In the Matter of Herman Silmon,
Appellant,
v.
Brion D. Travis, &c.,
Respondent.
2000 NY Int. 134
In North Carolina v Alford (400 US 25), the United
States Supreme Court recognized that an accused may voluntarily
enter a guilty plea without admitting culpability when there is
strong record evidence of actual guilt. In the case now before
us, petitioner was convicted, by way of an Alford plea, of first
degree manslaughter for bludgeoning his wife to death with a
barbell, and was sentenced to a prison term of five-to-fifteen
years. This appeal asks whether it was irrational for the Parole
Board to deny petitioner parole, after five years' imprisonment,
on the grounds that he lack[ed] remorse and insight and
As recounted by petitioner at a Parole Board hearing, he and his wife had argued at home, on the night before the killing, about his alleged involvement with another woman. Although his wife called 911, they resolved their differences before going to sleep. Petitioner told the Board that he went to work the next morning and later telephoned his wife at her job, but she had not arrived. When, at 11 a.m., his wife still had not reported for work, petitioner returned home and found her body on the floor, the apartment ransacked. Petitioner called the police. In response to questions by the Board, petitioner denied the prosecution theory that his wife was about to leave him. He conceded that she had purchased a plane ticket, but claimed that the trip was a planned visit to her sister. Petitioner denied that his wife had been having an affair, and adamantly denied that he had killed her.
During the hearing, a Parole Board Commissioner
informed petitioner that the Board would review his records
thoroughly, including any documents he wished to submit. He
furnished a letter from trial counsel stating that petitioner had
maintained his innocence but faced the admission of evidence at
trial that could have been dispositive of guilt and that, due to
the nature of this evidence, there was a strong likelihood that a
jury would convict him. (The plea minutes themselves were not
Petitioner himself told the Parole Board that he had initially been offered two to six years, but turned it down because he did not kill his wife and would not admit to it. Petitioner also told the Board that, while in prison, he was involved in educational and vocational programs, taught classes in accounting, investment and business administration, and collaborated on articles about prison issues with a college professor friend. The Board acknowledged that petitioner had a certificate of earned eligibility, a good institutional record and no disciplinary problems.
Petitioner admitted that he formerly used marijuana, hashish and cocaine, when he was hanging out for happy hour after work with his wife and their friends. Petitioner's inmate status report, prepared by the Division of Parole for the Parole Board appearance, indicated that petitioner required domestic violence treatment, as well as a drug therapy program, periodic urinalysis, abstention from alcohol and a possible curfew. Petitioner also acknowledged that, at the time of the plea, his mother-in-law's wrongful death suit was pending against him, and was later settled when he surrendered his assets to her.
The Board denied parole. The stated grounds were that
Discussion
A single issue is before us: is it irrational for the Parole Board to deny petitioner parole based on his refusal to accept responsibility for the crime after a court allowed him to enter a plea without admitting his culpability? There is no contention that petitioner's plea was anything less than fully knowing and voluntary, and founded on strong evidence of actual guilt.
Alford pleas are -- and should be -- rare.[1] Indeed, in some jurisdictions they are not permitted at all (see, e.g., State v Davis, 561 A2d 1082, 1097 [NJ] [a guilty plea cannot be accepted unless the defendant acknowledges guilt]; Ross v State, 456 NE2d 420, 423 [Ind] [same]; see also, Steven E. Walburn, Should the Military Adopt an Alford-Type Guilty Plea?, 44 Air Force L Rev 119, 120 [noting that Alford pleas are not recognized in military justice system]).
