband and she kills him. The Court held that A had a traumatic background and had experienced domestic violence but that there had not been, according to A, any previous violence by B towards A. The Court did not consider this an exceptional circumstance. A was sentenced to five years in prison for manslaughter committed as excessive self-defense.

In determining sentencing for a woman convicted of murdering her spouse, expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is more relevant to the sentencing decision than to the assessment of the legality of the defendant's actions. The court reviewed a line of cases involving women convicted of murdering their abusive partners. Although the court cited a variety of mitigating factors that should be considered (e.g., the sustained nature of the abusive conduct, the presence of children in the home,etc.), it held that foremost is the actual effect sustained domestic violence has on women. As a result, the court found expert testimony confirming that the defendant suffered form the syndrome to be a "substantial and compelling" reason to suspend the defendant's sentence.

By die bepaling van vonnisoplegging vir 'n vrou wat skuldig bevind is aan die moord op haar eggenoot, is kundige getuienis rakende die mishandelende vroue sindroom meer relevant op die vonnisoplegging as die beoordeling van die wettigheid van die verweerder se optrede. Die hof het 'n reeks sake ondersoek waar vroue skuldig bevind is aan die moord op hul geweldadige eggenote. Alhoewel die hof 'n verskeidenheid versagtende faktore noem wat in ag geneem moet word (soos die volgehoue ​​aard van die misbruik, die teenwoordigheid van kinders in die huis, ens.), het hy beslis dat die belangrikste effek is, is die gevolg wat huishoudelike geweld op vroue het. As gevolg hiervan het die hof genoegsame getuienis gevind wat bevestig dat die verweerder gely het aan die sindroom gevind as 'n "wesenlike en dwingende" rede om die vonnis van die verweerder op te skort.

The accused was charged and convicted on two separate counts of rape for raping two 15-year-old girls more than once and sentenced to six years imprisonment for the first count and 10 years imprisonment for the second. On appeal, the defense argued that the sentence was too severe because of mitigating circumstances, specifically that the victims did not suffer serious physical or psychological injuries and that both victims had previously been sexually active. The Court dismissed the appeal and held that the sentences were, in fact, too lenient, especially as the victims' previous sexual history was irrelevant and also that the extent of harm to the victims matters less because rape is a basic violation of dignity. The sentence was increased to 8 years for the first count and 12 years for the second.

Die beskuldigdes is op twee afsonderlike aanklagtes van verkragting aangekla en skuldig bevind vir die verkragting van twee 15-jarige meisies meer as een keer en gevonnis tot ses jaar gevangenisstraf op die eerste en tien jaar gevangenisstraf op die tweede. Op appèl het die verdediging gesê dat die vonnis te ernstig was weens versagtende omstandighede deurdat die slagoffers nie ernstige liggaamlike of sielkundige beserings opgedoen het nie en dat albei die slagoffers voorheen seksueel aktief was. Die hof het die appèl van die hand gewys en beslis dat die vonnisse in werklikheid te versagtend was, veral omdat die vorige seksuele geskiedenis van die slagoffers nie van belang was nie en dat die skade aan die slagoffers minder belangrik is omdat verkragting 'n basiese waardigheidskending is. Die vonnis is verhoog tot 8 jaar vir die eerste en 12 jaar vir die tweede.

The appellant was charged with defilement for having unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 13 years of age. The trial court convicted him of indecent assault because there was no penetration. He appealed his conviction for indecent assault because it was not included in the original charge. He also argued that his sentence was excessive. The Court dismissed the appeal of the conviction on the grounds that where the evidence is sufficient to sustain the lesser charge of indecent assault but may not be sufficient for defilement, the accused may be convicted of the lesser crime even when it was not included in the original charge. However, the Court upheld the appeal of the sentence and lowered it, despite of the fact that women and girls need to be protected, taking into account the mitigating factor of the appellant's youth.

The appellant was charged with three criminal violations in connection with his and his coconspirators' robbery of the complainant and corresponding violence: (1) aggravated robbery with violence, (2) rape of the complainant's niece during the robbery, and (3) possession of suspected stolen property. The trial court found the appellant guilty on all counts, but the first count was reduced to simple robbery. The trial court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment for robbery, ten years imprisonment for rape, and 12 months for handling suspected stole goods, to be served concurrently. Without citing a specific reason for reducing the aggravated robbery with violence charge, the trial magistrate noted that the complainant testified that she was not injured in the robbery. The appellant first appealed to the High Court, which found the appeal had no merit and that the appellant was guilty of aggravated robbery with violence. The High Court vacated the conviction and 10-year sentence for simple robbery and imposed the death sentence for robbery with violence. In this appeal to the Court of Appeal (Kisumu), the appellant raised four concerns: (1) whether he was improperly identified as the robber and rapist because the attack took place at night when it was dark, (2) whether the first appellate court properly re-evaluated the evidence, (3) whether the High Court's substitution of simple robbery with aggravated robbery with violence was proper, and (4) whether the State was required to file a cross-appeal to entitle the High Court to substitute the simple robbery conviction with aggravated robbery with violence. The High Court documents show that the appellant was warned more than once and that at the earliest opportunity the State Counsel would seek to increase the sentence to capital robbery, but the appellant decided to proceed with the appeal. Quoting its precedent, the lower courts' records, and the Criminal Procedure Code Sec. 354, the Court of Appeal rejected all aspects of the appeal and upheld the death sentence for robbery with violence.

The appellant was convicted of defilement for having sexual intercourse with the complainant, who was 12 years old at the time. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of proofs, that there was no evidence of violent force, that the complainant was his girlfriend, and that she consented. The prosecution presented evidence of the complainant's physical injuries and the appellant's HIV-positive status. The Court dismissed the appeal because sex with any girl younger than 16 years old is unlawful regardless of consent, and the appellant had not raised the defense that he had a reasonable belief that the girl was above the age of consent. The Court rejected appellant's plea for special consideration because of his alleged HIV status. Instead, the Court cited the appellant's decision to expose a 12-year-old child to HIV/AIDS in its decision to uphold the life sentence.

