Article III, Section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

The issue of what matters Congress can entrust to Article I courts may raise important constitutional questions. The Supreme Court first distinguished between constitutional courts and legislative courts in its 1828 decision in American Ins. Co. v. Canter.1 Justice Byron White later read Canter as raising the “simple” proposition that “[c]onstitutional courts exercise the judicial power described in Art. III of the Constitution; legislative courts do not and cannot.” 2 A two-fold difficulty attended that proposition, however. First, the territorial court in Canter had issued a decision in admiralty, a subject specifically included within the grant of federal judicial power in Article III, raising the question of how a non-Article III court could receive and exercise that power.3 Second, if territorial courts could not exercise Article III power, how could their decisions be subject to appellate review in the Supreme Court, or in any Article III court, which could exercise only Article III judicial power? Subsequent Supreme Court cases have clarified that Congress may in some cases allow non-Article III tribunals to hear matters that would fall within the scope of the federal judicial power, subject to appellate review by Article III courts.4

While Article I courts’ jurisdiction may raise vexing legal questions, in other ways Congress enjoys ample authority to structure those courts. First, in creating legislative courts, Congress is not limited by the provisions of Article III requiring that federal judges hold their offices during good behavior and prohibiting Congress from reducing their compensation.5 Congress may limit tenure on an Article I tribunal to a term of years, as it has done in acts creating magistrate judgeships and the Tax Court.6 It may also subject the judges of legislative courts to removal by the President7 or reduce judges’ salaries during their terms.8

In addition, Congress can vest in Article I courts nonjudicial functions of a legislative or advisory nature, meaning those courts may make rules or issue non-binding decisions.9 And, while Congress cannot disturb final judgment of Article III courts, it can deprive legislative court judgments of finality.10 Thus, in Gordon v. United States, the Court did not object to the power of the Secretary of the Treasury and Congress to revise or suspend the early judgments of the Court of Claims.11 Likewise, in United States v. Ferreira, the Court sustained an act conferring on the Florida territorial court the non-judicial power to examine claims arising under the treaty with Spain and report its findings to the Secretary of the Treasury for subsequent action.12

Footnotes

1

26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).

2

N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 106 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).

3

U.S. Const. art III, § 2.

4

Years after Canter, in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, Justice John Harlan asserted that Chief Justice John Marshall in Canter “did not mean to imply that the case heard by the Key West court was not one of admiralty jurisdiction otherwise properly justiciable in a Federal District Court sitting in one of the States. . . . All the Chief Justice meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article.” 370 U.S. 530, 544–45 (1962). For further discussion of when Congress can confer certain matters on Article I courts, see ArtIII.S1.9.4 District of Columbia and Territorial Courts; ArtIII.S1.9.5 Non-Article III Military Courts; ArtIII.S1.9.6 Legislative Courts Adjudicating Public Rights; ArtIII.S1.9.7 Article I Adjuncts to Article III Courts; ArtIII.S1.9.8 Bankruptcy Courts as Adjuncts to Article III Courts; ArtIII.S1.9.9 Consent to Article I Court Jurisdiction.

5

See U.S. Const. art III, § 1; ArtIII.S1.10.2.1 Overview of Good Behavior Clause; ArtIII.S1.10.3.1 Historical Background on Compensation Clause.

6

28 U.S.C. § 631(e) ( “The appointment of any individual as a full-time magistrate judge shall be for a term of eight years, and the appointment of any individuals as a part-time magistrate judge shall be for a term of four years[.]” ); 26 U.S.C. § 7443 ( “The term of office of any judge of the Tax Court shall expire 15 years after he takes office.” ).

7

McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891).

8

United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).

9

For discussion of the prohibition on Article III courts issuing advisory opinions, see ArtIII.S2.C1.4.1 Overview of Advisory Opinions.

10

For discussion of the finality of judgments of Article III courts, see ArtIII.S1.5.2 Reopening Final Judicial Decisions.

11

69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865).

12

54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).