Women and Justice: Topics: Abortion and reproductive health rights, Employment discrimination, Gender discrimination

Article 56 of the Labor Code stipulates the employer's obligation to set part-time working hours for certain categories of employees, including (i) pregnant women; (ii) women with children under the age of 14 and/or a child with a disability; (iii) women caring for a sick family member. The scope of their labor rights is not limited; such women still have the right to a full-time vacation and social benefits. For part-time work days, a person is paid in proportion to the time worked. Article 60-1 provides for the right of pregnant women and women with children to choose to work from home. At the same time, a woman can work from home only if: (i) it is possible, taking into account the nature of the work they performed and (ii) employer has the appropriate resources and means to do so.

Стаття 56 Кодексу законів про працю України передбачає обов’язок роботодавця встановлювати неповний робочий час для окремих категорій працівників, у тому числі (I) для вагітних жінок; (II) жінок, які мають дітей віком до 14 років та/або дитину з інвалідністю; (III) жінок, які доглядають за хворим членом сім'ї. Обсяг їх трудових прав не обмежений; такі жінки зберігають право на повну відпустку та соціальні виплати. За неповний робочий день робота особа оплачується пропорційно відпрацьованому часу. Стаття 601 передбачає право вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей, вибирати роботу вдома. Водночас жінка може працювати вдома, лише якщо: (I) це можливо з урахуванням характеру виконуваної роботи та (II) роботодавець має для цього відповідні ресурси та засоби.

The Procedure establishes a list of measures and services for the prevention of an unintended pregnancy, abortion procedures, and the prevention of post-operative complications. In Ukraine, artificial termination of pregnancy is permissible at the woman's request up to 12 weeks. From 12-22 weeks, pregnancy can be terminated only under a number of conditions specified in the legislation, for example, if the pregnancy occurred as a result of rape or, the woman became disabled during pregnancy. For a violation of these rules, the doctor may be held criminally liable for illegal abortion (Article 134 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). Currently, there are certain problems in the regulation of abortions of minor girls in Ukraine. In particular, the Procedure states that a girl who has reached the age of 14 can independently apply to a hospital to provide her with an abortion, without consent of her parents. However, this rule creates a conflict in Ukraine’s abortion laws because: (i) the Civil Code of Ukraine provides the right of the child's legal representatives to information about the child's state of health; (ii) other legislative acts of Ukraine determine that the patient's informed consent is valid after receiving full information about his health, and such information can be obtained only from the age of 18. Under these rules, the abortion of a minor girl without consent and informing her parents is considered illegal. Based on the analysis of these rules, it can be concluded that Ukraine belongs to the category of states where abortions are allowed at the request of a woman (according to the principle 'my body is my own'). This means that in order to access an abortion service, a woman only has to go to the appropriate health care facility. However, there are certain conditions when such a service is permissible.

Порядок встановлює перелік заходів і послуг із запобігання небажаній вагітності, процедур переривання вагітності та запобігання післяопераційних ускладнень. В Україні дозволено штучне переривання вагітності за бажанням жінки до 12 тижнів. Після 12 до 22 тижнів вагітність може бути перервана лише за наявності певних умов, визначених законодавством, наприклад, якщо вагітність настала внаслідок зґвалтування або жінка під час вагітності стала інвалідом. За порушення цих правил лікар може бути притягнутий до кримінальної відповідальності за незаконне проведення аборту (ст. 134 Кримінального кодексу України). Наразі в Україні існують певні проблеми щодо регулювання абортів неповнолітніх дівчат. Зокрема, у Порядку зазначено, що дівчина, яка досягла 14 років, може самостійно звернутися до лікарні для проведення їй аборту без згоди батьків. Однак ця норма створює суперечності в законодавстві України про аборти, оскільки: (I) Цивільний кодекс України передбачає право законних представників дитини на інформацію про стан здоров’я дитини; (II) іншими законодавчими актами України визначено, що інформована згода пацієнта є правомірною після отримання повної інформації про стан його здоров’я, і така інформація може бути отримана лише з 18 років. Згідно з цими правилами аборт неповнолітньої дівчини без згоди та повідомлення її батьків вважається незаконним. Виходячи з аналізу цих норм, можна зробити висновок, що Україна належить до категорії держав, де дозволені аборти за бажанням жінки (за принципом "моє тіло — моє"). Це означає, що для того, щоб отримати послугу аборту, жінці достатньо звернутися до відповідного медичного закладу. Однак є певні умови, коли така послуга дозволена.

The Act provides for parentage in case of donor-assisted human reproduction (“DAHR”) (Part 2), issues relating to DAHR facilities (including acquisition of gametes by operators) (Part 3), and amendments to the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Part 4), Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act 1976, the Status of Children Act 1987, Family Law Act 1995, and among other legislation, to reflect rights and responsibilities of spouses or civil partners of biological parents and to take into account DAHR situations. The Act provides that a child born as a result of a DAHR procedure shall have as parents the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant, provided that the mother and her spouse, civil partner, or cohabitant have consented to the latter being a parent to the child (Section 5). When construed as the parents of the child, the mother and any other parent, as the case may be, shall have all parental rights and duties in respect of the child (Section 5(3)). The donor of a gamete or embryo used in a DAHR procedure is not the parent of the child nor do they have any parental rights or duties in respect of the child (Section 5(5) and Section 5(6)). A person can only consent to providing a gamete for use in a DAHR procedure where they have attained the age of 18, have received the necessary information pursuant to the Act, and made a declaration pursuant to the Act (Section 6). An intending mother and her partner must be over the age of 21 to consent to parentage (Sections 9, 11).

Article 260 of the Penal Code provides that whoever willfully causes an abortion by beating or other violent injuries shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment (meaning imprisonment with hard labor per Article 13) (“Rigorous Imprisonment”). Those who provide medicine or other means of inducing abortion, with or without the consent of the pregnant woman, are subject to imprisonment (Article 261). It is also a crime for women to have an abortion using medicines or other means (Article 262). Any doctor, surgeon, pharmacist, or midwife who provides an abortion is subject to rigorous imprisonment with hard labor. However, attempted abortion is not a punishable offense (Article 264). English translation available here.

This law serves as the basis for the Colombian Criminal Code, it enumerates conducts that constitute crimes and their sanctions. The code sets forth several gender-related crimes. Article 104A criminalizes femicide, meaning the killing of women because they are female. Article 123 sanctions people who forcibly terminate a pregnancy. Article 187 prohibits forcing in-vitro treatments on women against their will. Article 229 regulates domestic violence offenses. Articles 208 and following criminalize rape and establish aggravating circumstances including, among others, if the victim is under 14 years old, if the victim is incapable of defending him or herself, if the abuser used violence and if the abuse was held within the household. Article 116 A prohibits the use of chemical agents or corrosive substances that cause injuries or harm when they come into contact with human tissue. Finally, for some crimes, the code treats as an aggravating circumstance the fact that the victim is a woman. Law 1719 of June 18, 2014 modified and expanded these provisions.

Esta ley que contiene el Código Penal colombiano enumera las conductas que constituyen delitos y sus sanciones. El código establece varios delitos relacionados con el género. El artículo 104A tipifica como delito el feminicidio, es decir, el asesinato de mujeres solo por el hecho de ser mujeres. El artículo 123 sanciona a las personas que obligan a la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo. El artículo 187 prohíbe realizar tratamientos in vitro a mujeres en contra de su voluntad. El artículo 229 regula el delito de violencia doméstica. Los artículos 208 y siguientes tipifican como delito la violación y establecen circunstancias agravantes que incluyen, entre otras, que la víctima sea menor de 14 años, que sea incapaz de defenderse por sí misma, si el abusador usó violencia y si el abuso se llevó a cabo dentro del hogar. El artículo 116 A prohíbe el uso de agentes químicos o sustancias corrosivas que causen lesiones o daños cuando entren en contacto con tejidos humanos. Finalmente, para algunos delitos, el código trata como circunstancia agravante el hecho de que la víctima sea mujer. La Ley 1719 de junio 18, 2014 modificó y amplió algunas de estas disposiciones.

The Ministry of Education encourages the integration of sex education into the content of subject curricula and non-formal education. This leaves considerable discretion to schools and teachers in presenting the topic. Moreover, the program aims to prepare for “the creation of marriage and a harmonious family,” seeking to encourage the association of sexuality expression with “fertility and the possibility of having children in the future.” The decree dictates that it is not permissible to present the use of birth control as an equivalent alternative to abstinence. Furthermore, there is no ascertainable mention of LGBTIQ inclusivity in the curriculum.

Švietimo ministerija skatina lytinio švietimo integravimą į dalykinių programų ir neformaliojo švietimo turinį. Tai palieka didelę savo nuožiūrą mokykloms ir mokytojams pristatant šią temą. Be to, šia programa siekiama parengti „santuokos ir darnios šeimos kūrimui“ ir skatinti seksualumo išraiškos siejimą su „vaisingumu ir galimybe turėti vaikų ateityje“. Įsakyme taip pat nurodoma, kad kontracepcijos naudojimo negalima pateikti kaip lygiavertės alternatyvos abstinencijai. Be to, nėra aiškiai paminėtas LGBTIQ temų įtraukimas į mokymo programą.

Under the Criminal Code, rape is defined quite narrowly as “sexual intercourse against a person’s will with the use or threat of physical violence present or deprivation of possibility of resistance.” There is also no mention of rape in marriage. To hold a person liable for rape, which is punished by imprisonment for up to seven years, the victim or their representative must file a complaint. However, in the case of rape (i) by a group of accomplices or (ii) of a minor or a young child, the term of imprisonment can be longer, and complaint filing is not needed. Further, sexual assault is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to seven years, sexual abuse is punished by arrest or imprisonment of up to three years, and sexual harassment is punished by a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest. However, Lithuania is one of the few European Union states to have not yet criminalized stalking. Trafficking in Human Beings is punished by imprisonment from two to ten years. Infanticide is punished by arrest or imprisonment for up to five years. In the case of illegal abortion, as defined in Decree No. 50 of the Minister of Health “On the Termination of Pregnancy Operation Procedure,” the doctor and assisting persons are liable. Finally, the Code recognizes acts committed to express hatred towards persons due to their, amongst other characteristics, gender and sexual orientation, to be an aggravating circumstance. English translation available here.

Pagal baudžiamąjį kodeksą išžaginimas gana siaurai apibrėžiamas kaip lytiniai santykiai prieš asmens valią „panaudojant fizinį smurtą ar grasinant tuoj pat jį panaudoti, ar kitaip atimant galimybę priešintis, ar pasinaudojant bejėgiška nukentėjusio asmens būkle”. Apie išprievartavimą santuokoje neužsimenama. Laikyti asmenį atsakingu už išžaginimą, kuris baudžiamas laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, auka ar jų atstovas turi pateikti skundą. Tačiau tuo atveju, kai išžaginama (i) bendrininkų grupės arba (ii) nepilnametį vaiką, laisvės atėmimo bausmė gali būti ilgesnė ir skundo padavimo nereikia. Už seksualinę prievartą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki septynerių metų, už seksualinį smurtą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki trejų metų, o už seksualinį priekabiavimą baudžiama bauda, laisvės apribojimu arba areštu. Lietuva yra viena iš nedaugelio Europos Sąjungos valstybių, kuri dar nėra kriminalizavusi persekiojimo. Už prekybą žmonėmis baudžiama laisvės atėmimu nuo dvejų iki dešimties metų. Už nužudymą baudžiama areštu arba laisvės atėmimu iki penkerių metų. Neteisėto aborto atveju, kaip apibrėžta sveikatos apsaugos ministro įsakyme Nr. 50 „Dėl nėštumo operacijos procedūros nutraukimo“, atsako gydytojas ir pagalbą teikiantys asmenys. Galiausiai kodekse pripažįstama, kad veiksmai, kuriais siekiama išreikšti neapykantą asmenims dėl jų, įskaitant kitų savybių, lyties ir seksualinės orientacijos, yra sunkinanti aplinkybė.

This regulation aims to ensure that pregnant women and their children have access to necessary basic medical care by tracking medical examinations received with a so-called mother-and-child-passport issued by the Federal Ministry of Health. Basic medical care includes, at least, five medical examinations of the pregnant woman and nine examinations of the child until the child reaches the age of 62 months. The regulation specifies contents, time intervals, and the information that should be included in the mother-and-child-passport. According to Sec. 8, a failure to abide to the time intervals has no consequences for state child allowance (Kinderbetreuungsgeld), as long as the mother is not responsible for the failure.