The accused was charged with defilement of a girl under the age of 14 years, and was convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. He appealed for leniency on the grounds that he was remorseful, suffering from acute pneumonia and only 17 years of age at the time of the incident. The Court upheld the sentence finding that the sentence of 10 years for defilement of a girl and 5 years for indecent assault is not excessive and no circumstances existed to justify mitigating the sentence.

The accused was convicted of rape and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The sentence was appealed by the judge who reviewed the lower court's decision because the reviewing judge found the sentence inadequate. The Court upheld the sentence, stating that it was not so excessively inadequate as to merit interference and taking note of the factors used in determining sentences for rape offenders: violence used to commit the rape, a repeated rape, a carefully planned rape, whether the defendant has previous convictions for rape or other serious offenses, whether the victim was subjected to any further sexual indignities, whether the victim was very young or very old, and the physical and mental effects upon the victim. The factors to warrant a harsher sentence were not judged to be present in this case, and the sentencing judge's decision was within his discretion.

The appellant challenged the sentence for rape under the sections of the Penal Code that set forth mandatory minimum sentences for rape charges depending on circumstances such as the perpetrator's use of violence or the perpetrator's status as being HIV positive. Section 142(5) of the Penal Code prohibits a sentence for rape from running concurrently with any other offense; the sentences must be served consecutively. The appellant was convicted on two counts of rape and sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years for each count, resulting in a total of 20 years imprisonment, which he claimed was a violation of the constitutional prohibition on "torture or inhuman or degrading punishment." The Court upheld the conviction, noting that although it was undeniably severe, it was not disproportionate to the offense, especially in light of the increase in the incidence of rape in Botswana and the heinous nature of rape itself.

The 1996 Act targets sex tourism. It provides that, where an Irish citizen or a person “ordinarily resident” in Ireland (a) commits an act in another country involving a child (person under the age of 17), and (b) the act constitutes an offence under the law of that country and would constitute an offence in Ireland, then the person will be guilty of the offense under Irish law (Section 2(2)). Other offences include attempted offences (Section 2(3)); procuring, aiding or abetting, and conspiring in an offence (Sections 2(4)–2(6)); transporting persons to enable such offences (Section 3); and publishing information likely to promote offenses (Sections 4). The Act also provides for offenses committed by corporate bodies (Section 5). Penalties are up to a maximum of a £10,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment on conviction on indictment, or up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction (Section 6).

The 1998 Act prohibits trafficking of children for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) amended the 1998 Act’s provisions related to child trafficking and sexual exploitation (Section 3) and the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2013 (available here) expanded the definition of labour exploitation and aggravating factors. The 1998 Act also criminalizes allowing a child to be used for child pornography (Section 4). A person found guilty on indictment of this offence faces up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Section 5 has been substituted by Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here), which prohibits the production, distribution, and possession, inter alia, of child pornography. Persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 14 years’ imprisonment (Section 5, as amended). Section 6, as amended, prohibits the possession of child pornography; persons convicted of such offences are liable, on summary conviction, to a Class A fine (€5,000) and/or up to 12 months’ imprisonment, or conviction on indictment, to a fine and/or up to 5 years’ imprisonment. Section 13 of the Criminal Justice Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here) also inserts Section 5A, prohibiting, inter alia, causing, inciting, compelling, coercing, recruiting, inviting, or inducing of a child to participate in a pornographic performance or the gaining from such participation.

The 2008 Act, which amends the 1998 Child Trafficking and Pornography Act (available here) among other legislation, defines trafficking as when a person, in relation to another person, “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbours the person, or (i) transfers the person to, (ii) places the person in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the person to, another person, (b) causes a person to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of a person or takes a person— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the person with accommodation or employment” (Section 1). Exploitation includes labour exploitation, sexual exploitation, or exploitation consisting of the removal of one or more of the organs of a person. Labour exploitation includes subjecting the person to forced labour, forcing him or her to render services to another, or enslavement or similar servitude. Sexual exploitation includes production of pornography depicting the person alone or with others, causing the person to engage in sexual activity for the purpose of the production of pornography, prostitution of the person, or otherwise causing the person to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 1). The Act contains specific provisions regarding trafficking of a child (a person under the age of 18), which were further amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (available here). Trafficking a child for exploitation is an offense, as is selling or offering to sell a child, or purchasing or offering to purchase a child (Sections 2 and 3). There is an additional definition of “trafficks” in relation to a child, meaning that a person “(a) procures, recruits, transports or harbors the child, or— (i) transfers the child to, (ii) places the child in the custody, care or charge, or under the control, of, or (iii) otherwise delivers the child to, another person, (b) causes the child to enter or leave the State or to travel within the State, (c) takes custody of the child or takes the child— (i) into one’s care or charge, or (ii) under one’s control, or (d) provides the child with accommodation or employment” (Section 3). There is also separate definition of “sexual exploitation” in relation to a child, and includes inviting, inducing, or coercing a child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography, or inviting, inducing, or coercing the child to engage or participate in any sexual, indecent, or obscene act, etc. (Section 3). The offences of exploitation and sexual exploitation in relation to children are subject to penalties specified in sections 2 and 3; a court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. Penalties for trafficking of persons other than children are specified in Section 4; the court may sentence a person found guilty on indictment to a term of life imprisonment (or less) and a fine. The Act also explicitly provides for penalties where an accused is found guilty of attempt, incitement, or conspiracy in relation to the offences under the Act. Soliciting or importuning for purposes of prostitution of trafficked persons, or benefiting from such activities, is also an offence subject to specified penalties (Section 5), as are offences committed by corporate bodies (Section 6). Jurisdiction includes extraterritorial jurisdiction (e.g., where a person commits an act in relation to an Irish citizen in a place other than the State that, if done in the State, would constitute one of certain enumerated offenses). The Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Act 2013 (available here) further amends these provisions, in particular with expanded definitions of labour exploitation and aggravating factors.

