Article III, Section 2, Clause 1:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

Even when a litigant satisfies Article III’s constitutional standing requirements, a federal court may refuse to adjudicate its claims for relief “under the prudential principles by which the Judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.” 1 The Supreme Court has applied these prudential principles to standing doctrine2 in several circumstances. A court may refuse to hear a case as a matter of self-restraint in at least three situations: (1) when the litigant seeks to assert the rights of third parties not before the court; (2) when the litigant seeks redress for a generalized grievance widely shared by a large number of citizens that is better addressed legislatively; and (3) when the litigant’s asserted interests do not fall within the zone of interests arguably protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision underlying its claims.3

At least the first two of these situations also implicate the concerns of constitutional standing in some cases, while the third appears to be purely prudential. Thus, more recently, the Court has questioned whether the doctrine of prudential standing should even exist, indicating that the bar on generalized grievances is a constitutional (and not prudential) requirement and rejecting a prudential application of the “zone of interests” test in favor of one aimed at determining whether the plaintiff’s claim falls within the scope of a statutory provision conferring a right of action.4 Regardless of the uncertain state of the law in this area, Congress may abrogate prudential standing requirements through the enactment of legislation containing express language to that effect.5 As discussed, while Congress may eliminate or modify prudential standing limits, it cannot supersede the Article III minimum requirements of injury, causation, and redressability.6

Footnotes

1

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979).

2

This section discusses only the prudential standing doctrine. However, it is important to note that other “prudential” doctrines that have a basis in Article III of the Constitution may be relevant to the question of whether a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a litigant’s claims for relief. See, e.g., ArtIII.S2.C1.5.1 Overview of Adversity Requirement (discussing the adversity requirement); ArtIII.S2.C1.9.1 Overview of Political Question Doctrine to ArtIII.S2.C1.9.11 Nonjusticiability of Partisan Gerrymandering Claims (discussing the political question doctrine).

3

United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 760 (2013) ( “Even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential considerations demand that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (listing the three types of prudential restraints).

4

Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014).

5

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ( “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.” ).

6

Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) ( “It is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” ).