Diese Verordnung zielt auf die Sicherstellung des Zugangs von Schwangeren und deren Kindern zu notwendigen medizinischen Grundbetreuung, indem die empfangenen medizinischen Leistungen mit einem so-genannten Mutter-Kind-Pass verfolgt werden. Dieser wird von dem Bundesgesundheitsministerium ausgestellt. Grundbetreuung beinhaltet mindestens fünf medizinische Untersuchungen der schwangeren Frau und weitere neun Untersuchungen des Kindes, bis dieses das Alter von 62 Monaten erreicht. Diese Verordnung spezifiziert den Inhalt und die Zeitintervalle zwischen den Untersuchungen, sowie die Informationen, die in dem Mutter-Kind-Pass festgehalten werden sollen. Gemäß § 8 hat es keine Auswirkungen auf die Berechnung der Höhe des Kindergeldes, wenn die Frau den Untersuchungen nicht im vorgeschriebenen Zeitpunkt nachkommt, so lange sie das nicht zu vertreten hat.

The Trafficking in Persons Act provides for the prevention and elimination of human trafficking, in addition to establishing the National Coordination Committee against Trafficking in Persons which serves to coordinate and manage related issues in Malawi (the “Committee”). The Act applies to offenses committed at least partly in Malawi (or in contemplation of committing a crime inside Malawi), committed by a citizen of Malawi, or involving the trafficking of a citizen of Malawi. The Committee is responsible for coordinating and overseeing investigations and prosecutions under the Act, as well as formulating policy, educational programming, and recommendations with Malawi on the topic, amongst other responsibilities. The Act provides the Committee with affirmative responsibilities to trafficked persons, including access to adequate health care and shelter, protection from discrimination, and legal support. The Act criminalizes the trafficking of other persons, punishable up to 14 years of imprisonment. The Act provides a list of aggravating factors that can extend the punishment by life imprisonment, including if a trafficked person becomes pregnant or is forced to terminate a pregnancy. There are additional penalties associated with trafficking in children, including a maximum sentence of 21 years imprisonment, as well as for benefiting from exploitation or trafficking and providing support for trafficking offenses. The Act further regulates international transportation organizations, and provides specialized investigatory and judicial mechanisms for the enforcement of the Act.

Under Article 140, abortion is considered a “crime against the intra-uterine life,” and someone who causes an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman may be sentenced from 2-8 years of imprisonment, while the person who performed the abortion and the pregnant woman can be sentence to up to three years of imprisonment. Article 142, however, permits the abortion if performed by a doctor and in the following scenarios: (1) the abortion is the only method to avoid risk of death or grave physical or mental harm to the mother; (2) the abortion is recommended in order to avoid the risk of death or permanent grave physical damage to the mother, up to the 12th week of pregnancy (3) the fetus is at risk of grave illness or malformation, up to the 24th week of pregnancy; (4) the pregnancy was caused by rape or sexual assault, up to the 16th week of pregnancy; (5) by the mother’s choice, up to the 10th week of pregnancy. In cases where the fetus is not viable, abortion can be performed at any time during pregnancy. Any of the conditions above mentioned have to be certified by a doctor, except item 5, case in which the mother has to submit an affidavit to a doctor or clinic stating that her decision was “mindful and responsible.” If the mother is under 16 years old or mentally incapacitated, the consent to perform an abortion has to be provided by the woman’s legal representative (usually parents).

Segundo o artigo 140 do Código Penal Português, o aborto é considerado um "crime contra a vida intrauterina", e quem causar aborto sem o consentimento da grávida pode ser condenado a penas de dois a oito anos de prisão, enquanto quem causar um aborto com o consentimento da grávida, bem como a própria grávida poderá ser condenado a pena de até 3 anos de prisão. A seção 142, entretanto, permite o aborto se realizado por um médico e nas seguintes situações: (1) o aborto é o único método para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico ou mental à mãe; (2) o aborto é recomendado para evitar o risco de morte ou grave dano físico permanente à mãe, até a 12ª semana de gravidez; (3) o feto está em risco de doença grave ou malformação, até a 24ª semana de gravidez; (4) a gravidez foi causada por estupro ou agressão sexual, até a 16ª semana de gravidez; (5) por escolha da mãe, até a 10ª semana de gravidez. Nos casos em que o feto não é viável, o aborto pode ser realizado a qualquer momento durante a gravidez. Qualquer uma das condições acima mencionadas tem que ser certificada por um médico, exceto o item 5, caso em que a mãe tem que apresentar uma declaração juramentada a um médico ou clínica declarando que sua decisão foi "atenta e responsável". No caso de a mãe ser menor de 16 anos ou mentalmente incapacitada, o consentimento para realizar um aborto tem que ser dado por um representante legal da mulher (geralmente os pais).

The law outlines clinic conditions to perform safe abortions, provisions for post-abortion care, the situations in which abortions can be given, definitions of the different types of pregnancies and abortions, and instructions for how to handle situations in which the woman is incapable of giving a written or verbal consent. Some acceptable abortion circumstances include if the woman’s life or physical health is at risk, the pregnancy is a result of a sexual assault or failed contraceptive, or if the woman has HIV or AIDS. The law also references the ICPD (Conferências de População e Desenvolvimento) in 1994 as well as the UN World Conference in 1993 to define reproductive rights and apply it to Mozambique’s national context. It acknowledges that abortions are an ethical issue in addition to a legal issue, and so does not oblige healthcare professionals who have moral objections to carry out the procedure, except when there is a risk of life for the pregnant woman.

A lei esboça condições clínicas para realização de abortos seguros, disposições para cuidados pós-aborto, situações em que abortos podem ser realizados, definições dos diferentes tipos de gravidezes e abortos, e instruções de como lidar com situações difíceis nas quais a mulher é incapaz de dar consentimento verbal ou escrito. Algumas circunstâncias permitidas de aborto incluem se a vida da mulher ou sua saúde física estão em risco, se a gravidez é resultado de abuso sexual ou de contraceptivo que falhou, ou se a mulher tem HIV ou AIDS. A lei também referencia a ICPD (Conferências de População e Desenvolvimento) em 1994, assim como a Conferência Mundial da ONU em 1993 para definir os direitos reprodutivos e aplicá-los ao contexto nacional de Moçambique. Ela reconhece que abortos são um problema ético em adição a um problema legal, assim não obriga os profissionais da saúde que têm objeções morais a realizar o procedimento, exceto quando há risco de vida para a mulher grávida.

The “social indications” noted in Art. 27 of the Law “on Healthcare” that allow performing an abortion up to the 22nd week of pregnancy are: (1) court decision on deprivation of parental rights regarding another existing child; and (2) pregnancy resulting from rape.

The President approved the creation of the National Commission of Audit and Prevention of Deaths of Mothers, Newborns and Infants in March 2012. This commission was established to contribute to the reduction of maternal and infant mortality by investigating maternal death, defining appropriate evidence-based interventions and recommending corrective actions. The priorities set out by the commission are to: 1) increase universal access to reproductive health services, namely family planning, prenatal care, and delivery by qualified personnel, and 2) prevention of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS.

O Presidente aprovou a criação da Comissão Nacional de Prevenção e Auditoria de Mortes Maternas e Neonatais em Março de 2012. Essa comissão foi estabelecida para contribuir com a redução de mortalidade maternal e infantil ao investigar a morte maternal, definindo intervenções apropriadas baseadas em evidências e recomendando ações corretivas. As prioridades estabelecidas pela comissão são para: 1) aumentar o acesso universal a serviços básicos de saúde reprodutiva, nomeadamente planejamento familiar, assistência pré-natal, e parto realizado por pessoa qualificada, e 2) prevenir a transmissão de doenças sexualmente infecciosas, incluindo HIV/AIDS.

Law No. 11.108/2005 was enacted to amend existing Law No. 8.080/1990, which regulates the Unified Health System (“SUS”). It included a new chapter providing that pregnant woman shall have the right to an accompanying party to be present during all health services provided by the SUS in connection with labor, birth, and the immediate post-partum period.

A Lei Federal n. 11.108/2005 altera a Lei n. 8.080/1990, para garantir às parturientes o direito à presença de acompanhante durante o trabalho de parto, parto e pós-parto imediato, no âmbito do Sistema Único de Saúde - SUS.

Under the Brazilian Criminal Code, it is illegal to terminate a pregnancy, as well as to kill a child during childbirth, or shortly thereafter. Under Article 124, it is a crime for someone to cause an abortion on themselves or to allow others to cause it, either of which carries a sentence of 1-3 years of imprisonment. Article 125 prohibits anyone from practicing an abortion on a pregnant woman without her consent and imposes a sentence of 3-10 years of imprisonment. Article 126 imposes a 1-4-year prison sentence to anyone who practice an abortion with pregnant woman’s consent. Pursuant to Article 128, a doctor is not punished for performing an abortion if (i) the pregnant woman’s life is at risk, or (ii) the pregnancy resulted from rape. The Brazilian Supreme Court authorized the practice of an abortion on fetus with anencephaly (Claim of non-compliance with fundamental precept - ADPF 54). Under no circumstances is it permissible for someone to cause an abortion without the consent of the pregnant woman.

Nos termos do Código Penal brasileiro, é ilegal terminar uma gestação, ou matar um recém-nascido. De acordo com o artigo 124, é crime sujeito à detenção de um a três anos provocar aborto em si mesma ou consentir que outrem lhe provoque. O artigo 125 proíbe a prática de aborto sem o consentimento da gestante, impondo pena de reclusão de três a 10 anos de reclusão. O artigo 126 impõe pena de um a quatro anos de reclusão para quem provoca o aborto com o consentimento da gestante. Nos termos do artigo 128, o médico não será punido ao provocar o aborto nas seguintes situações: (i) se não há outro meio de salvar a vida da gestante; ou (ii) se a gravidez resulta de estupro e o aborto é precedido de consentimento da gestante ou, quando incapaz, de seu representante legal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), quando do julgamento da Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) 54, autorizou interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico. Ainda, sob nenhuma hipótese é permitido provocar o aborto sem o consentimento da gestante.

Section 301 states that any woman, causing herself an abortion or allowing another person to procure an abortion for herself, shall be liable to imprisonment up to a term of three years or a fine not exceeding 60,000 Baht. Section 302 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman with her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine up to 20,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 303 punishes those who procure an abortion for a woman without her consent; the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years or a fine up to 40,000 Baht, with the term and amount varying according to if grievous bodily harm or death resulted from the abortion. Section 305 exempts those under Sections 301 or 302 from the offense if the abortion was carried out be a medical practitioner on medical grounds or the woman is younger than 15 years and the pregnancy resulted from rape or fetuses with fatal abnormalities. Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled on 19 February 2020 that existing laws on abortion (Sections 301 and 305) conflict with Thailand’s 2017 Constitution as they fail to hold men responsible for illegal abortions. It remains unclear how the provisions will be amended; the ruling gives the government 360 days for the amendments and does not immediately change the law. English translation available from the ILO through External Link.