Article 267 of the Penal Code provides for a punishment of rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor) for anyone who rapes a woman, which shall be permanent if the perpetrator is a “Specified Perpetrator, meaning an ancestor of the victim, other person responsible for her upbringing or having power over her, or a paid servant of the victim or the perpetrator . Article 267 does not address rape of men. Article 268, however, is gender-neutral. It prescribes three to seven years of rigorous imprisonment with hard labor for indecent assault of a person by force or threat, or an attempt to do so. The punishment for indecent assault may increase if (i) the victim was less than 16 years old, or (ii) the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator. The punishment for indecent assault increases to permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor when a Special Perpetrator indecently assaults a person under 16 years old. Finally, Article 269 provides that anyone who indecently assaults a minor under 18 years of age without force or punishment is subject to imprisonment. If the victim was less than seven years of age or the perpetrator is a Specified Perpetrator, the penalty is rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. Article 290 provides that kidnapping a woman is punished with permanent rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. If the kidnapper also rapes the woman, the sentence is death. English translation available here.

Law No. 10 of the Year 2021 amends the Penal Code to provide increased punishments for anyone who engages in female genital mutilation ("FGM"), which punishments range from a minimum of five years to a maximum of 20 years and depend on two factors: (a) whether the perpetrator is a licensed medical practitioner and (b) the extent of the harm inflicted on the woman or girl. Individuals who request or encourage FGM are also subject to imprisonment under this law.

The Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of Ukraine were amended in December 2017 to adopt provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). As a result of these amendments, new dangerous acts were criminalized. For example, Article 151-2 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine by providing criminal liability for forced marriage. Forced marriage (meaning coercing a person to marry, to continue a forcible marriage, to enter into cohabitation without marriage, to continue cohabitation, or to move to a territory other than that in which they reside, regardless of citizenship) is punishable by arrest for a term of up to six months, by restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by imprisonment for the same term. Article 126-1 supplemented the special part of the Criminal Code by providing criminal liability for domestic violence. Domestic violence (meaning intentional systematic physical, psychological, or economic violence against a spouse or ex-spouse or another person with whom an offender has had a family or close relationship) is punishable by community service of up to 150-240 hours, or arrest for up to six months, restriction of liberty for up to five years, or imprisonment for up to two years. A new chapter, “Restrictions,” established that, in the interests of domestic violence victims, the convicted person might be (i) banned from living with a person who suffered from domestic violence or (ii) restricted in communications with their child if the child was a victim or observer of domestic violence. In addition, these amendments provide criminal liability for failure to comply with restrictive measures, which is punishment with arrest for up to six months or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Finally, consent is valid if it is a person's exercise of free will, in consideration of attending circumstances.

У грудні 2017 року до Кримінального та Кримінально-процесуального кодексів України були внесені зміни з метою закріплення положень Конвенції Ради Європи «Про запобігання насильству щодо жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу з ними» (Стамбульська конвенція), прийнятої у 2011 році. У результаті цих змін нові суспільно небезпечні діяння були криміналізовані. Наприклад, особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України доповнено статтею 151-2, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за примушення до шлюбу. Примусовий шлюб (тобто примушування особи до вступу в шлюб або до продовження примусово укладеного шлюбу, або до вступу у співжиття без укладання шлюбу, або до продовження такого співжиття, або спонукання з цією метою особи до переміщення на територію іншої держави, ніж та, в якій вона проживає (там «проживає» означає постійне місце проживання в певному місці, не обов’язково пов’язане з громадянством) карається арештом на строк до шести місяців або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років, або позбавленням волі на той самий строк. Також у 2017 році особливу частину Кримінального кодексу України було доповнено статтею 126-1, яка передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за домашнє насильство. Домашнє насильство (тобто умисне систематичне вчинення фізичного, психологічного або економічного насильства щодо подружжя чи колишнього подружжя або іншої особи, з якою винний перебуває (перебував) у сімейних або близьких відносинах, що призводить до фізичних або психологічних страждань, розладів здоров’я, втрати працездатності, емоційної залежності або погіршення якості життя потерпілої особи) караються громадськими роботами на строк від 150 до 240 годин, або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до п'яти років, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. Додано новий розділ «Обмежувальні заходи». Встановлено, що в інтересах потерпілого від злочину, пов'язаного з домашнім насильством, на засудженого можуть бути покладені такі обов'язки: заборона перебувати в спільному місці проживання з жертвою; обмеження спілкування з дитиною у разі вчинення насильства в сім'ї щодо дитини або в її присутності; крім того, ці зміни передбачають кримінальну відповідальність за невиконання обмежувальних заходів (покарання у вигляді арешту на строк до шести місяців або обмеження волі на строк до двох років). Примітка: Згода вважається добровільною, якщо вона є результатом вільного волевиявлення особи, з урахуванням супутніх обставин.

Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and also procuring people for sex work in brothels, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 302 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine states that creating or running brothels, and procurement, shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-2,000 tax-free minimum incomes or restriction of liberty for up to two years. Article 303 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine prohibits engaging a person in prostitution or compulsion to engage in prostitution, involving deceit, blackmail or vulnerable state of a person, with imposition of violence or threat of violence, or pimping. If breached, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of three to five years. Under this Article, pimping shall mean any action of a person committed for the purpose of engaging another person in prostitution.

Статтею 302 Кримінального кодексу України передбачено, що створення або утримання місць розпусти, а також звідництво для розпусти караються штрафом від 1000 до 2000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або обмеженням волі на строк до двох років. Статтею 303 Кримінального кодексу України забороняється втягнення особи в заняття проституцією або примушування її до зайняття проституцією з використанням обману, шантажу чи уразливого стану цієї особи, або із застосуванням чи погрозою застосування насильства, або сутенерство. У разі вчинення дій, що криміналізовані цією статтею, передбачено покарання у вигляді позбавлення волі на строк від трьох до п'яти років. Відповідно до цієї статті під сутенерством слід розуміти дії особи по забезпеченню заняття проституцією іншою особою.

The Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 300 prohibits the importation, manufacture or distribution of works that promulgate violence and cruelty, racial, national or religious intolerance and discrimination. Importation into Ukraine for sale or distribution purposes, or manufacture, storage, transportation or other movement for the same purposes, or sale or distribution of works (and also compelling others to participate in the creation of such works) that promulgate discrimination, among other things, are criminalized by Article 300. These dangerous culpable acts shall be punishable by a fine of 1,000-4,000 tax-free minimum incomes, or arrest for a term of up to six months, or restriction of liberty for a term of up to three years. Committing the same actions with regard to motion pictures and video films that promulgate discrimination, and also selling works that promulgate discrimination, to minors or distribution of such works among minors are as aggravating circumstances.