In New York, such a plea is allowed only when, as in
Alford itself, it is the product of a voluntary and rational
choice, and the record before the court contains strong evidence
of actual guilt (see, e.g., People v Miller, , 91 NY2d 372, 377;
People v Francabandera, , 33 NY2d 429, 438 [a defendant suffering
amnesia could not honestly confess guilt, but could voluntarily
plead to a lesser charge in the face of overwhelming evidence of
his culpability]; see also, People v Foster, , 39 NY2d 463, 466
[upholding plea lacking an admission that defendant committed the
criminal act as falling squarely within the type of plea
While Alford pleas are rare, from the State's
perspective they are no different from other guilty pleas; it
would otherwise be unconscionable for a court to sentence an
individual to a term of imprisonment. In fact, this Court has
recognized that an Alford plea may generally be used for the same
purposes as any other conviction (People v Miller,
Petitioner's argument hinges on the assumption that
acceptance of an Alford plea implies a promise by the State that
Our jurisprudence also is well settled as to the
authority of the Parole Board. Judicial intervention is
warranted only when there is a showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety (see, Matter of Russo,
In New York, the Parole Board holds the power to decide whether to release a sentenced prisoner on parole. The Board follows the legislative mandate of ensuring that the prospective parolee will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his [or her] release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for law (Executive Law § 259-i[2][c][A]). Moreover, [d]iscretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined (id.). Rather, when, as here, the sentence has been set by the court, the Board must consider the seriousness of the offense (with consideration of the sentence, the pre-sentence report, mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities after arrest and prior to confinement) and the inmate's prior criminal record (Executive Law §§ 259-i[1][a], [2][c][A]).
In every case, the Board must additionally consider the
inmate's institutional record (vocational education, training or
work assignments, therapy), performance in any temporary release
program, release plans, any deportation order issued by the
federal government, and any statement to the Board by victims or
their representative (Executive Law § 259-i[2][c][A]). While
consideration of these guidelines is mandatory, the ultimate
We conclude that it was neither arbitrary nor
capricious for the Board to consider remorse and insight into the
offense following petitioner's Alford plea. These factors, we
recognize, are not enumerated in the statute. However, the Board
is empowered to deny parole where it concludes that release is
incompatible with the welfare of society. Thus, there is a
strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given
effect by considering remorse and insight (see, e.g., Matter of
Dudley v Brown, 227 AD2d 863 [lack of remorse and prior mental
illness history appropriate when taken together because they
relate directly to statutory standards]; Matter of Bockeno v New
York State Parole Bd., 227 AD2d 751 [appropriate to consider lack
of remorse, nature of crime, failure to participate in sex
offender counseling and vulnerability of victims]; Matter of
Walker v New York State Div. of Parole, 203 AD2d 757 [lack of
remorse properly considered with seriousness of crime and failure
to attend violent behavior modification programs]).
At petitioner's parole hearing, the Board was required
to assess whether he presented a danger to the community, or
whether there was a reasonable probability that he could live at
liberty without repeating his offense. Petitioner's inmate
status report indicated the necessity of domestic violence
treatment. The factors of remorse and insight were especially
relevant because petitioner was a productive citizen and model
prisoner who enthusiastically engaged in educational and
vocational programs, taught other prisoners and wrote about
prison life, and who nevertheless, in the eyes of the law,
brutally killed his wife. Since discretionary release may not be
granted merely as a reward for exemplary conduct, the Board
evaluated petitioner's rehabilitative progress to determine if he
still posed a danger, and in that connection properly considered
remorse and insight into the criminal act.[3]
We conclude that petitioner's personal refusal to admit the specific facts of the crime at the time of the Alford plea did not constrain the Parole Board's ensuing responsibility to confirm, within a reasonable probability, that petitioner is ready to rejoin the community. This is so for a convicted defendant who maintains innocence at and after trial, for a defendant who allocutes to the facts but later declares his innocence, and it is also the case here. Petitioner's remaining contention is without merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
Footnotes
1 Alford stands at the outer reaches of our settled
doctrine that if a defendant's recitation of the facts negates an
essential element of the crime, raising substantial doubt as to
guilt, the trial court must inquire further to ensure that
defendant's guilty plea is both knowing and voluntary (People v
Lopez, , 71 NY2d 662, 666; People v Beasley, , 25 NY2d 483, 487-488).
Upon further inquiry, the court may accept the plea only if it
determines the allocution sufficient (People v Lopez,
3 Other states that have considered Alford pleas in the context of parole and probation have reached a like result (see, Cable v Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 666 A2d 967, 968-969 [NH] [notwithstanding Alford plea, parole board could deny parole for failure to complete sex offender program]; State ex rel. Warren v Schwarz, 579 NW2d 698, 711 [Wis] [no promise that petitioner could maintain innocence for purposes other than Alford plea, so that probation revocation based on failure to admit guilt was proper]; contra, State v Birchler, 2000 WL 1473152 [Ohio App] [probationer who took Alford plea did not have notice that he would be required to admit sex offense]).