Abortions may be performed up to the 24th week of pregnancy, “the point at which the fetus becomes viable outside the mother’s womb.” The procedure must be carried out by a physician in a hospital or a specially licensed clinic and cannot occur earlier than six days after the woman has consulted the physician. The physician must inform the woman within five days of the consultation whether s/he will perform the requested procedure. The operating doctor must also advise the woman “on the different options available” and “inform her of the medical risks.” Minors (persons under 18 years of age) must have parental consent. The Act does not apply to late-term abortions (i.e., after 24 weeks). The Criminal Code penalizes the killing of a viable fetus. New regulations on late-term abortions were adopted in 2015, clarifying the circumstances, medical and legal, that must be considered before performing a late-term abortion. Late-term abortions are only authorized if they fall under one of two categories: 1) a fetus not expected to survive outside the mother’s body or 2) one with such serious conditions that, even with medical interventions, its chances of survival are small. The fetuses will be reported to a medical committee, which will determine whether the doctor acted with due care and, dependent on the category, send their findings to either the Healthcare Inspectorate (Category 1) or the Board of Procurators General of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Category 2) to see whether further investigation is needed. (Unofficial English translation available here: https://cyber.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Nether.abo.htm)

Abortion is a criminal offense unless there are no other means with which to save the life or health of the pregnant woman, the woman is mentally ill or otherwise challenged, or her pregnancy is the result of sexual assault. Those who perform abortions with the consent of the woman are liable to imprisonment for one to four years, or up to six years if the woman does not survive. Performing an abortion without the consent of the woman is punishable by three to ten years in prison, or up to 15 years if the woman does not survive. In addition to these prison sentences, doctors, surgeons, midwives, and pharmacists who assist or perform an abortion may be disqualified from practicing their profession for twice the period of imprisonment. A person who unintentionally causes an abortion through acts of violence is liable for six months to two years imprisonment. Finally, a woman who causes or consents to an abortion may be sentenced to one to four years imprisonment. An unsuccessful abortion attempt is not a punishable offense, so women who do so should be able to seek medical attention without penalty. (Note: The government of Argentina is voting on legalizing abortion as of December 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

El aborto es un delito penal a menos que no existan otros medios con los que salvar la vida o la salud de la mujer embarazada, la mujer tenga una enfermedad mental o sufra algún otro problema, o su embarazo sea el resultado de una agresión sexual. Quienes practican abortos con el consentimiento de la mujer pueden ser castigados con una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años, o hasta seis años si la mujer no sobrevive. Realizar un aborto sin el consentimiento de la mujer se castiga con tres a diez años de prisión, o hasta 15 años si la mujer no sobrevive. Además de estas penas de prisión, los médicos, cirujanos, parteras y farmacéuticos que ayuden o practiquen un aborto pueden ser inhabilitados para ejercer su profesión por el doble del período de prisión. Una persona que provoque involuntariamente un aborto mediante actos de violencia puede ser sancionada con una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años. Finalmente, una mujer que provoque o consienta en un aborto puede ser condenada a una pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años. Un intento de aborto fallido no es un delito punible, por lo que las mujeres que lo hagan deberían poder buscar atención médica sin sanción. (Nota: El gobierno de Argentina está votando sobre la legalización del aborto a diciembre de 2020: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/11/argentina-lower-house-appr...)

Law No. 21,030 amends article 119 of the Sanitary Code to permit the interruption of a pregnancy by a surgeon, with the consent of the woman, for: (i) any risk to the life of the mother; (ii) unfeasibility of the embryo or fetus; and (iii) rape.

La ley numero 21,030 amenda el Articulo 119 del Codigo Sanitario, permitiendo la interrupcion del embarazo por un cirujano, con la autorizacion de la mujer, por: (i) cualquier riesgo a la vida de la madre, (ii) imposibilidad de exito del embrion o feto, y (iii) violacion.

This Act overturned Division 12 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), which criminalised obtaining, performing, or otherwise assisting an abortion. Abortion is now legal in New South Wales until 22 weeks of pregnancy. To procure an abortion after 22 weeks, the procedure must be performed in a hospital by a specialist practitioner in consultation with a second practitioner. Medical providers who have conscientious objections to abortion must provide patients with information about where they can receive an abortion.

The Act amends the Public Health Act 2010 No 127. It provides for 150-metre “safe access zones” around reproductive health clinics, which are intended to protect the safety and well-being of people entering and leaving such clinics, including employees. The Act creates offenses punishable with imprisonment for interfering with access to clinics (§ 98C), causing actual or potential distress or anxiety to persons in safe access zones (§ 98D), or for taking/distributing photographs of people in safe access zones (§ 98E). The Act also contains exemptions under § 98F, which states that Act does not prohibit conduct in a religious building, near Parliament House in Macquarie Street, Sydney; or “the carrying out of any survey or opinion poll by or with the authority of a candidate, or the distribution of any handbill or leaflet by or with the authority of a candidate, during the course of a Commonwealth, State or local government election, referendum or plebiscite.” In enacting the Act, NSW joined other Australian states and territories, which had already enacted laws banning the harassment of women seeking abortions.

The Crimes Act is the principal Victorian criminal legislation setting out a range of criminal offences and penalties. In relation to gender justice, the Act prohibits sexual violence and rape, stalking, sexual assault, rape, abortion (as amended by the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008) and female genital mutilation. The Act also prohibits attempts and conspiracies to commit these offenses, and sets forth applicable procedures and defenses. The Act previously contained a defense of “defensive homicide,” which was intended to, among other things, assist women who killed an abusive partner in self-defense. However, this defense was abolished in November 2014 on the basis that it was not operating as intended. The penalties for violations of the Act vary, and the principles in the Sentencing Act 1991 apply to sentencing in all courts except the Children’s Court.

The Abortion Act states that a woman may have an abortion up to 18 weeks of pregnancy. An abortion past 18 weeks may be performed if the National Board of Health and Welfare (“NBHF”) (Sw. Socialstyrelsen) approves it due to exceptional grounds. A decision by NBHF regarding an abortion cannot be appealed. NBHF also reviews any cases of denied abortions. Any medical practitioner that disregards the Abortion Act may be fined or imprisoned for a maximum of six months.

Section 47A of the ordinance regulates abortion. Abortion is legal in only a few situations: (i) continuing the pregnancy would risk the health of the woman; (ii) there is a substantial risk that the child would be born with a physical or mental abnormality, making it severely handicapped; (iii) the woman is younger than 16 years; or (iv) the woman is the victim of unlawful sexual intercourse. Section 45 forbids bigamy and polygamy.

The Act allows abortion by a medical practitioner up to 16 weeks of pregnancy with the woman’s consent. After 16 weeks, pregnancy may be terminated if two medical practitioners reasonably believe the continuation of pregnancy would involve greater risk to the mother’s physical or mental health than termination. At least one of the medical practitioners must specialize in obstetrics or gynaecology. In assessing the physical or mental health, the practitioners must consider the woman’s physical, psychological, economic, and social circumstances. A medical practitioner is not required to perform an abortion unless it is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman or prevent her serious injury, and a nurse and midwife are required to assist in an emergency. However, a medical practitioner must provide the full range of pregnancy options to a woman. The Act also established “access zones” by criminalising interference, intimidation, recording, and similar behaviour within a radius of 150 meters from abortion clinics.

The Criminal Code applies to the southern states of Nigeria. The Criminal Code Act distinguishes between the treatment of assault on men and assault on women, with Chapter 29 (Sections 351-356) addressing “Assaults” and Chapter 30 (Sections 357-362) addressing “Assaults on Females: Abduction.” Notably, indecent assault on a man is considered a more serious offense and carries a higher sentence than does indecent assault on a woman. Under Section 353, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults any male person is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three years.” In contrast, under Section 360, “[a]ny person who unlawfully and indecently assaults a woman or girl is guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to imprisonment for two years.” Rape is defined in section 257. It is defined as “unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl, without her consent, or with her consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of harm, or by means of false and fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act, or, in the case of a married woman, by personating her husband.” Abortion is criminalized by sections 228-230. Abortion is defined in Section 228 as an attempt to procure a miscarriage. A mother trying to cause her own miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for seven years, while anyone who administers to her a poison or otherwise induces a woman’s miscarriage is liable for imprisonment for 14 years, and anyone who supplies or obtains any item with the knowledge of its intended use to cause an abortion is liable for imprisonment for three years. Sections 228-230. The laws derive culpability from intent and apply regardless of whether the woman is actually pregnant.

The Code defines certain crimes and their penalties. The Code includes provisions defining and prohibiting sexual assault and domestic violence. The Code legalizes abortions performed within 12 weeks of gestation. The Code also eliminates attenuating circumstances previously associated with the crime of rape, such as the possibility of acquittal in cases where the perpetrator married the victim. In addition, the Code decriminalizes prostitution.

Medically assisted reproduction is available only to married couples, or those in a registered partnership or cohabitation. Further, it is only permitted to the couple if certain difficulties in conceiving exist, such as (i) all other possible or reasonable treatments to induce pregnancy through sexual intercourse are unsuccessful or hopeless; (ii) pregnancy through sexual intercourse would expose the spouse or partner to a serious risk of transmitting a serious infectious disease; (iii) for certain couples where there may be difficulty becoming pregnant or giving birth, or may give birth to a child with a hereditary disease (such as severe, untreatable pain or brain damage, or which would require the child be kept alive through constant use of modern medical technology) due to genetic dispositions. It is also available to a woman living in a registered partnership or cohabitation with another woman. Surrogacy is not permitted in Austria because medically assisted reproduction is only permissible within a marriage or registered partnership or cohabitation, and only the ova and the semen of the spouses, registered partners, or cohabitants may be used. There are two exceptional circumstances in which a third party’s genetic material may be used for medically assisted reproduction: (i) the semen of a third person may be used if the spouse, registered partner or cohabitant is not capable of reproduction, or if the couple is two women in a registered partnership; or (ii) the oocyte of a third person may be used if a woman, younger than 45, whom the pregnancy will be induced is otherwise not able to reproduce.

Medizinisch assistierte Fortpflanzung steht verheirateten Paaren, eingetragenen Partnerschaften oder einer Lebensgemeinschaft zur Verfügung. Außerdem ist es Paaren nur gestattet, wenn sie gewisse Schwierigkeiten bei der Empfängnis haben; dies sind z.B.: (1.) alle oder zumutbare Behandlungen, um eine Schwangerschaft durch Geschlechtsverkehr herbeizuführen, sind erfolglos oder aussichtslos; (2.) der Geschlechtsverkehr ist dem Paar nicht zumutbar, da eine ernsthafte Gefahr der Übertragung einer schweren Infektionskrankheit besteht; (3.) wenn das Paar Schwierigkeiten hat schwanger zu werden oder zu gebären, oder das Kind wegen genetischer Dispositionen mit einer Erbkrankheit geboren würde (so wie ernsthaften, unbehandelbaren Schmerzen oder Gehirnschäden, oder solche die es erforderlich machen, dass das Kind dauerhaft durch moderne Technologie am Leben erhalten würde). Außerdem stehen die Möglichkeiten homosexuellen Frauen offen, die in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft oder Lebensgemeinschaft leben. Nicht erlaubt ist Leihmutterschaft in Österreich, denn medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung ist nur in der Ehe, eingetragenen Partnerschaften und in Lebensgemeinschaften erlaubt. Es gibt zwei Ausnahmen, in denen das genetische Material für eine medizinisch unterstützte Fortpflanzung genutzt werden darf: (1.) Der Samen einer dritten Person darf verwendet werden, wenn der Ehegatte, eingetragene Partner oder Partner in Lebensgemeinschaft nicht der Fortpflanzung fähig ist oder das Paar aus zwei Frauen in einer eingetragenen Partnerschaft besteht; (2.) die Eizelle einer dritten Person darf einer Frau eingesetzt werden, wenn diese jünger als 45 Jahre alt ist und auf andere Weise nicht fähig ist, sich fortzupflanzen.

Art. 118 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment for not more than five years or a monetary penalty for any person who terminates a pregnancy with the consent of the pregnant woman or incites or assists a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy without the requirements of Penal Code Art. 119 being met. Article 118 also provides for (1) imprisonment from one to 10 years for any person who terminates a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant woman, and (2) imprisonment for not more than three years or a monetary penalty for any woman who has her pregnancy terminated or otherwise participates in the termination of her pregnancy following the end of the twelfth week and without the requirements of Penal Code Art. 119 being met. Article 119 provides the requirements for legal abortion. The termination is, in the judgment of a physician, necessary in order to be able to prevent the pregnant woman from sustaining serious physical injury or serious psychological distress. The risk must be greater the more advanced the pregnancy is, or the termination must be performed (1) at the written request of a pregnant woman within 12 weeks of the start of the woman’s last period, (2) by a physician who is licensed to practice his profession, and (3) the woman claims that she is in a state of distress. The physician must have a detailed consultation with the woman prior to the termination and provide her with appropriate counsel. If the woman is incapable of judgment, the consent of her legal representative is required. The statute directs the Swiss Cantons to designate the medical practices and hospitals that fulfill the requirements for the professional conduct of procedures to terminate pregnancy and for the provision of counsel. Unofficial English translation available here.

The Law on Population and Family Planning was adopted by the National People’s Congress on December 29, 2001 and amended on December 27, 2015. This law stipulated the national policy popularly known as the “one-child” policy. It was amended in 2015 to allow and encourage each couple to have two children. Before the amendment, Article 18 provided that the State encourages citizens to marry and bear a child at a later age, and advocates one child for each couple, except in certain conditions prescribed by laws and regulations. As a result of the amendment, Article 18 provides that the State encourages citizens to have two children. Before the amendment, Article 27 provided that couples who bear only one child voluntarily shall be issued the Honor Certificate and enjoy the awards for parents of only one child. Article 41 provides that a citizen who bears children in violation of Article 18 shall pay the social upbringing fines according to law.