Ввезення в Україну творів, що пропагують, серед іншого, дискримінацію, з метою збуту чи розповсюдження або їх виготовлення, зберігання, перевезення чи інше переміщення з тією самою метою або їх збут чи розповсюдження (а також примушування до участі в їх створенні) криміналізовано статтею 300. Ці небезпечні винні дії караються штрафом від 1000 до 4000 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або арештом на строк до шести місяців, або обмеженням волі на строк до трьох років. Ті самі дії щодо кіно- та відеопродукції, що пропагують дискримінацію, а також збут такої продукції неповнолітнім чи розповсюдження серед них творів, що пропагують дискримінацію є кваліфікуючою ознакою цього злочину, що обтяжує покарання.

Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides criminal liability for trafficking in human beings, as well as recruitment, movement, concealment, transfer, or receipt of a person committed for the purpose of exploitation, coercion, abduction, fraud, blackmail, material, or other dependence of the victim, their vulnerable condition or bribery of a third-party controlling victim, to obtain consent for their exploitation. A person who commits such socially dangerous acts shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years. Article 149 defines exploitation of a human being as including, among other things, all forms of the sexual exploitation, forcing someone to work in the pornography industry, forced pregnancy or forced termination of pregnancy, forced marriage, etc. The Article also provides an explanation of a person's “vulnerable state” (i.e., physical or mental properties or external circumstances, that eliminate or limit the ability to realize their acts (omission) or to control them, to take independent decisions, to resist the violent or other unlawful actions, the coincidence of difficult personal, family, or other circumstances).

Стаття 149 Кримінального кодексу України передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за торгівлю людьми, а так само вербування, переміщення, переховування, передачу або одержання людини, вчинені з метою експлуатації, з використанням примусу, викрадення, обману, шантажу, матеріальної чи іншої залежності потерпілого, його уразливого стану або підкупу третьої особи, яка контролює потерпілого, для отримання згоди на його експлуатацію. Особа, яка вчинила вищезгадані суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до восьми років. Згідно примітки до цієї статті під експлуатацією людини, серед іншого, розуміються всі форми сексуальної експлуатації, використання в порнобізнесі, примусову вагітність або примусове переривання вагітності, примусове одруження тощо. У примітці також надається визначення поняття "уразливий стан особи" (тобто це зумовлений фізичними чи психічними властивостями або зовнішніми обставинами стан особи, який позбавляє або обмежує її здатність усвідомлювати свої дії (бездіяльність) або керувати ними, приймати за своєю волею самостійні рішення, чинити опір насильницьким чи іншим незаконним діям, збіг тяжких особистих, сімейних або інших обставин).

The Penal Code includes the follow aggravating circumstances if a crime involves discrimination on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, place of birth, sex, sexual orientation, sexual harassment, belief or religion, political or ideological convictions, social ideological convictions, social status or origin, or any other form of discrimination.

O Código Penal inclui as seguintes circunstâncias agravantes: se o crime envolve discriminação com base em raça, cor, etnia, local de nascença, sexo, orientação sexual, assédio sexual, crença ou religião, convicção política ou ideológica, convicção ideológica social, status social ou origem, ou qualquer outra forma de discriminação.

This section states crimes against sexual freedom, including the conditions under which sexual encounters violate a woman’s safety and the punishments thereafter. Anyone who engages in sexual activity without the woman’s consent by means of violence or physical intimidation, even if an act of artificial procreation, is subject to two to eight years in prison. Those who have sexual encounters with minors face imprisonment of 16-20 years. Anyone who takes advantage of a hierarchical position in a workplace to constrain someone to obtain sexual advantage is punished with imprisonment up to two years and a fine.

Essa seção estabelece os crimes contra a Liberdade sexual, incluindo as condições nas quais os encontros sexuais violam a segurança da mulher e as punições referentes. Aquele que inicia atividade sexual sem o consentimento da mulher por meio de violência ou intimidação física, ainda que seja um ato de procriação artificial, está sujeito a pena de dois a oito anos de prisão. Aquele que mantém encontros sexuais com menores encaram uma prisão de 16-20 anos. Aquele que tira proveito da sua posição hierárquica em um ambiente professional para constranger alguém para obter vantagem sexual é punido com prisão de até dois anos e multa.

Law No. 350-3 defines human trafficking and sets out measures to prevent human trafficking and related crimes. These include identifying victims of trafficking, educating, and providing information to citizens on related issues. The law further sets out measures for the protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, including ensuring their safety, providing temporary accommodation, legal, medical, and psychological assistance, among others. The law provides that persons guilty of trafficking in persons or related crimes are punishable in accordance with the legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus and the victim's "unwillingness or inability" to change his or her "anti-social behavior" caused by the trafficking does not eliminate or mitigate the offender's liability.\

Art. 199 prohibits the unjustified refusal to hire or the unlawful firing of a person, including a woman for reasons related to her pregnancy. This crime is punishable by a prohibition to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities, correctional labor, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.

For several crimes set out in the Criminal Code, knowing commission against a pregnant woman is an aggravating circumstance that increases the sentence. Murdering a pregnant woman is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8 to 12 years, life imprisonment, or the death sentence under Art. 139. Torture of a pregnant woman is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of one to three years or imprisonment for a term of one to five years under Art. 154. Taking a pregnant woman hostage is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 6 to 12 years under Art. 291.

Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.

