| Hodgson v. Minnesota
(Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309)
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Stevens ] | Concurrence
[ O'Connor ] | CDInPart
[ Marshall ] | CDInPart
[ Scalia ] | CDInPart
[ Kennedy ] |
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Hodgson v. Minnesota
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
As I understand the various opinions today: One Justice holds that two-parent notification is unconstitutional (at least in the present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but constitutional with bypass, ante at 459-461 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is constitutional with or without bypass, post at 488-497 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is unconstitutional with or without bypass, though the four apply two different standards, ante at 455-458 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), ante at 472-479 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); [p480] six Justices hold that one-parent notification with bypass is constitutional, though for two different sets of reasons, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 510-517; post at 522-524 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); and three Justices would hold that one-parent notification with bypass is unconstitutional, post at 526-527 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). One will search in vain the document we are supposed to be construing for text that provides the basis for the argument over these distinctions, and will find in our society's tradition regarding abortion no hint that the distinctions are constitutionally relevant, much less any indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to be resolved. The random and unpredictable results of our consequently unchanneled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term after Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the lawyer's -- and hence not in the judge's -- workbox. I continue to dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from the illusion that we have authority to do so.