堕胎与生育权

本法规于2001年12月29日通过，于2015年12月27日修正。此法规规定了众所周知的“一孩政策”。此法规为了鼓励一对夫妻可以生育两个子女于2015年进行了修正。在修正前，法规的第十八条阐明了国家鼓励晚婚晚育，并在除特定法规下要求一对夫妻生育一个子女。在修正后，第十八条鼓励每对夫妻生育两个子女。修正前，第二十八条规定只生育一个子女的夫妻，国家发给《独生子女光荣证》并享受独生子女父母奖励。第四十一条规定，不符合本法第十八条生育的公民，应依法缴纳社会抚养费。

if the continuation of the pregnancy is a serious threat to the mother’s health; (iii) if there is a serious risk that, if the child is born, it will suffer from a physical or mental defect that will cause the child to be severely disabled; (iv) where the pregnancy is a result of unlawful intercourse. Unlawful intercourse includes rape (this does not include marital rape), incest and mental handicap. However, a legal abortion can only be performed by a medical practitioner in a designated institution with the written permission of the superintendent of the institution. In cases where the mother’s life is in danger, the superintendent will not give permission until they have two different medical opinions regarding the danger to the mother. In circumstances of rape/incest, the superintendent must give permission after he receives written confirmation from a magistrate that the woman complained about the rape or the incestuous conduct. Contravention of the act by a medical practitioner in terminating a pregnancy or superintendent in providing permission not in accordance with the TPA constitutes an offense for which they could be liable for a fine not exceeding USD 5000, and/or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.

Under Virginia law, it is a Class 4 felony to cause destruction of a unborn child, abortion, or miscarriage through medical procedure, drugs, or other means. There is an exception for physicians who are licensed by the Board of Medicine to practice medicine and surgery, to terminate a pregnancy or assist in performing an abortion or causing a miscarriage during the first trimester of pregnancy, among other exceptions. Informed written consent is required for an abortion under Virginia law, subject to civil penalties. It is also a Class 3 misdemeanor to encourage an individual to have an abortion prohibited by Virginia law.

Since 1987, Alabama has had a judicial bypass law, which allows pregnant minors to obtain a court’s permission to have an abortion without parental consent. In 2014, the Alabama legislature passed House Bill 494 to amend the law. The original judicial bypass statute provided for an ex parte hearing with only the judge, the minor, and her attorney present. The 2014 amendments added to the proceedings parties who are permitted or required to “examine” the minor and represent the interests of the unborn child, the state, and the minor’s parents. It would have also allowed the appointment of a guardian to represent the interests of the fetus. The District Court of the Middle District of Alabama found these amendments unconstitutional and severed them from the judicial bypass law in Reproductive Health Services v. Marshall (2017).

Chapter VI of Title 8 (Crimes against Life and Physical Integrity) delineates the circumstances under which abortion is illegal and establishes the penalties performing illegal abortions. Pursuant to Article 267 of the Criminal Code, anyone who, without complying with public health regulations established in respect of abortions, performs an abortion or in any way destroy the embryo, with the consent of the pregnant woman, is subject to a penalty of imprisonment for three months up to one year or a fine of 100 to 300 cuotas. If an abortion is performed (1) for profit, (2) outside of official institutions or (3) by a person that is a physician, such person is subject to an increased punishment of imprisonment for two to five years. Pursuant to Article 268, an individual who purposefully destroys the embryo (a) without using any force or violence on the pregnant woman, but without her consent, is subject to two to five years’ imprisonment or (b) with the use of any force or violence on the pregnant woman, is subject to three to eight years’ imprisonment. If concurrently with the occurrence of (a) or (b), any of the circumstances described in (1), (2) or (3) also exist, the punishment is increased to imprisonment for four to ten years. If a pregnant woman dies as a result of any of the above actions, the offending person is subject to imprisonment for a period of five to twelve years. Articles 270 and 271, respectively, prescribe the punishments for those who, without intending to do so, cause an abortion and for those who prescribe any abortion-inducing substance to destroy the embryo.

Chapter I of Title XI covers crimes against the normal development of sexual relations. Article 298 prescribes a penalty of four to ten years imprisonment for anyone who rapes a woman (either through vaginal intercourse or contra naturam) if during the criminal event any of the following circumstances occurs: (a) use of force or sufficient intimidation in order to achieve the goal or (b) if the victim is in a mentally disturbed state or suffers from temporary insanity, or the victim is deprived of reason or sense for any reason, or unable to resist, or lacks the ability to understand the consequences of her actions or to conform her conduct. Article 298 prescribes a term of imprisonment of 7 to 15 years if (a) the event is carried out with the participation of two or more persons, (b) if the perpetrator dresses up in military uniform or purports to be a public official, in each case, to facilitate consummating the act or (c) if the victim is over 12 and under 14 years of age. Finally, the Article prescribes a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty if (a) the event is carried out by a person who has previously been sanctioned for the same crime, (b) as a result of the act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness, or (c) if the perpetrator knows that he is infected with a sexually transmitted disease. Anyone who rapes a minor who is under 12 years of age will be punished with either a term of imprisonment of 15 to 30 years or the death penalty, even if none of the circumstances described in the preceding sentence occur. Article 299 of the Criminal Code sanctions individuals guilty of “active” pedophilia. Any person who commits an act of “active” pedophilia using violence or intimidation, or by taking advantage of the fact that the victim is deprived of reason or sense or unable to resist, will be punished with imprisonment for seven to 15 years. Such penalty increases to 15 to 30 years or death if (a) the victim is a minor under 14 years of age, even if the circumstances set forth in the immediately preceding sentence are not present, (b) if, as a consequence of the criminal act, the victim suffers serious injuries or illness or (c) if the perpetrator has been previously sanctioned for the same crime.

Article 295 imposes a punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years or a fine of 200 to 500 cuotas, or both, to anyone who discriminates, or promotes or incites, discrimination, against another person, with manifestations in an offensive manner, on account of sex, race, color or national origin, or with actions to obstruct or impede, with motives relating to sex, race, color or national original, the exercise or enjoyment of rights of equality set forth in the Constitution. Any person who spreads ideas based on the superiority of races or racial hatred or commits, or incites, acts of violence against any race or group of people of another color or ethnic origin, shall be subject to the same punishment as indicated above.

El Capítulo VI del Título 8 (Delitos contra la vida y la integridad física) describe las circunstancias bajo las cuales el aborto es ilegal y establece las sanciones por realizar abortos ilegales. En conformidad con el artículo 267 del Código Penal, cualquier persona que, sin cumplir con las normas de salud pública establecidas con respecto a los abortos, realice un aborto o destruya de cualquier modo el embrión, con el consentimiento de la mujer embarazada, está sujeta a una pena de prisión. Por tres meses hasta un año o una multa de 100 a 300 cuotas. Si se realiza un aborto (1) con fines de lucro, (2) fuera de las instituciones oficiales o (3) por una persona que es un médico, dicha persona está sujeta a un aumento de la pena de prisión de dos a cinco años. En conformidad con el Artículo 268, una persona que destruye a propósito el embrión (a) sin usar ninguna fuerza o violencia contra la mujer embarazada, pero sin su consentimiento, está sujeta de dos a cinco años de prisión o (b) con el uso de cualquier fuerza o violencia en la mujer embarazada, está sujeto de tres a ocho años de prisión. Si concurrentemente con la ocurrencia de (a) o (b), cualquiera de las circunstancias descritas en (1), (2) o (3) también existen, el castigo se incrementa a la prisión de cuatro a diez años. Si una mujer embarazada muere como resultado de cualquiera de las acciones anteriores, la persona ofensora está sujeta a prisión por un período de cinco a doce años. Los artículos 270 y 271, respectivamente, prescriben los castigos para aquellos que, sin la intención de hacerlo, causan un aborto y para aquellos que prescriben cualquier sustancia inductora del aborto para destruir el embrión.

El Capítulo I del Título XI cubre los delitos contra el desarrollo normal de las relaciones sexuales. El artículo 298 prescribe una pena de cuatro a diez años de prisión para toda persona que viole a una mujer (ya sea por coito vaginal o contra naturam) si durante el evento criminal ocurre alguna de las siguientes circunstancias: (a) uso de la fuerza o suficiente intimidación para: lograr la meta o (b) si la víctima está en un estado mentalmente perturbado o sufre de locura temporal, o si la víctima está privada de razón o sentido por cualquier razón, o no puede resistirse, o carece de la capacidad de entender las consecuencias de las acciones o para conformar su conducta. El artículo 298 prescribe un período de prisión de 7 a 15 años si (a) el evento se lleva a cabo con la participación de dos o más personas, (b) si el perpetrador se viste de uniforme militar o pretende ser un funcionario público, en en cada caso, para facilitar la consumación del acto o (c) si la víctima es mayor de 12 años y menor de 14 años. Finalmente, el artículo prescribe un período de prisión de 15 a 30 años o la pena de muerte si (a) el evento es llevado a cabo por una persona que ha sido sancionada previamente por el mismo delito, (b) como resultado del acto, la víctima sufre lesiones o enfermedades graves, o (c) si el autor sabe que está infectado con una enfermedad de transmisión sexual. Cualquier persona que viole a un menor de edad menor de 12 años será castigada con una pena de prisión de 15 a 30 años o con la pena de muerte, incluso si no ocurre ninguna de las circunstancias descritas en la oración anterior. El artículo 299 del Código Penal sanciona a las personas culpables de pedofilia "activa". Cualquier persona que cometa un acto de pedofilia "activa" mediante el uso de la violencia o la intimidación, o aprovechando el hecho de que la víctima está privada de razón o sentido o no puede resistir, será castigada con pena de prisión de siete a 15 años. Dicha penalización aumenta a 15 a 30 años o fallece si (a) la víctima es menor de 14 años, incluso si las circunstancias establecidas en la oración inmediatamente anterior no están presentes, (b) si, como consecuencia de la acto criminal, la víctima sufre lesiones graves o enfermedad o (c) si el autor ha sido previamente sancionado por el mismo delito.

El artículo 295 impone una pena de prisión de seis meses a dos años o una multa de 200 a 500 cuotas, o ambas, a cualquier persona que discrimine, promueva o incite a la discriminación de otra persona, con manifestaciones de manera ofensiva. , debido al sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, o con acciones para obstruir o impedir, con motivos relacionados con el sexo, raza, color u origen nacional, el ejercicio o disfrute de los derechos de igualdad establecidos en la Constitución. Cualquier persona que difunda ideas basadas en la superioridad de las razas o el odio racial o cometa, o incite, actos de violencia contra cualquier raza o grupo de personas de otro color u origen étnico, estará sujeta al mismo castigo que se indicó anteriormente.

Article 260 punishes spouses who conceal from their spouse a legal barrier to marriage with a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Article 284 punishes adulterous spouses and their partners, regardless of their marital status. The penal code only criminalizes acts of rape outside marriage unless the wife is underage and incurs injuries as a result. Articles 285 prohibits forcing or threatening force a woman to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and punishes violators with a maximum penalty of 12 years. Article 286 punishes sexual intercourse with an unconscious or helpless woman with a maximum of nine years imprisonment. If there is a complaint, Article 287 imposes a maximum sentence of nine years imprisonment for “carnal knowledge” of a girl outside of marriage when the man knows or reasonably should presume that she is less than 15 years of age. Prosecutions are triggered automatically when the girl is less than 12 years of age. Article 288 punishes husbands that have “carnal knowledge” of their wives who “are not yet marriageable” if it results in injury (four years imprisonment), serious injury (eight years), or death (12 years). Article 292 punishes adults that have carnal knowledge of those they know to be or reasonably should know to be minors of the same sex with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Article 293 punishes sexual abuse of a minor with a maximum of five years imprisonment. Incest is punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment pursuant to Article 294. Article 297 prohibits trafficking in woman and boys, which carries a maximum sentence of six years imprisonment. Article 299 imposes a four-year maximum sentence for abortion and provides for a one-third increase in sentencing for professionals (e.g., doctor, midwife) who perform abortions.

The Termination of Pregnancy Law Reform Act 2017 (NT) reforms the laws in the Northern Territory relating to terminations of pregnancy by improving access to abortion and abortion drugs, and prohibiting harassing conduct targeted at persons seeking abortion. From July 1 2017, termination was made available in the Northern Territory up to 14 weeks into a pregnancy if a medical practitioner considers the termination to be appropriate having regard to: all relevant medical circumstances; the woman’s current and future physical, psychological and social circumstances; and professional standards and guidelines. For women who are more than 14 weeks but fewer than 23 weeks into the pregnancy, an abortion is permitted if two medical practitioners agree that the termination is appropriate having regard to the same factors. Only terminations necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman are permitted 23 weeks or more into the pregnancy. The Act makes it an offense to engage in harassing conduct in termination facilities or any area that is within 150m of such facilities. The maximum penalty for such an offense is 100 penalty units ($15,500 as of August 2018) or 12 months’ imprisonment.