The purpose of the Act is to provide protection for victims of domestic violence, to prevent and eliminate violence within domestic relationships, to ensure the safety of children who witness or experience domestic violence, and to enact provisions consistent with Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Act defines domestic violence in detail (See Part 1, Section 4.1.a-c) and allows victims of domestic violence to file for protection orders and allows a court to issue an emergency or ex parte protection order (See Part 2: Protection Orders). The Act also mandates government ministries to enact public awareness programs on violence within families, the collection of data regarding the incidences and frequency of domestic violence to support preventative measures, and training regarding human rights and the equality of women for public officials, health care professionals, and police officers. It also provides for the establishment of support facilities for victims of domestic and gender-based violence. (See Part 3: Prevention and Response). The Act also provides that police personnel while responding to a report of domestic violence sufficiently supported by evidence must undertake to do all things necessary for a court to commence the criminal prosecution of the matter. (See Part 4: Police Powers and Duties, Section 30.) Health care professionals who have provided assistance to victims of domestic violence must advise the victim about counseling and advise the victim to file a report with the police. (See Part 5: Role of Health Care Professionals and Social Service Providers.) Lastly, the Act prescribes that the crime of domestic violence is punishable by six months to three years imprisonment, as well as accompanying monetary fines. Certain circumstances such as repeat offenses, offenses against pregnant women or persons with special needs, domestic violence committed against or witnessed by a child, violence resulting in severe or life-threatening injury, or acts committed with a weapon constitute aggravations resulting in enhanced penalties to offenders. (See Section 6: Offences and Penalties.)

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act replaced the Ordinance of the same name which was promulgated in the aftermath of the Kathua Rape case in Jammu & Kashmir region of India in 2018, which involved the rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl. The Act amended various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, Indian Evidence Act, and The Code of Criminal Procedure. Notably, the Act increased the minimum punishment for rape from seven years to ten years of rigorous imprisonment which is extendable to life imprisonment. The penalty for rape of a girl under 16 years of age has also been increased to 20 years of imprisonment extendable to life, a significant increase from the original term of 10 years. Rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with imprisonment of minimum 20 years extendable to life or with capital punishment. Lastly, the gang rape of a girl under 12 years of age has been made punishable with life imprisonment or capital punishment. The Act includes measures related to bail restrictions, speedy trial, and strengthening prosecution.

Rape is defined as using force, armed threats, drugs, or other means to coerce sexual intercourse with a woman against her will (where such woman is not the offender’s spouse), and is subject to three to five years of imprisonment. When the victim is between 15 to 18 years old, or is the offender’s dependent or patient, the offender is subject to 5-10 years of imprisonment. When the victim is under 15 years old, the offender committed battery, or the rape resulted the victim’s disability or caused the victim’s death, the offender is subject to 7-15 years of imprisonment. When the victim is also murdered, the offender is subject to 15-20 years of imprisonment, and may be sentenced to life imprisonment or death penalty. Violators are also subject to fines ranging from 5 million to 70 million kip. Attempted rape is also punishable. "Marital rape" through use of force or threats is also punishable by article 252 ("Sexual Intercourse by Force with a Female Spouse"), but separately and differently from other rape offenses. Violators of article 252 may face three months to one year imprisonment or re-education without imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 3 million kip. If the rape of a female spouse results in serious injury, the penalties increase to one to five years in prison and a fine of 1 million to 5 million kip. While article 248 includes male victims of rape, article 252's prohibition on marital rape only applies to female spouses. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.

Discrimination against women or restriction of women’s participation in any political, economic, socio-cultural or family activity based on gender reasons is subject to one to three years of imprisonment. Violators are subject to “public criticism,” “re-education without deprivation of liberty,” or imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of 3 million to 10 million kip. English translation available from the Laos Official Gazette here.

Female genital mutilation is punishable as a form of child abuse under sections 300-304, 307, and 308 of the Criminal Code. Such abuse carries a maximum sentence of 12 years or a maximum fine of 76,000 euros. Parents who perform the circumcision themselves on their own daughter or on a child over whom they exercise parental authority or whom they care for or raise, may serve a one-third increase in their prison sentence, per section 304(1). Parents and custodians are also punishable if they allow and/or support the procedure to be performed, order it, pay for it, provide the means for it and/or assist the circumciser during the circumcision, as these acts are considered soliciting, abetting or co-perpetration under Dutch criminal law. Though FGM is not specifically mentioned in these sections, the General Provisions Section 5(3°) explicitly includes FGM in these Title XX-XXI provisions. (Unofficial English translation of the Criminal Code as of 2012 available here: http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStra...)

A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.

La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.

A man who kills a woman through an act of gender violence is liable for life imprisonment ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").

Un hombre que mata a una mujer mediante un acto de violencia de género es condenado a cadena perpetua ("reclusión perpetua o prisión perpetua").

Chapter 16 sets forth criminal offenses for conduct against the family. §16.3 provides that an abortion after 24 weeks of pregnancy is a felony, unless it is conducted by a licensed physician upon his belief that the pregnancy causes danger to the mother or the child would be born with a grave defect. §16.1-16.2 prohibits bigamy, polygamy, incest, or deviate sexual intercourse with a family member and designates these acts as felonies. Separately, the Law prohibits harassment, which is defined as a written threat, an offensive telephone call, or repeated telephone calls with no legitimate communication purpose with the intent to frighten or harass the recipient. Chapter 14 Subchapter D outlines crimes involving sexual violence against persons committed on or after January 17, 2006. The age for statutory rape is 18 years. Gang rape constitutes first-degree felony. The Law defines lack of “consent” as including violence or the threat of violence against the victim or another person, the victim’s unconsciousness, a physical disability that prevents the victim from being able to to communicate his or her consent, or intentionally forcing the victim’s consent. The following acts constitute first-degree rape: rape of an underage victim, gang rape, rape that results in permanent disability to the victim, and use of a deadly weapon. The maximum punishment for first-degree rape is life imprisonment, and the maximum punishment for second-degree rape is 10 years imprisonment. Chapter 14 Subchapter D also covers sexual violence crimes committed before January 17, 2006. For those earlier offenses, the following constitute rape: a male has sexual intercourse with a female that is not his wife by force or by impairing her power to control her conduct; or a male has sexual intercourse with a female less than 16 years old. First-degree rape includes the following: the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female under 16 years of age, or the defendant has sexual intercourse with a female who has not previously consented. The change of language regarding crimes committed after 2006 indicates several important gender-related developments. First, the new language explicitly allows for the prosecution of men and women as perpetrators of rape. Second, it allows for the prosecution of rapes of male victims. Third, it no longer exempts “marital rape” from prosecution. Finally, it raises the age of statutory rape from 16 to 18 years. However, the Law also criminalizes homosexuality, making “voluntary sodomy” a misdemeanor (chapter 14.74).

