Article III, Section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

In some circumstances, when a person seeking to bring a claim under federal law also has a remedy available under state law, that person will be required to exhaust state law remedies before proceeding in federal court. For instance, as discussed further in the next section, prisoners challenging their detention by state authorities must generally exhaust state law remedies before seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.1

As another example, a person seeking to challenge state legislative action must await completion of the state legislative process before suing in federal court.2 In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., the Supreme Court declined to hear a claim that certain railroad rates that a state agency planned to promulgate were confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that the Virginia state constitution allowed the railroads to challenge the new rates before the state Supreme Court of Appeals before they went into effect and explained that determination of rates, including review by the state court, amounted to a legislative process rather than a judicial one. Because completion of that legislative process might result in different rates and obviate the constitutional challenge, the Court concluded, the challengers “should make sure that the State in its final legislative action would not respect what they think their rights to be, before resorting to the courts of the United States.” 4 Justice Holmes also emphasized that the Court’s decision was grounded not in mandatory jurisdictional limits but rather in prudential considerations such as comity and efficiency.5

While complainants must generally exhaust available state legislative and administrative remedies before proceeding in federal court, they are not ordinarily required to seek a judicial remedy in state court before filing a claim in federal court.6 Thus, in Bacon v. Rutland R.R., the Supreme Court held that the federal courts could hear a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an order of the Public Service Commission of Vermont concerning a passenger railway station.7 Justice Holmes, again writing for the majority, distinguished the Virginia system in Prentis, where “the [state] court was given legislative powers,” and the Vermont system, which did “not attempt to confer legislative powers upon the court” but instead created a remedy that was “purely judicial.” 8 Likewise, in Lane v. Wilson, the court held that a Black man denied voter registration in Oklahoma could challenge the denial in federal court without first pursuing a state law challenge that “has all the indicia of a conventional judicial proceeding and does not confer upon the Oklahoma courts any of the discretionary or initiatory functions that are characteristic of administrative agencies.” 9

Subject to limited exceptions, exhaustion of state remedies is not required before a person may seek relief under federal civil rights statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state judicial remedies before seeking relief in federal court under Section 1983.11 In McNeese v. Board of Education, the Court extended that holding to state administrative remedies, holding that plaintiffs who sought to challenge school segregation need not first seek relief through a state administrative process.12 In Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court reaffirmed that “exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983.” 13

Footnotes

1

See ArtIII.S1.6.9 Habeas Review.

2

See, e.g., Porter v. Invs. Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932).

3

211 U.S. 210 (1908).

4

Id. at 230.

5

Id. at 232 ( “[O]ur decision does not go upon a denial of power to entertain the bills at the present stage but upon our views as to what is the most proper and orderly course in cases of this sort when practicable.” ). Comity is a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint whereby independent tribunals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction act to moderate the stresses of coexistence and to avoid collisions of authority. The Court has elsewhere explained that it is not a rule of law but “one of practice, convenience, and expediency,” which persuades but does not command. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 458, 488 (1900).

6

An exception occurs when a state prisoner petitions in federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. See ArtIII.S1.6.9 Habeas Review.

7

232 U.S. 134 (1914).

8

Id. at 137–38. See also City Bank Farmers’ Tr. Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934).

9

307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939).

10

Courts may require exhaustion of state administrative remedies before filing a Section 1983 suit when there are pending state administrative proceedings in which an important state interest is involved. See Ohio C.R. Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 n.2 (1986). Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination on racial and other specified grounds, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may not consider a claim until a state agency having jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints has had at least sixty days to resolve the matter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(c); see Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972). The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act contains a specific, limited exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions pursuant to § 1983. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 508 (1982).

11

365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (reversed on other grounds).

12

373 U.S. 668 (1963).

13

457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982). See also, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).