This Act provides policies that address the improvement of the quality of life of individuals and the reduction of the growth rate of the population. (§§ 1-3). §7 sets forth that the Ministry of Gender Development and women’s organizations shall implement gender policy to achieve gender equity, specifically, to increase women’s participation in the work force and in political institutions, to protect women’s property rights in statutory law and customary practices, and to prevent various forms of violence against women, including female genital mutilation, early marriage, teenage pregnancy. §5 sets forth that the family planning facilities shall actively involve the participation of women in deciding family size. §10 states that marriage of young girls before 18 years old, and marriage of boys before 21 years old should be discouraged.

Under Section 16.1 of the Penal Law, bigamy, and polygamy are illegal unless a legal defense is provided. Such defenses include a defendant’s belief that his or her former spouse is dead. Under Section 16.3, abortion beyond the 24th week of pregnancy is illegal. An abortion is legal if it occurs only after a licensed physician determines there is a substantial risk that continuing the pregnancy would gravely impair the mother’s physical and/or mental health. An abortion may also be justified if the child would be born with grave physical or mental defects or if the pregnancy was the result of illegal intercourse such as rape. Additionally, the abortion must be sanctioned by two physicians who have certified in writing the reasons why the abortion is necessary. The Penal Law also prohibits a woman from carrying out an abortion herself by any means once beyond the 24th week of pregnancy.

The case concerned abortion, the right to life, the right to health, and the right to self-determination. The court ruled for the partial decriminalization of abortion and set circumstances under which voluntary termination of pregnancy would be permissible. The Criminal Code previously criminalized voluntary abortion with one to three years of imprisonment. The plaintiffs argued that the criminalization of abortion violated women’s constitutional rights to life and dignity, physical integrity, equality, liberty, and unhindered development of personality, health, and reproductive self-determination. The Colombian Constitutional Court determined that abortion shall not be considered a crime in any of the following three circumstances: (i) a physician certified that pregnancy could threaten the woman’s health or life; (ii) a physician concluded that the fetus would suffer from serious malformations that could eventually endanger or terminate his life; and (iii) if the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or non-consensual artificial insemination, as long as the criminal act was lawfully reported to the competent authorities. The court found that articles 32.7, 122, 123, and 124 were constitutional, subject only to the aforementioned criteria. This case is of paramount importance because it established for the first time the right of women to terminate their pregnancy under the three specific scenarios. The scope of this decision was recently modified under Decision C-055-22 by the Constitutional Court, which has been announced but not yet published as of April 2022. This decision decriminalized voluntary abortion under any circumstances until 24 weeks of pregnancy. Voluntary abortions carried out after week 24 will not be deemed criminal offenses only if they are performed under any of the three events previously recognized by the Constitutional Court in the Decision C-355-06.

El caso se refería al aborto, el derecho a la vida, el derecho a la salud y el derecho al libre desarrollo de la personalidad. La Corte Constitucional falló a favor de la despenalización parcial del aborto y fijó las circunstancias bajo las cuales sería permisible la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo. El Código Penal tipificaba como delito el aborto voluntario con uno a tres años de prisión. Los demandantes argumentaron que la penalización del aborto violaba los derechos constitucionales de las mujeres a la vida y la dignidad, la integridad física, la igualdad, la libertad, el libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la salud y la libre determinación reproductiva. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia determinó que el aborto no sería considerado delito en ninguna de las siguientes tres circunstancias: (i) cuando un médico certifique que el embarazo puede poner en peligro la salud o la vida de la mujer; (ii) cuando un médico concluya que el feto sufriría de graves malformaciones que eventualmente podrían poner en peligro o acabar con su vida; y (iii) si el embarazo fue producto de violación, incesto o inseminación artificial no consentida, siempre que el hecho delictivo haya sido legalmente denunciado ante las autoridades competentes. El tribunal consideró que los artículos 32.7, 122, 123 y 124 eran constitucionales condicionados a los criterios antes mencionados. Este caso es de suma importancia porque estableció por primera vez el derecho de la mujer a interrumpir su embarazo bajo los tres supuestos específicos. El alcance de esta decisión fue modificado recientemente mediante la Sentencia C-055-22 de la Corte Constitucional. Esta decisión despenalizó el aborto voluntario bajo cualquier circunstancia hasta la semana 24 de embarazo. Los abortos voluntarios practicados después de la semana 24 no serán considerados delitos si se realizan bajo cualquiera de los tres supuestos previamente reconocidos por la Corte Constitucional en la Sentencia C-355-06.

This action concerned couples’ reproductive health rights, specifically related to in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF"). The plaintiff requested protection of his fundamental health and equality rights and his right to have a family, which he considered violated by Salud Total EPS when it refused to carry out an IVF procedure for the plaintiff’s wife. The Constitutional Court held that infertility is considered by the World Health Organization as a reproductive system disease that affects the couple who suffer from it. Thus, the State must adopt affirmative actions tending to include assisted reproduction techniques in the national health system when the couple does not have enough resources to afford it. Failure to do so may result in a violation of the fundamental rights to reproductive health and personal integrity. Thus, the court ruled that Salud Total EPS was obligated to provide the couple with the IVF procedure to protect their reproductive health rights. Furthermore, the court exhorted the Colombian Government and the Health Ministry to evaluate the best mechanism to add IVF treatments to the national mandatory health plan for those people that cannot afford the procedure.

Esta acción se refería a los derechos de salud reproductiva de las parejas, específicamente relacionados con el tratamiento de fecundación in vitro. El demandante solicitó la protección de sus derechos fundamentales de salud e igualdad y su derecho a formar una familia, los cuales consideró vulnerados por parte de Salud Total EPS al negarse a realizar un procedimiento de fecundación in vitro a la pareja del demandante. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que la infertilidad es considerada por la Organización Mundial de la Salud como una enfermedad del sistema reproductivo que afecta a la pareja que la padece. En este sentido, el Estado debe adoptar acciones afirmativas tendientes a incluir las técnicas de reproducción asistida en el sistema nacional de salud cuando la pareja no cuenta con los recursos suficientes para costearlo. El no hacerlo puede resultar en una violación de los derechos fundamentales a la salud reproductiva y la integridad personal. En esta línea, la Corte dictaminó que Salud Total EPS estaba obligada a brindarle a la pareja el procedimiento in vitro para proteger sus derechos de salud reproductiva. Además, la Corte exhortó al Gobierno de Colombia y al Ministerio de Salud a evaluar el mejor mecanismo para incorporar los tratamientos de fecundación in vitro al plan nacional de salud obligatorio para aquellas personas que no pueden costear el procedimiento.

In this case, the defendant, the mayor of a Colombian town, was convicted of rape and non-consensual abortion. The penalty was 261 months of imprisonment and 20 years of disqualification from exercising political roles in the public sector. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, a minor, against her will and, as a result, she got pregnant. The defendant forced the plaintiff to terminate the pregnancy. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the appellant court omitted at least seven fundamental testimonies. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as some of the testimonies from other witnesses, was inconsistent. The plaintiff declared out-of-court that the defendant raped her and forced her to abort, however, during the appellate trial she testified that the lawsuit was a stratagem designed by her uncle, who was a candidate and political opponent of the defendant, to discredit the defendant. However, the appellate court learned that defendant, in order to obtain an acquittal, extorted, threatened, and attempted to bribe the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, and other witnesses involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Justice found that even though the plaintiff changed her testimony, the other evidence suggested that the defendant was guilty of the charges. Therefore, the Court ultimately upheld the defendant’s conviction.

En este caso, el acusado, alcalde de un pueblo colombiano, fue condenado por acceso carnal violento y aborto no consentido. La pena fue de 261 meses de prisión y 20 años de inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos. El fiscal argumentó que el acusado tuvo varios encuentros sexuales con una víctima menor de edad, en contra de su voluntad y, como consecuencia, quedó embarazada. La víctima fue obligada por el acusado a interrumpir el embarazo. El acusado alegó ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia que la corte de segunda instancia omitió al menos siete testimonios fundamentales para el caso. También afirmó que el testimonio de la víctima, así como algunos de los testimonios de otros testigos, eran inconsistentes. La víctima declaró extrajudicialmente que el acusado la violó y la obligó a abortar, sin embargo, durante el juicio de apelación declaró que la demanda fue una estrategia diseñada por su tío, quien era candidato y opositor político del acusado, para desacreditar al acusado. Sin embargo, la corte de segunda instancia se enteró que el acusado extorsionó, amenazó e intentó sobornar a la víctima, a los familiares de la víctima y a otros testigos involucrados en el caso, con el fin de obtener una absolución. La Corte Suprema de Justicia encontró que, a pesar de que la víctima cambió su testimonio, la evidencia sugería que el acusado era culpable de los cargos que se le imputaban. Por lo tanto, la Corte finalmente confirmó la condena del acusado.

The issue in this case was whether embryos, having been frozen and stored in a clinic, are “unborn” and thus protected by the right to life under Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland. The applicant-wife brought this suit against her husband, the respondent. The applicant had in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF") and six embryos resulted. Three of the embryos were implanted successfully in the applicant’s uterus and she became pregnant. The remaining three embryos, at issue in the case, were frozen and placed in storage with a clinic. The applicant and her husband separated, after which the applicant requested that the three frozen embryos be released to her to have them implanted. The clinic refused to release them absent consent from the respondent which he refused to provide. The applicant brought the court proceedings to obtain the embryos on constitutional and contractual grounds. The High Court dismissed the case and the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. A majority of the Supreme Court held that an embryo is not “unborn” for the purposes of Irish Constitutional law, and that there was no consequential (enforceable) right for the embryos to be released and implanted; Article 40.3.3 only applied after implantation.

The plaintiffs challenged an 1879 Connecticut law, which banned the use of all drugs, medical devices, or other instruments necessary for contraception, by opening a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut. The Supreme Court found that the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments established a right of marital privacy against state contraception regulations. As a result, the Court held that the Connecticut law violated this constitutionally established right to privacy, so the law was struck down. The Court applied this reasoning, in part, to a case affirming unmarried people's access to contraception in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972).

A federal statute established in 1873 prohibited the mailing of unsolicited pamphlets regarding contraceptives. Filing a friend-of-the-court brief, the ACLU challenged the constitutionality of this statute, alleging that it violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. Applying the test regarding commercial speech established in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court found that based on the economic motivation of the sender, the advertising content of the pamphlets, and their reference to a specified product, the mail could be classified as commercial speech. The Court also held that the governmental interest in prohibiting the pamphlets was insufficient as recipients could easily discard the information if they wished.

The local court denied the petitioner’s motion to certify the approval of her female partner to conduct in vitro fertilization with a third person’s semen. The regional court denied the appeal. It held that the wording of the Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (FMedG) aims to exclude same-sex parenthood. The Supreme Court decided to bring this question to the attention of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court decided that certain sections of the FMedG were unconstitutional. Referencing the European Court of Human Right’s judgements, the Court stressed that same-sex partnerships can fall under the protection of Article 8 of the EHRC as a family. Even though the legislature has discretion in the implementation of new rules, the FMedG is missing sufficient grounds for a differential treatment of same sex couples and heterosexual couples. The impact of this decision was far-reaching because it made it immediately permissible for lesbian couples to receive sperm donations and reproductive medication. Before this decision, these medical treatments were solely available to heterosexual couples.

Das Amtsgericht lehnte den Antrag der Antragsstellerin ab, die Zustimmung ihres weiblichen Partners zur Durchführung einer In-vitro-Fertilisation mit dem Samen einer dritten Person zu bescheinigen. Das Landgericht wies die Berufung zurück. Es vertrat die Auffassung, dass der Wortlaut des österreichischen Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (FMedG) darauf abziele, gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft auszuschließen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof beschloss, den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof mit dieser Frage zu befassen. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof entschied, dass bestimmte Abschnitte des FMedG verfassungswidrig sind. Unter Verweis auf die Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte betonte das Gericht, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften als Familie unter den Schutz von Artikel 8 der EMRK fallen können. Auch wenn der Gesetzgeber bei der Umsetzung neuer Regelungen einen Ermessensspielraum hat, fehlt es dem FMedG an einer ausreichenden Begründung für eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von gleichgeschlechtlichen und heterosexuellen Paaren. Die Auswirkungen dieser Entscheidung waren weitreichend, da sie es lesbischen Paaren sofort erlaubte, Samenspenden und reproduktionsmedizinische Behandlungen in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vor dieser Entscheidung waren diese medizinischen Behandlungen ausschließlich heterosexuellen Paaren vorbehalten.