On June 21, 2018, the NSW Parliament passed the Act to supplement existing criminal legislation both at the NSW (e.g., Crimes Act 1900 and Human Tissue Act 1983) and Commonwealth levels (e.g., the Criminal Code Act 1995). The Act defines “modern slavery” as “any conduct involving the use of any form of slavery, servitude or forced labour to exploit children or other persons taking place in the supply chains of government agencies or non-government agencies.” The Act provides for an Anti-slavery Commissioner and establishes a Modern Slavery Committee.

The Act aims to prevent, ensure accountability for, and apply standards set by the United Nations and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women to domestic violence. It aims to fulfill these objectives by “empowering courts to make apprehended domestic violence orders to protect people from domestic violence, intimidation (including harassment) and stalking” (§ 9(2)(a)). Intimidation is defined as: “conduct amounting to harassment or molestation of the person,” “an approach made to the person by any means (including by telephone, telephone text messaging, e-mailing, and other technologically assisted means) that causes the person to fear for his or her safety,” or “any conduct that causes a reasonable apprehension of injury to a person or to a person with whom he or she has a domestic relationship, or of violence or damage to any person or property” (§ 7(1)). Stalking is defined as following, watching, frequenting the vicinity of or approaching a person’s place of residence, business or work, or any place that a person frequents for the purposes of any social or leisure activity (§ 8(1)). The Act (at Parts 3 and 4) gives courts the authority to issue orders relating to apprehended domestic or personal violence. The Act provides that a “person who stalks or intimidates another person with the intention of causing the other person to fear physical or mental harm” may be punished with up to five years imprisonment (§ 13(1)). A person who “knowingly contravenes a prohibition or restriction specified in an apprehended violence order made against the person” may be punished with up to two years imprisonment (§ 14(1)).

NSW, much like the rest of Australia, suffers from high incidents of domestic violence. Across Australia, one in three women have experienced physical and/or sexual violence perpetrated by someone known to them, one in five women have been stalked during their lifetime, and on average one woman is killed every week by a current or former partner. Aboriginal women and girls are 35 times more likely than the wider female population to be hospitalised due to family violence. In 2016, the NSW Minister for the Prevention of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, launched the ‘NSW Domestic Family Violence Blueprint for Reform 2016-2021: Safer Lives for Women, Men and Children’ setting out actions to reform the domestic violence system in NSW over a five-year period (the blueprint is the first of its kind in Australia). The NSW Government has allocated AUD 350 million in the 2017/18 budget over a four-year period to fund the effort. (http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/Pages/bocsar_pages/Domestic-Violence.aspx; https://www.whiteribbon.org.au/understand-domestic-violence/facts-violence-women/domestic-violence-statistics/; http://www.domesticviolence.nsw.gov.au/home)

Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.

España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.

The Criminal Code defines and criminalizes domestic violence under Article 194, which is the main legislation providing for domestic violence prosecution. Domestic violence is defined as the “use of violence, threat of attacks against life or body, insolent or ruthless behaviour [that] endangers the tranquility, physical integrity or mental condition of a member of his family.” The definition of “family member” does not include ex-spouses or unmarried partners who do not live together or have children. The penalties for domestic violence under the Criminal Code are fines or imprisonment for up to 15 years. In 2017, new crimes for stalking (Art. 138a) and sexual harassment (Art. 182a) were added to the Criminal Code. Additionally, the minimum statutory sentence for rape was increased from three years to five years. In 2019, amendments to the Criminal code introduced life imprisonment without conditional release for those who commit crimes of rape or murder of children, pregnant women, or disabled persons. New crimes for stalking, sexual harassment, female genital mutilation, and forced marriage were also introduced. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

This law defines, prohibits, and facilitates the treatment of perpetrators of domestic violence through a system of protection orders. The law stipulates family relationship to exist among persons beyond spouses and parent/child. It includes people who are/were engaged, in an extra-marital union, or co-habitating in a common household, and recognizes domestic violence to include abuses such as causing fear, insults, derogative behavior, and non-consensual sex. The law contemplates various protection measures that can be ordered by the courts, such as those prohibiting the approach or harassment of the victim, mandating medical treatment for substance abuse, and authorizing accompaniment by a police officer. A petition for a protection order or emergency protection order can be submitted by not only the victim and his/her representatives, but also by NGOs. The courts are required to render a decision within 15 days of receipt of a petition for protection order, and within 24 hours after the submission of a petition for emergency protection order. A protection order or emergency protection order shall be issued under the Law where the court suspects the perpetrator shall unavoidably risk the health, safety, or well-being of the protected party. A decision regarding a protection order or emergency protection order may be appealed, but the filing of the appeal does not stay the execution of the order. The Law further provides temporary emergency protection orders, petitions for which can be submitted to the police outside the courts’ working hours, which expire at the end of the next court working day. The police may issue a temporary emergency protection order if the perpetrator poses an immediate threat to the safety, healthy, or well-being of the protected party and the issuance of the order is necessary to protect against such a threat. A violation of a protection order, emergency protection order, or temporary emergency protection order is punishable by a fine of 200 to 2,000 Euros, or imprisonment of up to six months. (Unofficial English version available here.)

This Act prescribes measures to prevent and combat trafficking in persons with particular regard to victims who are women and children, and aims to assist victims of trafficking and facilitating efficient investigation of cases of trafficking. The offence of trafficking is committed if a person recruits, transports, transfer, harbors or receives another person within Jamaica, from Jamaica to another country, or from another country to Jamaica. A person found guilty of an offence in terms of the Act is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years.

Esta ley prescribe medidas para prevenir y combatir la trata de personas con especial atención a las víctimas que son mujeres y niños, y tiene como objetivo ayudar a las víctimas de la trata y facilitar la investigación eficaz de los casos de trata. El delito de trata se comete si una persona recluta, transporta, traslada, alberga o recibe a otra persona dentro de Jamaica, de Jamaica a otro país o de otro país a Jamaica. Una persona declarada culpable de este delito en los términos de la ley puede ser sancionada con una multa o con una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años.

