Article III, Section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

One key feature of the federal judicial power is the power of judicial review, the authority of federal courts to declare that federal or state government actions violate the Constitution. While judicial review is now one of the distinctive features of United States constitutional law, the Constitution does not expressly grant federal courts power to declare government actions unconstitutional. However, the historical record from the Founding and the early years of the Republic suggests that those who framed and ratified the Constitution were aware of judicial review, and that some favored granting courts that power.

The concept of judicial review was already established at the time of the Founding. The Privy Council had employed a limited form of judicial review to review colonial legislation and its validity under the colonial charters.1 There were several instances known to the Framers of state court invalidation of state legislation as inconsistent with state constitutions.2 Practically all of the Framers who expressed an opinion on the issue in the Convention appear to have assumed and welcomed the existence of court review of the constitutionality of legislation.3 Alexander Hamilton argued in favor of the doctrine in the Federalist Papers.4 In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress explicitly provided for the exercise of the power,5 and in other legislative debates questions of constitutionality and of judicial review were prominent.6 Early Supreme Court Justices seem to have assumed the existence of judicial review.7

The Supreme Court first formally embraced the doctrine of judicial review in the 1803 case Marbury v. Madison.8 Since Marbury, judicial review has become a core feature of American constitutional law.9 While the doctrine is well established, some legal commentators have criticized judicial review, and some who support it debate its doctrinal basis or how it should be applied.10

Footnotes

1

Julius Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, History of the Supreme Court of the United States 60–95 (1971).

2

Id. at 96–142.

3

1 Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 97–98 (1913) (Gerry), 109 (King); 2 Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 28 (1913) (Morris and perhaps Sherman), 73 (Wilson), 75 (Strong, but the remark is ambiguous), 76 (Martin), 78 (Mason), 79 (Gorham, but ambiguous), 80 (Rutledge), 92–93 (Madison), 248 (Pinckney), 299 (Morris), 376 (Williamson), 391 (Wilson), 428 (Rutledge), 430 (Madison), 440 (Madison), 589 (Madison); 3 Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 220 (1913) (Martin). The only expressed opposition to judicial review came from Mercer with a weak seconding from Dickinson. “Mr. Mercer . . . disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.” 2 Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 298 (1913). “Mr. Dickinson was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought no such power ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss what expedient to substitute.” Id. at 299. Of course, the debates in the Convention were not available when the state ratifying conventions acted, so that the delegates could not have known these views about judicial review in order to have acted knowingly about them. Views, were, however, expressed in the ratifying conventions recognizing judicial review, some of them being uttered by Framers. 2 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 131 (1836) (Samuel Adams, Massachusetts), 196–97 (Ellsworth, Connecticut), 348, 362 (Hamilton, New York): 445–46. 478 (Wilson, Pennsylvania); 3 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 324–25, 539 , 541 (1836) (Henry, Virginia), 480 (Mason, Virginia), 532 (Madison, Virginia), 570 (Randolph, Virginia); 4 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 71 (1836) (Steele, North Carolina), 156–57 (Davie, North Carolina). In the Virginia convention, Chief Justice John Marshall observed if Congress “were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judge as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard . . . They would declare it void . . . . To what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such a protection.” 3 id. at 553–54. Both Madison and Hamilton similarly asserted the power of judicial review in their campaign for ratification. The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison); id. Nos. 78, 81 (Alexander Hamilton). The persons supporting or at least indicating they thought judicial review existed did not constitute a majority of the Framers, but the absence of controverting statements, with the exception of the Mercer-Dickinson comments, indicates at least acquiescence if not agreements by the other Framers.

4

The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ( “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution, is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.” ).

5

In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, Congress chose not to vest “federal question” jurisdiction in the federal courts but to leave to the state courts the enforcement of claims under the Constitution and federal laws. In Section 25 of the Judiciary Act ( 1 Stat. 85), Congress provided for review by the Supreme Court of final judgments in state courts (1) “where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity;” (2) “where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity;” or (3) “where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed” thereunder. § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86.

6

See in particular the debate on the President’s removal powers, discussed in ArtII.S2.C2.3.15.1 Overview of Removal of Executive Branch Officers with statements excerpted in R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court 144–150 (1969). Debates on the Alien and Sedition Acts and on the power of Congress to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801 similarly saw recognition of judicial review of acts of Congress. C. Warren, in id. at 107–124.

7

Thus, the Justices on circuit refused to administer a pension act on the grounds of its unconstitutionally, see Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) , and ArtIII.S1.4.4 Inherent Power to Issue Judgments. Chief Justice Jay and other Justices wrote that the imposition of circuit duty on Justices was unconstitutional, although they never mailed the letter in Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), a feigned suit, the constitutionality of a federal law was argued before the Justices and upheld on the merits, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), a state law was overturned, and dicta in several opinions asserted the principle. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Justice Iredell), and several Justices on circuit, quoted in Julius Goebel, supra note 1, at 589–592.

8

5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).

9

See ArtIII.S1.3 Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review.

10

See, e.g., G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 1–38 (12th ed. 1991); For expositions on the legitimacy of judicial review, see L. Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958); H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law: Selected Essays 1–15 (1961); A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 1–33 (1962); R. Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court (1969). For an extensive historical attack on judicial review, see 2 W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States chs. 27–29 (1953), with which compare Hart, Book Review, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1456 (1954). A brief review of the ongoing debate on the subject, in a work that now is a classic attack on judicial review, is Westin, Introduction: Charles Beard and American Debate Over Judicial Review, 1790–1961, in C. Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution 1–34 (1962 reissue of 1938 ed.), and bibliography at 133–149. While much of the debate focuses on judicial review of acts of Congress, the similar review of state acts has occasioned much controversy as well.