The defendant, a nurse, was charged with the crimes of indecent assault and abortion, for which he was sentenced in 2016 to cumulatively serve five years and two months in prison and ordered to pay monetary compensation to the victim, who was his niece. It was established that the defendant and the victim began a relationship when she was 15 years old and, in course of the relationship and while she was still underage, the defendant performed three abortions with the victim’s consent. On one occasion, a member of the family accidentally witnessed the abortion. It was said that the defendant would insert a chirurgical instrument into the victim’s womb and cut out the fetus at the house where they both lived. The defendant denied all accusations against him, including the relationship itself. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant committed the crimes of abortion and indecent assault (i.e., the “harassment of another person by engaging in exhibitionist acts, making sexual advances or coercing that person into contact of a sexual nature that is not consummated”). However, due to the fact that such criminal offenses are, together, punishable with a sentence lower than 12 years in prison, the Supreme Court declared him amnestied and, consequently, extinguished the criminal proceedings against him, without prejudice of the monetary compensation for damages. In 2016, Angola published an amnesty law (Lei nº 11/16) in which it pardoned common crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to 12 years. Although the amnesty law excludes sexual crimes, the crime committed in this case does not fit the exception.

O réu, um enfermeiro, foi acusado de crimes de atentado ao pudor e aborto, pelos quais ele foi sentenciado em 2016 a cumulativamente cumprir cinco anos e dois meses de prisão e ordenado a pagar indenização à vítima, que era sua sobrinha. Foi estabelecido que o réu e a vítima começaram uma relação quando ela tinha 15 anos e, no curso da relação e enquanto ela ainda era menor de idade, o réu realizou três abortos com o consentimento da vítima. Em uma ocasião, um membro da família presenciou acidentalmente o aborto. Foi dito que o réu, dentro da casa em que eles viviam, inseria um instrumento cirúrgico dentro do útero da vítima e retirava o feto. O réu negou todas as acusações contra ele, incluindo a própria relação. O Tribunal Supremo decidiu que o réu cometeu os crimes de aborto e de atentado ao pudor (i.e., o “assédio de outra pessoa ao se envolver em atos exibicionistas, realizando avanços sexuais ou coagindo a pessoa a fazer contato de natureza sexual que não foi consumado”). Porém, dado o fato de que as ofensas criminais são, juntas, puníveis com uma sentença menor que 12 anos de prisão, o Tribunal Supremo declarou ele anistiado e, consequentemente, extinguiu os processos criminais contra ele, sem prejuízo da indenização por danos. Em 2016, Angola publicou uma lei de anistia (Lei nº 11/16) em que perdoou crimes comuns que são puníveis com penas de até 12 anos. Ainda que a lei de anistia excluda crimes sexuais, o crime neste caso não se encaixa nessa exceção.

X was a 14-year-old girl who became pregnant and suicidal after being raped. Her parents tried to take her to England in order to obtain a first-trimester abortion that was illegal in Ireland, but the Attorney General obtained an interim injunction from the High Court restraining the girl and her parents from leaving the country for a period of nine months or from arranging an abortion for her. The family appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution's prohibition on abortion did not prevent a suicidal 14-year-old, pregnant as the result of rape, from obtaining an abortion in Ireland because the suicide was a substantial risk to the life of the pregnant girl. The Court also struck down the injunction prohibiting the girl from leaving the country.

A to-be midwife, E.G., was denied jobs for which she had applied at three different obstetrics and gynecology departments. When applying, E.G. said that she could not participate in performing abortions due to her religious beliefs. The court considered whether the region had discriminated against E.G. according to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Swedish Discrimination Act and whether the region had violated E.G’s rights under Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR. The Swedish Labor Court found that the region’s decision not to employ E.G. for the positions she applied to, which included tasks that she had declared that she would not perform, did not constitute direct or indirect discrimination. The Labor Court stated that the region’s criteria – that the applicant could perform all tasks falling within the position, including abortion – was motivated by a legitimate purpose, i.e. good healthcare for the women seeking abortion as defined in the democratically adopted law. The criteria was also found appropriate and necessary to reach the aim of good health care. The Labor Court further deemed that it was E.G’s “professional limitations” and not her opinions regarding abortion that had mattered in the region’s decision not to hire her. Therefore, the Labor Court ruled that region had not committed violations of neither Article 9, 10 or 14 of the ECHR, nor the Swedish Discrimination Act.

In this case a doctor was held criminally liable under section 219a of the Criminal Code for publishing information about abortion services on the her website. The doctor argued that she was not "advertising" abortion (which is prohibited by law under section 219a) but merely providing information on abortions. The court disagreed, holding that the downloadable PDF on the doctor's website that contained information about abortions fell under the prohibited conduct of section 219a. The doctor was required to pay a fine of 6000 Euros (150 euros per day over the course of 40 days).

The appellant challenged section 9(2) of the Tasmanian Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 which prohibits protests that can be seen or heard within 150 meters of an abortion clinic. The appellant was convicted under the Act after standing on a street corner within the protest zone, holding placards with depictions of fetuses and statements about the “right to life.” He sought review of the conviction on the grounds that the law impermissibly burdens the freedom of communications on governmental and political matters, a right implied in the Australian Constitution. The High Court dismissed the appeal unanimously holding that the statute aims to protect the safety, wellbeing, privacy, and dignity of women, and in doing so, adequately balances the right to political communication and protection of those in need of medical assistance. Because the statute is limited in geographical reach and does not discriminate between sources of protest within the protected zone, the burden upon political communication within the Act is minor and proportionate.

Here, in a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed a decision by the High Court to dismiss a medical negligence claim raised by a woman who underwent a surgical procedure for the removal of her womb and experienced the leaking of urine after the procedure. Appellant had sought damages from medical negligence and lack of proper post-operative care. The Court’s holding clarifies the law on prescription and medical negligence, which are a prominent method through which women try to access the courts when their reproductive health rights are violated.

The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) revoked the pretrial detention order issued against staff and patients of a clinic that was alleged to have been performing clandestine abortions. The 2ND Panel of STF found that criminal laws against abortion were unconstitutional with respect to the case in hand, and the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy during the first three months was incompatible with the protection of multiple fundamental rights of women. The decision set an important precedent for the sexual and reproductive rights of women in Brazil. The court also discussed that the criminalization of abortion disproportionately affected women living in poverty who do not have access to private or public abortion clinics. Justice Barroso stated that while the potential life of the fetus is important, the criminalization of abortion before the end of the first three months of pregnancy violated several fundamental rights of women granted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (personal autonomy, physical and mental integrity, sexual and reproductive rights, and gender equality). This decision does not decriminalize abortion in all circumstances, and it is not bidding. This is perhaps a softening of the law regarding abortion in Brazil.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF desconstitui prisão de ofício emitida contra funcionários e donos de clinica de aborto presos em flagrante em razão de suposta prática de aborto clandestinos. A 2ª turma do STF entendeu que as leis criminais contra a prática do aborto são inconstitucionais em relação ao caso em análise, estabelecendo ainda que a criminalização do aborto voluntário durante os 3 (três) primeiros meses de gravidez era incompatível com múltiplos direitos fundamentais garantidos às mulheres. Nesse aspecto, trata-se de um precedente importante para os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos das mulheres no Brasil. Ainda a 2 turma do STF discutiu que a criminalização do aborto afeta, desproporcionalmente, as mulheres pobres que não têm acesso a clínicas privadas ou públicas. Ainda, o Ministro Barroso, relator do caso, estabelece que, enquanto a vida potencial de um feto é importante, a criminalização do aborto realizado dentro dos 3 meses iniciais da gravidez viola diversos direitos fundamentais garantidos constitucionalmente, como a autonomia, o direito à integridade física e mental, os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos, além da igualdade de gênero. Ressalta-se que essa decisão não descriminaliza o aborto em todas as circunstâncias, bem como não vincula o STF a emitir decisões com o mesmo posicionamento, apesar de se tratar de decisão favorável às mulheres no tocante a realização de aborto no Brasil.

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, a member of the Bolivian Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of several articles of the Criminal Code on the basis that they discriminated against women. The Court held that some of the challenged articles were unconstitutional and upheld others. On the grounds of gender discrimination, the Court found unconstitutional Article 56, which prevented imprisoned women from being employed outside of prisons while allowing imprisoned men outside employment, and Article 245, which recognized as a defense to the offense of falsifying a birth record the motive of protecting the honor of one’s wife, mother, daughter, or sister. The Court declared unconstitutional the words “fragility” and “dishonor” in Article 258 regarding infanticide also due to gender discrimination, although this did not affect the operation of the offense. The final unconstitutional issue was that Article 250 criminalized an unmarried man abandoning a woman who became pregnant with him, but did not criminalize a married father’s abandonment of his pregnant wife. The Court was unwilling to hold restrictions on abortion unconstitutional. As such, receiving an abortion remains prohibited under Articles 263 and 264, and the performance of abortion is prohibited under Article 269. However, the Court did declare unconstitutional the requirements in Article 266 that a woman inform the police and obtain judicial authorization in order to obtain an abortion in the case of rape or incest (article 266).

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, quien es miembro del Parlamento boliviano, cuestionó la constitucionalidad de varios artículos del Código Penal sobre la base de que eran discriminatorios contra las mujeres. El Tribunal sostuvo que varios de los artículos impugnados eran inconstitucionales: el Artículo 56, que impedía que las mujeres encarceladas fueran empleadas fuera de las cárceles mientras que los hombres encarcelados, por otro lado, podían tener empleo y el Artículo 245, que reconocía la protección del honor de la esposa, la madre, la hija o la hermana de uno como defensa al delito de falsificar un registro de nacimiento. Ambos Artículos se consideraron inconstitucionales sobre la base de la discriminación de género. La Corte declaró que las palabras "fragilidad" y "deshonra" contenidas en el Artículo 258 en asociación con el infanticidio eran inconstitucionales por la misma base, aunque esto no afecta el funcionamiento del delito. Además, la distinción dentro del Artículo 250 que penalizaba el abandono por parte de un padre de una mujer que no es su esposa después de dejarla embarazada pero que no se aplicaba a la esposa de un padre también se consideró inconstitucional. La Corte no estaba dispuesta a mantener las restricciones sobre el aborto como inconstitucionales. Como tal, recibir un aborto sigue prohibido según los Artículos 263 y 264, y el aborto está prohibido según el Artículo 269. Sin embargo, la Corte declaró inconstitucional los requisitos del Artículo 266 de que una mujer informe a la policía y obtenga la autorización judicial para obtener un aborto en caso de violación o incesto (artículo 266).

The accused took a concoction of herbs with the intent to procure an abortion when she was six months pregnant and buried the fetus. She pled guilty to contravening the Termination of Pregnancy Act, which bans abortions subject to enumerated exceptions. She was sentenced to nine months imprisonment that were suspended on the condition that she complete 305 hours of community service. The issue under review was whether the conviction was proper without medical evidence to prove that the ingested herbal concoction could induce an abortion. It was held that before a person is convicted for abortion it must be proved that the instrument or method used can induce an abortion. Except for a few obvious cases were the conduct of the accused is known to cause abortions, medical evidence must prove that the terminated pregnancy was not spontaneous but induced by the actions of the accused. Here, there was no proof that the herbal concoction was, in fact, capable of inducing an abortion. Therefore a conviction for abortion was an error, accused was guilty solely of attempting abortion.

The plaintiff’s employee health benefit plan denied coverage for certain infertility procedures that can only be performed on women, including in vitro fertilization (“IVF”). She sued her employer for unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and state law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer. On the plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit analyzed the issue differently than the district court but ultimately affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding that the health plan’s exclusion of coverage for surgical implantation procedures limited its infertility procedures for male and female employees equally and as a result did not amount to unlawful discrimination.

A Tennessee statute required private clinics providing a “substantial number” of abortions to obtain a “certificate of need” from the Health Facilities Commission and a license from the Department of Health. The Department of Health denied a license to the defendants, and then sued to enjoin them from performing abortions. The defendants alleged that the licensing requirement violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions' protection of women’s right to privacy. The Davidson County Chancery Court upheld the statute and enjoined the defendants from performing abortions. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional becauese it placed an undue burden on women's right to privacy.