The Child Pornography (Prevention) Act prohibits the production, distribution, importation, exportation or possession of child pornography and the use of children for pornography A “Child” is a male or a female person under the age of 18 years. Child pornography constitutes any visual representation, any audio recording or written material depicting engagement of a child in sexual activity or depicts body parts of child for sexual purposes, or depicts a child subject to torture, cruelty, or physical abuse of a sexual context. A person who has custody of, charge or care of a child and knowingly causes or incites the involvement of a child in the production of child pornography commits an offence and will be liable for a fine or to imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 15 years. The production or distribution of child pornography carries a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years. Possession of child pornography carries a penalty of a fine or imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 8 years. The receipt of any financial benefit from any offence in terms of the act carries a penalty of a fine or imprisonment (or both) for a term not exceeding 20 years. The act preserves the identity of the victims, thereby preventing any disclosure in relation to the victim. Any person that publishes information in contravention of the act shall be liable for a fine not exceeding one million dollars or imprisonment for a maximum period of 12 months.

La Ley (de prevención) de la pornografía infantil prohíbe la producción, distribución, importación, exportación o posesión de pornografía infantil y el uso de niños para la pornografía. Un "niño" es un hombre o una mujer menor de 18 años. La pornografía infantil constituye cualquier representación visual, cualquier grabación de audio o material escrito que represente la participación de un niño en una actividad sexual o que muestre partes del cuerpo de un niño con fines sexuales, o que represente a un niño sujeto a tortura, crueldad o abuso físico de un contexto sexual. Una persona que tiene la custodia, el cargo o el cuidado de un niño y, a sabiendas, causa o incita a la participación de un niño en la producción de pornografía infantil, comete un delito y será responsable de una multa o de prisión (o ambas) por un período máximo a 15 años. La producción o distribución de pornografía infantil conlleva una pena de prisión por un período no superior a 20 años. La posesión de pornografía infantil conlleva una pena de multa o encarcelamiento (o ambos) por un período no superior a 8 años. La recepción de cualquier beneficio económico de cualquier delito en términos del acto conlleva una pena de multa o prisión (o ambas) por un período no superior a 20 años. El acto preserva la identidad de las víctimas, impidiendo así cualquier revelación en relación con la víctima. Toda persona que publique información en contravención a la ley será responsable de una multa que no exceda de un millón de dólares o pena de prisión por un período máximo de 12 meses.

The Domestic Violence Act (“DVA”), originally enacted in 1996 and amended in 2004, aims to provide protections for women and children domestic violence situations. It gives courts the power to grant protection and occupation orders. Applications for such orders can be brought by the victim or, in the case of a child, a parent, guardian, constable, or social worker can bring an application on the child’s behalf. The DVA sets forth the limitations imposed by protective orders, and it states courts can grant such an order if “it is satisfied that” the individual against whom the order is sought used or threatened to use violence, mental or physical, against the person seeking the order. Even without that showing, the court can grant a protective order if it finds the order necessary for the protection of the person “having regard to all circumstances.” The court can grant protection and occupation orders on an ex parte basis if the court deems it necessary. Punishment for violating an order is a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months, or both.

This statute makes it illegal to harass or to knowingly and repeatedly follow another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Under the statute, stalking is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.

Article 144-A bans female genital mutilation and imposes a prison sentence of 2-10 years. Article 145 imposes greater penalties for offenses against physical integrity and female genital mutilation if the crime is committed, among other special circumstances, against the current or former spouse or a person with whom the perpetrator has a romantic relationship, regardless of sex and gender; if the victim is pregnant; or if the crime is committed due to the victim’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Article 118 provides that the statute of limitations on crimes of sexual violence and female genital mutilation against minors do not expire until the victim is at least 23 years old. Article 152 establishes the crime of domestic violence, punishable with imprisonment from 1-5 years. The crime consists of mental or physical abuse, including mistreatment, corporal punishment and sexual offenses, inflicted once or repeatedly on the following victims (1) a current or former spouse; (2) a person with whom the perpetrator has or had a relationship akin to a spousal relationship; (3) a parent of the perpetrator’s child; (4) a person who is incapable to defend him/herself due to age, disability, pregnancy, illness or economic dependency to the perpetrator. In addition, under Article 152, (1) the minimum imprisonment penalty is increased from one to two years if the perpetrator publicizes the victim’s personal information or any other private information (including information stored on audio or video) via Internet or other means available; (2) the perpetrator may be prohibited of having contact with the victim; (3) the perpetrator may be prohibited from being granted a gun license; (4) the perpetrator may lose parenting rights for up to 10 years. Also, Article 152 imposes a sentence of 2-8 years imprisonment if the domestic violence results in serious physical injury, which increases to imprisonment to 3-10 years if the domestic violence results in death.

O artigo 114 proíbe a realização de mutilação genital feminina, impondo pena de prisão de dois a 10 anos. O artigo 145 estabelece penas maiores aos crimes de ofensa contra a integridade física e mutilação genital feminina, se o crime for cometido, dentre outras circunstâncias, contra cônjuge ou ex-cônjuge ou contra pessoa no qual o agente tenha estabelecido um relacionamento romântico, independente do gênero ou do sexo, se a vítima estiver grávida ou se o crime for cometido em razão do gênero, orientação sexual ou identidade de gênero da vítima. O artigo 118 estabelece que os crimes contra a liberdade e autodeterminação sexual de menores, bem como no crime de mutilação genital feminina sendo a vítima menor, o procedimento criminal não se extingue, por efeito da prescrição, antes de o ofendido perfazer 23 anos. O artigo 152 versa sobre o crime de violência doméstica, punível com prisão de um a cinco anos. O crime consiste em abuso mental ou físico, incluindo maus-tratos, castigos corporais e ofensas sexuais, infligidos uma ou várias vezes às seguintes vítimas (1) atual ou ex-cônjuge; (2) uma pessoa com a qual o agente tem ou teve uma relação semelhante a uma relação conjugal; (3) um dos pais do filho do agente; (4) uma pessoa incapaz de se defender devido à idade, deficiência, gravidez, doença ou dependência econômica do agente. Além disso, nos termos do artigo 152, (1) a pena mínima de prisão é aumentada de um para dois anos se o agente divulgar as informações pessoais da vítima ou qualquer outra informação privada (inclusive informações armazenadas em áudio ou vídeo) via Internet ou outros meios disponíveis; (2) o agente pode ser proibido de entrar em contato com a vítima; (3) o agente pode ser proibido de receber uma licença de porte de arma; (4) o agente pode perder os direitos parentais por até 10 anos. Além disso, o Artigo 152 pune com prisão de dois a oito anos caso a violência doméstica resulte em sérios danos físicos e pune com prisão de três a dez anos se a violência doméstica resultar em morte.

