| United States v. Guest
(No. 65)
246 F.Supp. 475, reversed and remanded. |
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| Syllabus
| Opinion
[ Stewart ] | Concurrence
[ Clark ] | CDInPart
[ Harlan ] | CDInPart
[ Brennan ] |
| HTML version
PDF version | HTML version
PDF version | HTML version
PDF version | HTML version
PDF version | HTML version
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United States v. Guest
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FORTAS join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in this case but believe it worthwhile to comment on its Part II in which the Court discusses that portion of the indictment charging the appellees with conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Negro citizens of the United States in the free exercise and enjoyment of:
The right to the equal utilization, without discrimination upon the basis of race, of public facilities in the vicinity of Athens, Georgia, owned, operated or managed by or on behalf of the State of Georgia or any subdivision thereof.
The appellees contend that the indictment is invalid since 18 U.S.C. § 241 under which it was returned, protects only against interference with the exercise of the right to equal utilization of state facilities, which is not a right "secured" by the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of state action. With respect to this contention the Court upholds the indictment on the ground that it alleges the conspiracy was accomplished, in part, "[b]y causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had committed criminal acts." The Court reasons that this allegation of the indictment might well cover active connivance by agents of the State in the making of these false reports or in carrying on other conduct amounting to official discrimination. By so construing the indictment, it finds the language sufficient to cover a denial of rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. The Court thus removes from the case any necessity for a "determination of the threshold level that state action must attain in order to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause." A study of the language in the indictment clearly shows [p762] that the Court's construction is not a capricious one, and I therefore agree with that construction, as well as the conclusion that follows.
The Court carves out of its opinion the question of the power of Congress, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact legislation implementing the Equal Protection Clause or any other provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's interpretation of the indictment clearly avoids the question whether Congress, by appropriate legislation, has the power to punish private conspiracies that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights, such as the right to utilize public facilities. My Brother BRENNAN, however, says that the Court's disposition constitutes an acceptance of appellees' aforesaid contention as to § 241. Some of his language further suggests that the Court indicates sub silentio that Congress does not have the power to outlaw such conspiracies. Although the Court specifically rejects any such connotation, ante p. 755, it is, I believe, both appropriate and necessary under the circumstances here to say that there now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies -- with or without state action -- that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.