This case struck down provisions of the Rhode Island “Informed Consent for Abortion” Act for failure to demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify its interference with women’s rights to abortion including: (i) a provision that required women be informed of “all medical risks” associated with the abortion procedure, including “psychological risks to the fetus,” as such a provision was unconstitutionally vague; (ii) a provision requiring a woman seeking abortion to give written consent to the procedure at least 24 hours prior to her scheduled operation, as such a provision imposed a legally significant burden on a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, and the state did not demonstrate a compelling state interest necessitating such waiting period. However, the Court upheld a provision requiring that an abortion patient be informed of the “nature of her abortion,” i.e., that the abortion will irreversibly terminate her pregnancy.

Doctors and clinics sued anti-abortion activist group Operation Rescue for invasion of privacy, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy. Anti-abortion activists planned to picket and obstruct abortion clinics and homes of physicians who worked for the clinics to coincide with the 1992 Republican National Convention. The district court granted a permanent injunction to restrict anti-abortion demonstrations, which prohibited activists from, among other things, demonstrating within specified areas of each clinic. Operation Rescue appealed. Pursuant to free speech principles, the Court held that the injunction must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. The Court upheld the injunction as it related to physicians’ homes, but found the injunction overbroad because it limited peaceful communication within speech-free zones, such as peaceful sidewalk counseling and prayer. The Court modified the injunction, allowing no more than two demonstrators within a zone. These two demonstrators may individually sidewalk counsel patients in a normal speaking voice, but must retreat when the patient or physician verbally indicates that they wish to be alone. Otherwise, the lower court’s judgment was affirmed.

Pregnant minor filed an application for judicial bypass to receive an abortion without notifying her parents. The district court did not rule on the application or make findings of fact, but issued a writing that sua sponte concluded that the parental bypass law was unconstitutional. Doe appealed due to uncertainty about the judgment, and the court of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that because the judge did not issue findings of fact within two business days, her application was deemed granted.

Physicians and clinics sued the Commissioner of Health sued, claiming that Texas Medical Assistance Program’s (“TMAP”) abortion funding restrictions for indigent women violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Rights Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution, and their rights to privacy. TMAP was prohibited from authorizing abortion services without matching federal funds. The relevant federal law, the Hyde Amendment, prevented TMAP from funding abortions unless the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or placed the woman in danger of death. The plaintiffs argued that the restriction constituted sex discrimination because the state funded virtually all medically necessary services for men while refusing to fund abortions that are medically necessary even though the woman is not at risk of death. The Supreme Court held that although any restriction related to abortion would only affect women, TMAP’s restriction was not “on the basis of sex,” but rather due to the nature of abortion as a medical procedure involving potential life, which has no similar treatment method. The Court noted that other than medically necessary abortions, TMAP funded virtually all other medical treatment for women, and funded abortions to the extent that matching federal funds were available. The Court held that the discouragement of abortion through funding restrictions cannot, by itself, be considered purposeful discrimination against women as a class. The Court recognized the state’s interest in encouraging childbirth over abortion and held that the right to choose an abortion does not translate into a state obligation to subsidize abortions. The Court thus held that the funding restrictions did not violate the Texas Constitution, reversing the Court of Appeals and entering judgment for the defendant.

The parents of a minor who received an abortion sued Planned Parenthood, which they alleged had performed the abortion illegally because the clinic did not notify them in advance. The plaintiffs sought the medical records and any reports of abuse relating to minors who had received abortions in the prior 10 years. The defendant refused to produce the records of nonparty patients on the ground of physician-patient privilege. The trial court ordered the defendant to produce the non-party records with identifying information redacted, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling, holding that the medical records of non-party patients were not discoverable.

The plaintiff-appellant operated an abortion clinic in Dayton, Ohio. Ohio law required it to be licensed, which in part required it to enter into a written transfer agreement with a Dayton-area hospital. When no hospital would enter into such an agreement with the plaintiff, it sought a waiver of the transfer agreement requirement. Even though the plaintiff had both a back-up group of physicians ready to provide emergency care and a letter from Miami Valley Hospital confirming that it would admit patients in the event of an emergency, the Director of the Ohio Department of Health denied the plaintiff’s request for a waiver and ordered that it immediately close. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and an injunction against the Department of Health’s order. The District Court granted both requests and awarded attorney’s fees and expenses to the plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were violated, but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for a hearing on the denial of the plaintiff’s application.

Plaintiff, a mother of a stillborn child, sued physicians and a medical group, alleging that they wrongfully caused the death of her son and caused her emotional distress. The trial court held that a wrongful death action could not be maintained for the death of a fetus before viability. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed this holding, while agreeing with the trial court that Plaintiff could not recover damages for emotional distress. The court concluded that “Alabama’s wrongful-death statute allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child, even when the child dies before reaching viability.” Nonetheless, the court held that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to damages for emotional distress because she did not present evidence that she was within the “zone of danger” and she could not claim a physical injury to herself based on the death of the fetus.

A licensed abortion facility and its owner sued Alabama’s Attorney General and the Montgomery County District Attorney. Among Plaintiffs claims were allegations that the 2014 amendments to Alabama Code Title 26’s judicial bypass law violated the due process rights of minor patients seeking abortions because it failed to provide an adequate judicial bypass by permitting adverse parties and the court to disclose private information about the minor to others. Citing Supreme Court precedent enshrining a minor’s constitutional right to seek an abortion through judicial bypass without outside interference violating her privacy, the court ultimately agreed with the plaintiffs and severed the unconstitutional provisions allowing the participation of (1) the district attorney, (2) the minor’s parents, and (3) a guardian ad litem for the fetus from the judicial bypass process.

The Supreme Court was asked to rule whether a father-child relationship could be legally recognized in the case where a child’s mother became pregnant through in-vitro fertilization with the frozen sperm of a deceased husband who, while he was alive, had consented to the use of the sperm even after his death. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s ruling and declined to recognize the father-child relationship. The Supreme Court considered that the legal framework in Japan concerning parent-child relationships did not anticipate such a relationship between a father and his child who was conceived after his death in light of the fact that, even if the father-child relationship had been legally established, the deceased father would not be in a position to hold parental rights, he would not be able to support his child, and the child could not be an heir of the father for the purposes of inheritance. According to the Supreme Court, such issues need to be addressed by legislation upon analyzing several factors including bioethics, child welfare, and social acceptance. As the country lacks such legislation, the Supreme Court did not find that the father-parent relationship could be established.

本件は、亡夫の妻が冷凍保存していた亡夫の精子を用いて人工受精で妊娠した場合に、亡夫と子の父子関係が法的に認められるべきか否かを最高裁が判断した事案である。最高裁は高裁の判決を破棄し、夫は死後の授精、出産の意思をもっていたが、法律上の親子関係が生じることを想定していないとし、父子関係が認められないとした。また、最高裁は、仮に父子関係が法的に成立していたとしても、その父親は親権者になり得る余地はなく、子を養育、扶養することもできず、子が父の相続人にもなり得ないとした。このように、父子関係が存在するか否かは、生命倫理、子の福祉、社会一般の考え方等多角的な観点から検討を行い、立法によって解決されるべき問題であって、日本にこのような法律がない以上、父子関係の形成は認められないとした。

A legal scholar and four non-governmental organizations filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court of Macedonia for the commencement of a procedure to review the constitutionality of the Law on Termination of Pregnancy ((“Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia”, nos.87/2013, 164/2013 and 144/2014”) (the “LTP”) and its compatibility with international law, on the basis that the LTP created “a possibility of state interference into the right of choice and free decision-making of the women (which was contrary to Article 41 paragraph 1 and Article 118 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia)”. Further, the applicants stated that the LTP contravenes Articles 11 paragraph 1, Article 39 paragraph 2 and Article 41 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides that female citizens had sovereignty over themselves, their life, physical integrity and health. The applicants pointed out, inter alia, that the requirement to submit a written request, mandatory counselling, and waiting period were incompatible with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of choice regarding childbirth. In addition, given that those provisions in the LTP did not exist for any other medical intervention, they represented a discrimination against women. All but one of the judges stated that they do not consider the LTP to be problematic and fully rejected the initiative.

A women inmate at Tafaigata Prison who was two months pregnant asked the defendant to abort the fetus using a duck speculum and uterine sound instrument while she was on weekend parole. Upon returning to the prison and complaining of severe pain, the woman was rushed to the hospital, where she delivered a live, premature female infant. The baby died of respiratory failure as a result of extreme prematurity and neonatal sepsis; the medical report stated that the instruments used by the defendant had infected the victim’s uterus and induced labor. In 2004, she had been sentenced to two and one-half years for the same offense. Although the charges were not prosecuted at the time, they were revisited in 2005 and a year was added to the defendant’s sentence. The sentencing judge in the case considered the defendant’s record of recent convictions as aggravating factors. While the maximum sentence for this offence is seven years, the court considered that it warranted a starting point of six and a half years. The only mitigating factor in the defendant’s favor was her guilty plea, which avoided the necessity of a full trial, for which twelve months were deducted from her sentence. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Convention on the Rights of the Child and CEDAW ought to be considered in sentencing. In the course of answering such question in the negative, the judge was clear in relying solely upon national legislation: “This country through its elected representatives namely Parliament has chosen to take a pro-life stand and have legislated against abortion except when it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Parliament having enacted that law, the courts duty is beyond question, it is required to enforce the laws of the land. The rightness, wrongness or morality of such a law is debated in the building next door, not in this one.” The fact that Samoa continues to criminalize abortion after ratifying international conventions evinces clear legislative intent against domesticating CEDAW through specific legislation.

This case challenged a decision by the Secretary of the Department of Justice to refuse Ms. Castles’ access to in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) treatment, while she was in a low security prison. Prior to her imprisonment for social security fraud, Ms. Castles was undergoing IVF treatment. Although she was sentenced to only 18 months of imprisonment, Ms. Castles was nearing the age at which IVF would no longer be available to her. Ms. Castles sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enable her to continue IVF treatment to conceive a second child with her husband. The question decided by the Supreme Court was whether access to IVF is inherent in the right to respect privacy and family life. The Supreme Court acknowledged that although incarceration necessarily involves a limitation of the right to liberty, it places an additional burden on the State to preserve human dignity. International agreements, including CEDAW and ICESCR, recognize that decisions concerning the number and spacing of children, and access to health services, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health, are an aspect of the inherent dignity of a person that underlies all human rights. The Supreme Court held that the requirement to give proper consideration to human rights required the decision-maker to consider the possible impact of the decision on a person’s human rights, but that this need not be a sophisticated legal exercise. The Supreme Court further ordered the Department of Justice to allow Ms. Castles access to the relevant medical treatment, subject to an assessment of any countervailing security or other concerns on a visit-by-visit basis.

In light of the ruling in Roe v. Wade, which established a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability the plaintiffs challenged various abortion-limiting restrictions in Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act. The act restricted public funding to abortion clinics. It also required women to obtain informed consent, notify their husbands if married, wait 24 hours before proceeding with the surgery, and obtain parental consent if underage. In response, the Supreme Court created a new test that asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden,” which the Court defined as a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Though the Court reaffirmed Roe pursuant to this test, the Court upheld nearly all of the restrictions in Pennsylvania’s state abortion law, including parental notification/consent requirements for minors and limitations on public funding of abortions. However, the Court did find that the statute’s husband notification requirement was unlawful.

Capital Care is a medical facility that offers abortion services. It had been licensed for years to operate as an ambulatory surgical facility. An Ohio statute was passed that required all abortion providers to have a license from the Director of the Ohio Department of Health, and such licenses required providers to have a written transfer agreement with a local hospital. Capital Care could not obtain a transfer agreement with a local hospital, but had such an agreement with a nearby hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, yet was denied a license. The plaintiff sued in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, claiming this requirement placed an undue burden on women’s access to abortions. The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed that the transfer agreement requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Capital Care.

In 2004, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) considered a claim brought by the National Trade Union of Health Workers and ANIS (Institute of Bioethics, Human Rights, and Gender) to determine whether terminating a pregnancy in which the fetus suffers from anencephaly (absence of major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp) violates the prohibition on abortion as set forth in Brazil’s Penal Code. On April 12, 2012, the STF rendered an 8-2 decision (with one abstention) that abortion in the circumstance of anencephaly is not a criminal act under the Penal Code. The majority extended a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy to cases of anecephalic fetuses because the fetus does not have the potential for a viable life outside of the womb, and to force a woman to carry such a pregnancy to term is akin to torture. Justice Marco Aurelio and the majority held that to interpret the Penal Code to prohibit such abortion would violate a woman’s constitutional guarantees of human dignity, autonomy, privacy, and the right to health. A woman therefore may seek and receive treatment to terminate the anencephalic pregnancy without risk of criminal prosecution and without judicial involvement.