This act defines human trafficking and provides punishment for and methods of preventing human trafficking. §1.100-§1.102 of the act define human trafficking as including recruitment, transportation, and retention of a person by force or coercion for the purpose of slavery, forced labor, keeping a person in a state of servitude, prostitution, other commercial sexual exploitation, and removal of human organs. §3 provides that a person that commits trafficking must pay restitution to the victim. §7 provides that the Court shall sentence a person convicted of human trafficking to prison for at least one year, and that the offender can be sentenced to prison for longer periods under different situations. §8 provides that the fact that the victim was old enough to consent to sex shall not serve as a defense to the human trafficking offense. While §9 provides that the victim is immune from the prostitution or other criminal offenses caused by human trafficking. Art. II, §1 provides that the President shall implement a National Plan to prevent human trafficking and shall appoint members to a task force on implementation, which shall be led by the Minister of Labor. The Law also provides that a victim has a right to restitution including damages to compensate for costs of medical treatment, rehabilitation, transportation costs, lost income, legal fees, and general compensation for distress and pain as well as any other loss suffered. Compensation is paid by the defendant directly to the victim upon conviction. The right to restitution is not affected by the victim returning to his or her home country or by the victim not being present in Liberia. Section 9 provides immunity to any immigration offence that may have been committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Additionally, under Section 8, the Law confirms that consent to sex is not a valid defence to trafficking when violence is used to commit the crime. The Law also imposes corporate liability on international transport companies that fail to verify that passengers in company vehicles which enter other countries have the requisite travel documentation. A company may be fined for failing to comply. Additionally, a company that knowingly facilitates trafficking is liable for the cost of accommodating and providing meals to the victim and any dependent.

This legislation introduces the concept of “domestic violence,” which is defined as act (or omission) of physical, sexual, psychological, or economic violence (intentional deprivation of housing, food, clothing, other property, funds or documents or the ability to use them; leaving without care; hampering the receipt of necessary treatment or rehabilitation services; prohibition of, or compulsion to, work; prohibition of studies; and other offenses of an economic nature) committed within a family or between relatives, or between spouses or ex-spouses, former or current spouses, or other persons who have lived together as a family, irrespective of whether the person who committed domestic violence lives (or lived) together with the victim, as well as a threat of similar actions. The Act contains a series of governmental steps aimed at combatting domestic violence and improving the status of victims of domestic violence, which includes that the Ukrainian government (i) maintain a unified state register of cases of domestic violence and sex-based violence; (ii) establish a domestic violence call center; (iii) adopt immediate injunctions with respect to domestic violence offenders; (iv) provide free legal, medical, social, and psychological assistance to all victims in all cases of domestic violence; and (v) reimburse inflicted harm and damage to the victim’s physical and psychological health. The Act, through amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses Act and the Criminal Code, makes domestic violence or sex-based violence without grave consequences punishable by a fine in the amount of 20 non-taxable minimal income wages or public works for up to 30 - 40 hours or administrative detention for up to 10 days. If such actions are repeated within a year, the punishment is increased up to 40 non-taxable minimal income wages, public works for a period of up to 60 hours, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days. Domestic violence or sex-based violence that results in grave consequences is punishable by public works for up to 240 hours or detention for up to six months or imprisonment for up to two years.

Закон України «Про захист від насильства в сім’ї» (далі – «Закон») вводить поняття «домашнє насильство», яке визначається як діяння (дії або бездіяльність) фізичного, сексуального, психологічного або економічного насильства, що вчиняються в сім’ї чи в межах місця проживання або між родичами, або між колишнім чи теперішнім подружжям, або між іншими особами, які спільно проживають (проживали) однією сім’єю, але не перебувають (не перебували) у родинних відносинах чи у шлюбі між собою, незалежно від того, чи проживає (проживала) особа, яка вчинила домашнє насильство, у тому самому місці, що й постраждала особа, а також погрози вчинення таких діянь. (Економічне насильство - форма домашнього насильства, що включає умисне позбавлення житла, їжі, одягу, іншого майна, коштів чи документів або можливості користуватися ними, залишення без догляду чи піклування, перешкоджання в отриманні необхідних послуг з лікування чи реабілітації, заборону працювати, примушування до праці, заборону навчатися та інші правопорушення економічного характеру). Закон містить низку заходів, спрямованих на боротьбу з домашнім насильством та покращення статусу жертв домашнього насильства, серед яких, зокрема, ведення урядом України Єдиного державного реєстру випадків домашнього насильства та сексуального насильства та створення відповідного кол-центру, прийняття невідкладних заходів щодо винних у домашньому насильстві, надання безоплатної правової допомоги всім потерпілим у всіх випадках домашнього насильства, безоплатної медичної, соціальної та психологічної допомоги, відшкодування завданої шкоди. Кодексом України про адміністративні правопорушення передбачено відповідальність за домашнє насильство (без тяжких наслідків) у вигляді штрафу в розмірі двадцяти неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян або громадські роботи на строк до від 30 до 40 годин або адміністративний арешт на строк до 10 семи діб. Кримінальний Кодекс передбачає відповідальність за домашнє насильство (яке спричинило тяжкі наслідки)у вигляді громадських робіт на строк до 240 годин або арешту на строк до 6 місяців, або позбавлення волі на строк до двох років. У разі повторного вчинення подібних дій протягом року передбачається посилення покарання: штраф до 40 неоподатковуваних мінімумів доходів громадян, громадські роботи на строк до 60 годин або адміністративний арешт на строк до 15 діб.