Em 2004, a Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, quando da análise do Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 54 formalizada pela Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde – CNTS, determinou que a interrupção da gravidez de feto anencefálico não viola as proibições de realização de aborto trazidas no Código Penal. Em abri de 2012, o Pleno do STF entendeu, por 8-2 votos (com uma abstenção), pela descriminalização do aborto realizado em razão da anencefalia do feto. A maioria estendeu o direito da mulher de interromper sua gravidez a casos de fetos anencefálicos porque o feto não tem potencial para uma vida viável fora do útero, e forçar uma mulher a levar tal gravidez adiante é semelhante a tortura. O Juiz Marco Aurélio e a maioria dos juízes sustentou que interpretar o Código Penal para proibir tais abortos violaria as garantias constitucionais de dignidade humana, autonomia, privacidade e o direito à saúde da mulher. Assim, a mulher poderá procurar e receber tratamento para interromper a gravidez anencefálica sem risco de processo criminal e sem envolvimento judicial.

Mrs. I.G., Mrs. R.H., and Mrs. M.K. (the claimants of Roma ethnicity) were sterilized while giving birth to their children. The claimants initiated criminal proceedings on the grounds of unlawful sterilization, claiming that their consent (or informed consent in the case of R.H.) was not given. Criminal proceedings were stopped by the regional prosecutor with the conclusion that no unlawful act had been committed. The claimants filed a formal complaint against the decision, in part claiming that the investigation did not examine the substantive material issue, the lack of consent to sterilization. This formal complaint was dismissed by the regional prosecutor. The claimants petitioned the Constitutional Court to address the decision to discontinue criminal proceedings by the regional prosecutor; they claimed among other things the breach of their right to private and family life and of their right to privacy. The Constitutional Court held that sterilization was not a “life-saving” procedure, as claimed by the regional prosecutor and the hospital. Therefore, the explanation given by the regional prosecutor for the discontinuation of criminal proceedings on these grounds was unfounded. The Constitutional Court further held that the investigation did not exhaust all possible avenues, and completely ignored the issue of consent. This and the subsequent dismissal of the complaint amounted to inhumane or degrading treatment of the claimants affecting their private and family lives. The Constitutional Court awarded each claimant 50,000 SK (EUR 1,659.70) in damages and ordered the regional prosecutor to re-examine the issue.

In a case referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights, the applicants complained of an injunction imposed by the Irish courts to perpetually restrain them from providing certain information to pregnant women concerning abortion facilities outside Ireland. The majority of the Court found the injunction to be over-broad and disproportionate to the aims pursued. It noted that the applicants provided the counseling to pregnant women without advocating or encouraging abortion; and that information on abortion facilities abroad could be obtained from other sources in Ireland, such as magazines and telephone directories. The Court also noted that there was no definite link between the provision of information and the “destruction of unborn life” as contended by the respondent, given that some women who availed of the counseling services elected not to obtain an abortion. As such, the majority of the Court found that the restriction breached the applicants’ right of free expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The continued relevance of this case is affected by subsequent events: first by the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995, which was superseded by the 2018 Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.

The European Court of Human Rights found inadmissible a complaint regarding the unavailability of abortion services for fatal fetal abnormality in Ireland and a question of the compatibility of the constitutional restriction on the availability of abortion in Ireland with Article 8 of the ECHR because the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court found that the applicant had not availed herself of a legal constitutional remedy which was, in principle, available: declaratory and mandatory orders to obtain a legal abortion. Despite “some uncertainty” with regard to the chances of success, the timing of the proceedings and the guarantees of the confidentiality of the applicant’s identity, the Court found that the applicant could reasonably have been expected to take certain preliminary steps, notably, to take legal advice and seek an urgent in camera hearing before the High Court. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.

In 2017, the Committee (referring back to its decision in Mellet v Ireland), found violations of the same provisions (Articles 7 (freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment), 17 (right to privacy), and 26 (equal protection of the law)) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in a similar factual situation a woman in Ireland, pregnant with a fetus diagnosed with a fatal abnormality, was unable to obtain an abortion in Ireland and had to travel to the UK to do so. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.

Three applicants, all Roma women, alleged that a public hospital sterilized them without their consent and that they were unable to obtain appropriate redress from the Slovakian authorities. Although the Court found that the third applicant’s children lacked standing to continue the proceedings in their mother’s stead, it ruled in favor of the first and second applicants. The first and second applicants argued that they had been denied their right to have a family because the hospital sterilized them without consent. The Court accepted that the first applicant felt debased and humiliated when she learned that she had been sterilized without her or her legal guardians’ prior informed consent. Considering the nature of the sterilization, its circumstances, the applicant’s age, and the fact that she was a member of a vulnerable population group, the Court concluded that the second applicant’s sterilization was also with a violation of the requirement of respect for her human freedom and dignity. The Court’s decision ultimately rested on Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

The applicant was sterilized at age 17 during the birth of her second child. She claimed that she was coerced into signing the authorizations for the sterilization, segregated in the hospital based on her Roma ethnicity, and that the decision to sterilize her was discriminatory. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action against the hospital on the basis that the sterilization was required to save her life and, therefore, did not need consent. On appeal, the Regional Court, found that the sterilization was not required to save her life and valid consent had not been provided as she was a minor and parental consent was required. The Court ordered EUR 1,593 in damages for the applicant. A criminal action and complaint at the Constitutional Court were both dismissed. The applicant argued she had been subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, her private and family life had been negatively impacted, and that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and ethnic origin as there were no anti-discrimination laws effective in Slovakia at the time of her sterilization. The State argued the compensation already awarded was appropriate, as she was 10 days away from the age of majority when she signed the consent documents, the medical staff had acted in good faith, and that she was not permanently infertile as she could pursue in-vitro fertilization or reverse the sterilization through surgery. The European Court of Human Rights held that there was a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and that the State’s failure to provide sufficient legal protections of the reproductive health of Roma women violated Article 8. The Court awarded the applicant damages.

The first applicant, who was in the fifth month of pregnancy, was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery. The national court ordered her pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. During her detention, the applicant gave birth to her son, the second applicant. Later, the woman appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) to obtain just satisfaction, as she argued that her right under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of torture) was violated during detention. The applicant alleged that she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynecological examination chair. In addition, the woman claimed that the detention conditions were inhuman (due to absence of hot water and bed for child, irregular supply of cold water, etc.). She also complained about her placement in a metal cage during court hearings. In view of the above facts, the Court concluded that the unjustified shackling of the first applicant (during and after childbirth, when she was particularly sensitive) can be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment. Also, the Court drew attention to (i) the woman's physical and psychological suffering, which was caused by the lack of normal nutrition, (ii) improper organization of sanitary and hygiene arrangements, and (iii) the applicant's placement in a metal cage, which is incompatible with the standards of civilized behavior that are the hallmark of a democratic society. Thus, the domestic authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR, deciding in equity, awarded both applicants €22,000. This case is important because it identifies the shortcomings of places of detention within a criminal justice system, which neglects the needs of female prisoners with children and during the pregnancy.

Першу заявницю, яка перебувала на п'ятому місяці вагітності, було затримано міліцією за підозрою у вчиненні розбою. Національний суд обрав заявниці запобіжний захід у вигляді тримання під вартою. Під час перебування під вартою заявниця народила сина, другого заявника. Пізніше жінка звернулася до Європейського суду з прав людини (“ЄСПЛ”) для отримання справедливої сатисфакції, оскільки вона стверджувала, що її право, гарантоване статтею 3 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод (заборона катування) було порушено під час тримання під вартою. Заявниця стверджувала, що вона весь час була прикута наручниками до лікарняного ліжка або до гінекологічного крісла. Крім того, жінка стверджувала, що умови утримання були нелюдськими (через відсутність гарячої води та ліжка для дитини, нерегулярного постачання холодної води тощо). Також вона скаржилась на те, що під час судових засідань її поміщали до металевої клітки. З огляду на вищенаведені факти, Суд дійшов висновку, що невиправдане застосування наручників до першої заявниці (під час і після пологів, коли вона була особливо чутливою) можна кваліфікувати як нелюдське чи таке, що принижує гідність, поводження. Також Суд звернув увагу на (i) фізичні та психологічні страждання жінки, які були спричинені відсутністю нормального харчування, (ii) неналежну організацію санітарних та гігієнічних заходів, а також (iii) поміщення заявниці в металеву клітку, що несумісне зі стандартами цивілізованої поведінки, яка є ознакою демократичного суспільства. Таким чином, національні органи влади не виконали своїх зобов’язань за статтею 3 Конвенції про захист прав людини та основоположних свобод. ЄСПЛ, вирішуючи справу на засадах справедливості, присудив обом заявникам 22 000 євро. Ця справа важлива, оскільки вона визначає недоліки місць ув’язнення в системі кримінального правосуддя, яка нехтує потребами ув’язнених жінок з дітьми та під час вагітності.

The detention pending deportation of a woman who had recently given birth found to be unlawful and violated Article 5 §1(f) and Article 5 §5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights. In September 2000, the applicant, a woman from Bosnia and Herzegovina, applied to the Italian authorities for refugee status. The application was not forwarded to the competent commission because it contained formal defects. On September 26, 2003, the applicant gave birth to a child, who died a few days later at the hospital. Then, on November 11, 2003, the police served her with a deportation order and transferred her to a holding center. The European Court of Human Rights declared that the deportation order and the applicant's detention were in breach of Italian immigration law no. 286 of 1998, which provided that her deportation should have been suspended until six months after she had given birth (March 26, 2004), regardless of the fact that the baby had died. In March 2006, the Rome Civil Court granted the applicant refugee status. In addition, by way of just satisfaction, the government was required to pay the applicant 7,500 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage for her unlawful detention as there was no redress available under Italian law.

La detenzione di una donna che aveva da poco partorito, in attesa della sua deportazione, è stata ritenuta illegale e in violazione dell’articolo 5 § 1 (f) e dell’articolo 5 § 5 (diritto alla libertà e alla sicurezza) della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Nel settembre del 2000, la ricorrente, una donna della Bosnia-Erzegovina, richiedeva alle autorità italiane lo status di rifugiato. La richiesta non veniva inoltrata alla commissione competente in quanto conteneva delle irregolarità formali. Il 26 settembre 2003, la ricorrente dava alla luce un figlio, che moriva pochi giorni dopo in ospedale. In seguito, l’11 novembre 2003, la polizia emetteva nei confronti della donna un decreto di espulsione e la trasferiva in un centro di soggiorno temporaneo. La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo dichiarava che il decreto di espulsione e la detenzione fossero stati emessi in violazione della legge italiana n. 286 del 1998, che prevede che l’espulsione avrebbe dovuto essere stata sospesa fino a sei mesi dopo il parto (26 marzo 2004), indipendentemente dal fatto che il figlio fosse morto. Nel marzo 2006, il Tribunale civile di Roma accordava alla Sig.ra Seferovic lo status di rifugiato. Inoltre, come giusta compensazione, poiché la legge italiana non prevedeva alcun risarcimento, al Governo veniva imposto di pagare alla ricorrente 7,500 euro come danno non patrimoniale per la sua detenzione illegale.

VC, a Roma woman, was forcibly sterilized in a state hospital in Eastern Slovakia during a cesarean section. While she was in the height of labor, hospital staff insisted that she sign a consent form for sterilization, without informing her about what the procedure entailed. She was only told that a future pregnancy could kill her and was pressured to immediately undergo the procedure. VC did not understand what she was agreeing to but fearing for her life, she signed the form. After learning that the sterilization was not medically necessary, VC filed a civil lawsuit in Slovakia. All her petitions were rejected, and she filed a complaint against Slovakia at the ECtHR The Court found a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, i.e. the right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to private and family life respectively. The court noted that sterilization is never a lifesaving procedure and cannot be performed without the full and informed consent of the patient even if doctors believe that future pregnancy may pose a risk to the woman. However, it did not address whether such conduct was a violation of the right to non-discrimination (Article 14), thus falling short of addressing the crux of the problem: racial stereotypes. The ruling is the first of its kind issued by the ECHR, and will have the major effect of bringing justice to the potentially thousands of Roma women who were sterilized without their consent in Central and Eastern Europe.